Arms Control & Disarmament

A QUARTERLY BIBLIOGRAPHY WITH ABSTRACTS AND ANNOTATIONS



VOLUME 7, NUMBER 2

SPRING 1971

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A QUARTERLY BIBLIOGRAPHY WITH ABSTRACTS AND ANNOTATIONS

Prepared by the

ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT BIBLIOGRAPHY SECTION

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PREFACE

Arms Control & Disarmament attempts to bring under bibliographic control a large and growing body of literature in an important subject area. It is prepared by the Arms Control and Disarmament Bibliography Section of the Library of Congress, through the support of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Each quarterly issue contains abstracts and annotations of current literature in the English, French, and German languages, as well as abstracts and annotations of current literature in all languages published in English translation. Author and subject indexes appear in the first three numbers of each volume, with the fourth number containing cumulative author and subject indexes.

To facilitate the use of this bibliography the title of each foreign language entry is preceded by its English translation in brackets. For the convenience of readers in the Library of Congress, locations are shown by call numbers for cataloged items and by symbols for uncataloged items and materials held by custodial units of the Library. A list of these symbols appears on the next page.

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The bibliography is compiled from a survey of the literature received by the Library of Congress that is likely to be available in the larger research and public libraries in the United States. Sources surveyed include trade books, monographs, selected government publications, publications of national and international organizations and societies, and approximately 1,200 periodicals. With the exception of materials delayed in arriving at the Library, the literature cited has usually been published in the 3 months preceding the month in which a number is sent to press. Entries are chosen under the assumption that arms control and disarmament is a subject area encompassing related topics such as weapons development and basic factors in world politics. The coverage is not exhaustive, however. It excludes articles in newspapers and the reporting of day-to-day events in newsmagazines.

The abstracts are written by the Arms Control and Disarmament Bibliography Section, except that abstracts or summaries published with the articles to which they relate are, with the permission of their copyright owners, sometimes used verbatim or in modified form and are designated as "abstract supplied" or "abstract supplied, modified."

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Slav Rm	Slavic Room

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I. THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

BASIC FACTORS IN WORLD POLITICS

486
Albrecht-Carrié, René. THE IMPERIAL TRADITION. South Atlantic quarterly, v. 69, autumn 1970: 511-524. AP2.S7, v. 69

The Soviet Union and the United States are empires and behave in the classical manner of empires. Rome laid down the basic pattern--conquest followed by assimilation--and the goal--universality. It also established a standard of performance never since equaled--not by Great Britain, which never attempted to assimilate foreign peoples, nor by France, which did try but found the task beyond its capacity. Today the Soviet Union follows the Roman example, both in its efforts, not always successful, to consolidate a conquering expansionism by the assimilation or "Russification" of foreign peoples, and in its pursuit of a Marxist universality. The Americans, too, though they show no desire to conquer the world, reveal a universalistic impulse in their belief, shaken somewhat in recent years, in the superiority of the American way of life and American institutions over all competitors. That America is a product of transcontinental conquest and multinational assimilation cannot be ignored. Someday China, and perhaps a rejuvenated Europe, will achieve the status of imperiums. In that thought, "Orwellian possibilities suggest themselves." In the meantime, man changes very little, his institutions evolve but slowly, and the imperial tradition is far from dead.

487
Althaus, Peter. [ON NATIONAL INTERESTS] Über nationale Interessen. Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau; Zeitschrift für die europäische Sicherheit, v. 20, July 1970: 384-393. U3.W485, v. 20

Considers various historical and political definitions of "national" and "interests." The foreign policy goals of a society are considered national interests when they provide a maximum chance of self-realization for the largest possible number of its members, when these are the result of free, competitive wills and represent the compromise between specific egoisms. As long as no effective supranational body exists there will be national interests, although each nation has to consider the interests of all others in order to avoid nuclear war. There are only two politically autonomous powers, and all nations must cooperate within their two systems.

488
Andrews, William G., ed. THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL CRISES. New York, Van Nostrand Reinhold [1970] 152 p. (New perspectives in political science, 28) D843.A483
Includes bibliographical references.

Contents.--Introduction, by William G. Andrews. --The Cuban missile crisis of 1962, by Lawrence Littwin.--The Suez crisis of 1956, by Fred J. Khouri.--The Congo crisis of 1960, by Ernest W. Lefever.--The Berlin wall crisis of 1961, by John S. Gibson.

Case studies in international crises and responses. Causes, solutions, the role of international organizations, and long-term effects on the international system are discussed by the authors. The editor points out that the outcome of these and other contemporary crises suggest that the overwhelming strength of the superpowers has had a stabilizing influence on international relations in the nuclear age. In each instance, both powers have exercised great restraint. "So long as they wield the only power that counts on the global stage and use it as gingerly as they have so far, the spectre of nuclear holocaust, so dear to the hearts of hysterics, may be left to repose quietly in the closet of intellectual horrors."

489
Backman, Carl W. ROLE THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: A COMMENTARY AND EXTENSION. International studies quarterly, v. 14, Sept. 1970: 310-319. D839.B2, v. 14

Extends K. J. Holsti's analysis of national role conceptions in foreign policy (cited elsewhere in this bibliography) to ascertain whether it can organize what is currently known and provide new insights leading to testable propositions. Backman concludes that there is some basis for optimism, although more research is needed on the potential of the use of role theory in international relations.

490
Beer, Francis A., ed. ALLIANCES: LATENT WAR COMMUNITIES IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD. New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston [c1970] 384 p. (Cases in international politics) JX4005.B4

Contents.--pt. 1. Introduction.--pt. 2. Alliances and international conflict: Alliance aggregation and the onset of war, 1815-1945, by J. David Singer and Melvin Small. NATO strategy and flexible response, by Carl H. Amme.--pt. 3. Alliance cooperation: NATO and the OAS, by Elliot Vandevanter, Jr. An economic theory of alliances, by Mancur Olson, Jr., and Richard Zeckhauser. The role of the United States in NATO, by William T. R. Fox and Annette B. Fox. The Warsaw Treaty Organization, by Richard F. Staar. SEATO, by George Modelski. The League of Arab States, by Robert W.

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Macdonald. The African states and the OAU, by Nora McKeon.--pt. 4. Alliance disintegration: Sino-Soviet military relations, 1954-1966, by Raymond L. Garthoff. Reflections on empires, by William H. Riker.--Appendixes: Selected bibliography. Brief chronologies. Treaty abstracts. Organization charts. Military forces.

Essays dating from the 1960's that discuss current theory and research relating to contemporary alliances and describe the important alliances in the East, the West, and the Third World. The first two essays concentrate on the relationship between alliances and international conflict. Elliot Vandevanter and Mancur Olson and Richard Zeckhauser focus on cooperative alliance processes, while William and Annette Fox define American perspectives on the roles the United States should play in furthering NATO's goals. A description of the interaction between the Soviet Union and its satellites with respect to the Warsaw Pact is given by Staar, and a distinction between routine cooperation and crisis cooperation is developed by Modelski. Robert Macdonald and Nora McKeon consider the dynamics of coalition formation and patterns of division within alliances. The final two selections study the dynamics of disintegration.

491
Bergius, Rudolf. [ARE AGGRESSIONS ONLY LEARNED? CONDITIONS OF AGGRESSIVE BEHAVIOR IN CHILDREN AND YOUTHS] Werden Aggressionen nur gelernt? Bedingungen aggressiven Verhaltens bei Kindern und Jugendlichen. Politische Studien, v. 21, May/June 1970: 286-303. H35.P66, v. 21
Bibliography: p. 302-303.

Investigations of the development of aggressive behavior frequently contradict each other, perhaps because no agreement exists on basic terminology and because the roots of behavior are too complex to be easily distinguished. However, it seems improbable that there is only one specific drive for aggression, that all aggressions are the result of frustration, and that the instinctual behavior of animals can shed light on the nature of aggression. Empirical considerations can be advanced against accepting either aggression as an instinct or the concept of catharsis. To validate the hypothesis that aggression is learned behavior, further experimental study in reinforcing and diminishing the aggressive behavior of children should be undertaken. The most general determinants of aggressive behavior are the social norms and attitudes acquired from experience, usually in the educational situation. Such causes of aggression as blind obedience to authority, hostility and xenophobia, and social prejudices arise in the individual's social context. The behavior model of aggression foresees four points in a crisis situation in which a decision for or against aggression will be made: the interpretation of the situation, the activation of one of the modes of behavior instilled as appropriate to the situation, the appearance of inhibition, and the social or other rewards and sanctions in the situation.

492
Black, Cyril E. ACCESSIBILITY OF GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED RESEARCH IN INTERNATIONAL STUDIES. International studies quarterly, v. 14, Sept. 1970: 320-324. D839.B2, v. 14

An introduction to the problem of the accessibility of intra- and extra-mural government research in public affairs, which is "intended to raise issues rather than to solve them." Black suggests for further study the revival of annual listings of research in progress, the question of the need for classification of basic, rather than mission-oriented research, and the utility of a comprehensive and integrated information system along the lines suggested in the Leonard report. In addition he asks for the establishment of an office to inform scholars of the general character of classified intramural Government research.

493
Bowling, John W. HOW WE DO OUR THING: INNOVATION. Foreign service journal, v. 47, Oct. 1970: 25-27, 55-56. illus. JX1.A53, v. 47

Describes how innovation, as contrasted with advocacy and crisis management, is produced within the real, as opposed to the formal, national security bureaucracy by a crisis manager able to persuade his colleagues that something new must be tried. Such ad hoc innovations are usually nonproductive because, among other reasons, they lack the basis of bureaucratic advocacy. They are usually operational rather than areal in design and are usually manned by the "young comers," the careerists in a hurry. Where the American effect on the international scene is slight, or different from that intended, the crisis managers are reluctant to accept the inevitability of constraints. Bowling thinks that the crisis manager loses interest in his innovation and goes on to others, while the standard bureaucrats take over from him and incorporate the innovation into the ranks of recognized advocacies.

494
Bracht, Hans W. [POSSIBILITIES FOR A PEACE PRAXEOLOGY IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS] Möglichkeiten für eine Praxeologie des Friedens im Ost-West-Verhältnis. Deutsche Studien, v. 8, Nov. 1970: 376-390. D839.D48, v. 8
"Anmerkungen": p. 388-390.

Argues that if Western peace research is to work out a peace order valid for both East and West, it must accept the fact that the Eastern nations, because of their ideological, political, and strategic convictions, do not favor the convergence theory. The Soviets see the convergence theory as an unacceptable attempt at "de-ideologizing." The West must understand that although peace research is basically interdisciplinary, history and international law predominate, and in the Soviet Union ideology pervades both. The same is true for the Soviet Union's policies toward Eastern countries, regulated by coexistence, and toward Western countries, in which coexistence is an instrument in the worldwide class struggle. A treaty with a Western country plays an important role in Soviet international law: "The coordination of wills . . . is a specific form of the international class struggle . . . and not a reconciliation of international antagonistic differences, but a way of settling them with peaceful means." Bracht evaluates a recent Soviet study that attempts to neutralize ideology in international relations and to introduce a more pragmatic attitude, recogniz-

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ing the possibility of working out a universal international law system not based on ideology. Although it is too early to say whether this development will catch on or represent merely an exception, it can be seen as a promising step toward establishing a successful peace praxeology in East-West relations.

495
Brutents, K. NEOCOLONIALISM AND ITS SOCIOECONOMIC STRATEGY. Reprints from the Soviet press, v. 11, Oct. 16, 1970: 16-33.
DK266.A2R37, v. 11
Translated from Kommunist, no. 4, 1970.
Slav Rm

Neocolonialism, the colonialism of the period of confrontation between socialism and capitalism, is an organic part of global imperialist strategy at this stage of capitalism's general crisis, when traditional colonialism has collapsed. The inculcation of capitalist relationships into the social structures of the newly independent countries is the central socioeconomic task of this new imperialist weapon. In economic relations, neocolonialism supports the moderately reformist, capitalist transformation of the former enslaved countries while carefully perpetuating their subordinate position in relation to the international capitalist division of labor. Socially, neocolonialism allies itself with those sections of the bureaucracy and bourgeoisie that, through distrust of the masses, collaborate with imperialism. However, there are deep and irreconcilable contradictions in the strategy of neocolonialism. By encouraging even a moderate development of the young national states, neocolonialism produces the proletariat who will be its grave diggers and alienates the bureaucracy and bourgeoisie. While inevitable from the point of view of world history, the defeat of neocolonialism will require the determined struggle of the oppressed peoples despite these internal contradictions.

496
Calvert, Peter. REVOLUTION. New York, Praeger [1970] 174 p. (Key concepts in political science)
JC491.C23
Bibliography: p. 157-166.

Contents.--Revolution in the ancient world.--Plato, Aristotle and the Romans.--The effects of obedience.--The sense of rebellion.--The theory of inevitability.--The attraction of permanence.--The possibility of prediction.--Revolution in the world of the future.--Index.

Traces the historical development of the concept of revolution. Calvert distinguishes at least nine root meanings of revolution: defiance of authority, overthrow of rulers, social dissolution, revulsion against misused authority, constitutional change, reordering of society, inevitable stage of development, permanent attribute of ideal order, and psychological outlet.

497
Chadwick, Richard W. A PARTIAL MODEL OF NATIONAL POLITICAL-ECONOMIC SYSTEMS: EVALUATION BY CAUSAL INFERENCE. Journal of peace research, no. 2, 1970: 121-131.
AS9.J6, 1970

Applies a combination of factor analysis and causal inference techniques to refine a partial model of national political systems and international behavior. The model, which is a revision and extension of one used as "background assumptions" in an Inter-Nation Simulation at Northwestern University (1960), contains such variables as international trade and agreements (both military and economic), national economic and military capabilities, and several political system variables such as the probability of revolution; an earlier version of this model is reported in the Journal of Peace Research, No. 3, 1969. Data for the study are circa 1955-1957, cover 64 nations, and were obtained from the Dimensionality of Nations Project file (now at the University of Hawaii), to which the author contributed. Some twenty-four interlocking causal assumptions are settled upon as sufficient explanation for the matrix of correlations generated by the data. (Abstract supplied)

498
Deutsche Vereinigung für Politische Wissenschaft. Sektion Internationale Politik. [ANACHRONISTIC SOVEREIGNTY; ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICY] Die anachronistische Souveränität; zum Verhältnis von Innen- und Aussenpolitik. Im Auftrag der Sektion hrsg. von Ernst-Otto Czempiel. Köln, Westdeutscher Verlag, 1969. 304 p. (Politische Vierteljahresschrift, 10. Jahrg., 1969. Sonderheft 1)
JX4041.D4
"The contributions . . . are the result of sessions held by the Sektion Internationale Politik . . . 1966-1969."

Partial contents.--International politics and foreign policy, by Klaus Faupel.--Transnational politics, by Karl Kaiser.--The arms race and the political conditions for decisions, by Klaus Jürgen Gantzel.

Studies on the relationship between foreign and domestic policies. Faupel undertakes a systematic analysis of the internal political process of foreign policy, using the structure and operation of American foreign policymaking as a prototype. Kaiser analyzes changes in the Western political and economic system brought about by transnational societies. He sketches an ideal of transnational politics as a first step toward developing a theory of multinational politics, pointing out the dangers of interdependence and attempting to develop a peace praxeology. Gantzel studies the political problem of the arms race, specifically the relation between conflicts involving political economic interests on the one hand and escalation elements on the other, and how these determine international "output." His approach is based on Richardson's and Boulding's mathematical formulae. He gives suggestions on how research can develop a more concrete theory.

499
[DEVELOPMENTAL TENDENCIES OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS] Entwicklungstendenzen der internationalen Politik. Unter der Redaktion von Gerhard Hahn [et al.] [Hrsg. vom Institut für Internationale Beziehungen

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an der Deutschen Akademie für Staats- und Rechtswissenschaft "Walter Ulbricht," Potsdam-Babelsberg] Berlin, Staatsverlag der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 1969. 310 p.
JX1395.E55
Includes bibliographical references.

Contents.--Stand and perspectives of the worldwide class dispute between socialism and imperialism.--Soviet foreign policy and the world revolutionary process, by Siegmar Quilitzsch.--On the development of cooperation of the Socialist states of Europe, by Helmut Busch and Walter Müller.--The Socialist community and European security, by Werner Hänisch.--East Germany's fight for disarmament, by Joachim Krüger.--Forcing the global strategy--expression of the crisis of U.S. imperialism, by Klaus Bollinger and Hans Maretzki.--NATO in imperialist policy, by Jochen Dankert.--West Germany's aim at hegemony in capitalist Europe, by Wilhelm Ersil.--The aggravation of Bonn's policy of aggression against the German Democratic Republic and against reality, by Herbert Kröger.--Present developmental tendencies of the Afro-Asian states and their influence on changes in the international balance of power, by Günther Thole and Renate Wünsche.--On some developmental tendencies in the U.N. system, by Gerhard Hahn.--Subject index.

Argues that in the struggle between socialism and imperialism, socialism, democracy, national independence, and peace are the winning forces, because of the economic, political, and military strength of the Socialist countries, headed by the Soviet Union, and their cooperation in the fight against imperialism in order to guarantee peace and security and further the rise of socialism and communism. West Germany, struggling for hegemony in capitalist Europe, must be forced to accept the status quo in Europe, recognize the German Democratic Republic, and renounce nuclear and military ambitions. These are the prerequisites for normal relations between the two German states, for a peaceful solution to the German problem, and for peaceful coexistence and collective security in Europe. Developments in the Latin American countries show that capitalism is not an acceptable alternative to colonialism. It is therefore essential that the developing countries strengthen their relations with Socialist countries to give new impulse to their anticolonial and ideological policies, economic independence, and social progress. In light of the changes in the international scene and East Germany's concern and demonstrated capability to contribute to the goals of the United Nations, East Germany should become a full and equal member of this international forum.

500
Doob, Anthony N. CATHARSIS AND AGGRESSION: THE EFFECT OF HURTING ONE'S ENEMY. Journal of experimental research in personality, v. 4, Oct. 1970: 291-296. BF1.J62, v. 4

Subjects were either annoyed by a confederate of the experimenter or left alone. The subject then tested the confederate on a learning task. Instructions were varied so that for half of the subjects, the confederate lost some or all of the money he was to receive as payment for participating in the experiment; for the other half of the subjects, there was no mention of money. All subjects were then given an opportunity to give electric shocks to the confederate. Subjects in the annoy conditions gave shorter shocks when the confederate had lost money. The confederate's losing money had no effect on the duration of the shocks the subject delivered when the subject had not been annoyed. (Abstract supplied)

501
Dukes, Paul. THE EMERGENCE OF THE SUPER-POWERS; A SHORT COMPARATIVE HISTORY OF THE U.S.A. AND THE U.S.S.R. New York, Harper & Row [1970] 155 p.
E178.D86 1970b

Contents.--Preface.--Introduction: the action, the place, the time.--The age of the democratic revolution, 1763-1815.--Two great nations, 1815-1850.--Interlude in the drama, 1850-1880.--From nationalism to imperialism, 1880-1917.--The age of the proletarian revolution, 1917-1941.--From world power into space, 1941-1969.--Conclusion?--Notes.--Select bibliography.--Index.

Argues that "the emergence of the super-powers has involved at least three hundred years of comparable development, and that the historical examination of this process can make a contribution to their mutual understanding and future progress." Dukes stresses similarities in the historical development of Russia and the United States, particularly their common origin as frontier offshoots of Western European society, but he does not deny significant differences. He voices the hope that each will learn from the other's experience and thereby make possible a continuation of the present relationship of peaceful coexistence.

502
Fontaine, André. THE NEW CLIMATE OF COEXISTENCE. Current, no. 122, Oct. 1970: 60-64.
AP2.C9259, 1970
From "Coexistence, Stage Three," Le Monde, Aug. 19, 1970. N&CPR

Asserts that the Soviet-American détente stems less from an ideological choice than from a realization that because of the balance of terror neither power has a chance of forcing the other to yield its sphere of influence; traces the cold war, focusing on the periods of détente and on the disarmament treaties formulated during those periods; and compares the circumstances that led to the West German-Soviet renunciation-of-force accord and the Middle East cease-fire agreement. Fontaine contends that the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia postponed the process of terminating the cold war. He agrees that the road to peace in the Near East will be long, but he argues that the trend has been reversed, for the belligerents are becoming aware that a confrontation would be suicidal.

503
Genovés Tarazaga, Santiago. IS PEACE INEVITABLE? AGGRESSION, EVOLUTION, AND HUMAN DESTINY. With an introd. by Theodosius Dobzhansky. New York, Walker [1970] 194 p. U22.3.G4513 1970

Rejects the theory that aggression is inborn. Genovés contends that war is a social disease that

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must be avoided and that, despite the arms race supported by the military-industrial complexes of East and West, it can be avoided. He concludes that man, the creature who invented war, has the obligation to invent peace.

504
Gold, Volker. [GAME THEORY AND POLITICAL REALITY] Spieltheorie und politische Realität. Politische Studien, v. 21, May/June 1970: 257-276.
H35.P66, v. 21

Uses the Erfurt and Kassel meetings of representatives of East and West Germany in a demonstration of the possible application of game-theory methodology to a political situation. The terminology and basic concept of game theory are sketched, and some examples already analyzed in the literature are summarized. Gold does not propose game theory as an instrument of political prognostication. His hope is that the analysis by analogy "will throw light, no matter how weak and uncertain, on the strategy and communication aspects of the real problem."

505
Haavelsrud, Magnus. VIEWS ON WAR AND PEACE AMONG STUDENTS IN WEST BERLIN PUBLIC SCHOOLS. Journal of peace research, no. 2, 1970: 99-120.
AS9.J6, 1970

Undertakes to (1) clarify relationships between certain international orientations and independent variables as age, sex, and socioeconomic background and (2) compare data with previous findings from England, Japan, Norway, and Sweden. The image of "war" viewed developmentally shows the younger subjects to be less concerned with negative effects of war on people. Further, the younger subjects view war more as an activity and process. The concept "peace" is decreasingly defined as the negation of war with age whereas "peace" defined as coexistence is more common with older subjects. No clear sex differences exist. An overall reaction to provocation when a subject imagines a threatening situation regarding family, city, native country, and ally of own country is that a war should not be started. Previous findings that older subjects tend to justify war to a greater extent is not supported. Ninety percent of the sample display the belief that there is something inside people that causes war. However, in giving reasons for their predictions of the probability of future war few references are made to man's bad qualities. No clear trend emerges between the independent variables and the probability ratings. The general trend for the total sample is that quite low probability exists for having a war in 5 years whereas the ratings for 100 years indicate a much greater probability. (Abstract supplied, modified)

506
Hartogs, Renatus, and Eric Artzt, comps. VIOLENCE: CAUSES AND SOLUTIONS. [New York, Dell Pub. Co., 1970] 424 p. (A Laurel original)
HN59.H28
Includes bibliographical references.

Partial contents.--Introduction: on the nature of violence, by Renatus Hartogs and Eric Artzt.--Dimensions of violence: Violence and the Western political tradition, by Sheldon S. Wolin. Violence in American literature, by David Brion Davis. Educating children to violence, by Mary Redmer Josephson. Mass media and mass violence, by Eugene H. Methvin. Trade winds: violent toys, by John G. Fuller. Violence and the national character, by Chester M. Pierce.--Understanding and controlling violence: Is there something about America . . . ? by Eric Artzt. Violence: biological need and social control, by Norman E. Zinberg and Gordon A. Fellman. The language of violence, by Renatus Hartogs. Some social functions of violence, by Lewis A. Coser. Who will act violently: the predictive criteria, by Renatus Hartogs. Substitutes for violence, by John Fischer. The victim-offender relationship, by Leroy G. Schultz. The treatment and prevention of violence, by Renatus Hartogs.--Conclusion, by Renatus Hartogs and Eric Artzt.

Essays from various perspectives on the causes, consequences, and control of human violence. Violence is an outgrowth of widespread and deeply felt alienation; it is an expression of revolt against injustices that cry out for change. But it is also a manifestation of inadequacy in the user, "an attempt to deal with feelings of anxiety and unworthiness by not coming to grips with them, a palliative at best, and a temporary one." The cure for violence is constructive effort, through which a man "defines himself and achieves a unique identity that is worth maintaining--I create, therefore I am."

507
Holsti, K. J. NATIONAL ROLE CONCEPTIONS IN THE STUDY OF FOREIGN POLICY. International studies quarterly, v. 14, Sept. 1970: 233-309.
D839.B2, v. 14

Explores the possibilities and problems of using role-theory concepts in the analysis of foreign policy to illustrate how the national-role concept can aid in the construction of frameworks for foreign policy analysis and of realistic models of international systems. National role conceptions are viewed as "orientations toward the external environment and commitments to certain tasks or functions within various sets of international relationships." The discussion of the number, types, characteristics, and distribution of national role conceptions is derived from a survey of recent foreign policy statements made by 71 governments.

508
Hugo, Grant. APPEARANCE AND REALITY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. London, Chatto & Windus, 1970. 207 p.
JX1395.H8
Bibliography: p. 197-200.

Illustrates by examples drawn from many nations "the proposition that the quarrels of mankind are aggravated by misunderstanding and that their consequences might perhaps be mitigated if governments were to precede their decisions by a more methodical process of analysis." Hugo contends that some methods of reaching decisions are better

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than others because they are more likely to have advantageous results. He states that predicting the results of an action is essential if the action is to be decided in the light of its consequences.

509
Hunt, Kenneth. FUTURE TRENDS IN GLOBAL STRATEGIES. NATO's fifteen nations, v. 15, Dec. 1970/Jan. 1971: 66-71. UA646.F5, v. 15

Speculates on the evolution of global military and political strategies during the next 10 years. Technological innovations and political change are the chief determinants of trends in strategy. The Soviet-American stalemate at the level of strategic nuclear weapons will continue to put a premium on the avoidance of nuclear war and the use of lower spectrum violence or the substitution of political and economic action for military means. Military security will still be a prime need during this period, and the use of violence to control change may be unavoidable. At the same time, one should expect to see a further blurring of the division between East and West and some convergence of Soviet and American interests, particularly as these relate to Communist China.

510
Hveem, Helge. 'BLAME' AS INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOR: A CONTRIBUTION TO INTER-STATE INTERACTION THEORY. Journal of peace research, no. 1, 1970: 49-67. AS9.J6, 1970

This article presents a dimension of state behavior which it proposes has theoretical and practical relevance to a theory of conflict, a theory of sanctions, and generally to theories of interstate interaction. Being primarily theoretical, the article discusses the role of 'blame' in international politics, both as an isolated pattern of behavior, and in connection with other patterns of behavior. 'Blame' is seen as non-violent, conflict behavior. It is related to the stratification of international systems, and to the concept of political distance between two actors. Scales and estimates for measuring blame, both from the sender's and the receiver's point of view, are presented, and a discussion of methodological problems involved in an empirical test of the theory proposed, is made at the end. (Abstract supplied)

511
International Documentation and Information Centre, Hague. [COEXISTENCE 1970; TENSION AND DÉTENTE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST] Koexistenz 1970; Spannung und Entspannung zwischen Ost und West. Bern, Verlag SOI [1970] 134 p. (Tatsachen und Meinungen, 11) D843.I54

Contents.--Meaning and limits of Soviet coexistence policy, by Peter Sager.--Neutralism and détente between East and West--dream or reality? by Rolf Geyer.--The problems of neutrality in the light of the East-West conflict, by C. D. Kernig. --Intent and reaction from the Soviet Communist view, by Hans Hartl.--Détente and military balance, by W. F. K. Thompson.--Neutralistic tendencies in Scandinavia, by P. A. Heegaard-Poulsen.--Canadian foreign policy: a qualified neutralism, by Eric Waldman.--Détente, neutralism and Asiatic security, by Etsuo Kohtani.--The absolutist will, by Ivan Matteo Lombardo.--The Soviet Union and the European security system, by Erna Wolfensberger.--The authors.

Lectures given at the Internationale Interdok Konferenz held in Deidesheim, Federal Republic of Germany, in September 1969, on the problem of "neutralism and détente between East and West--dream or reality?" Sager presents a historical survey, showing international communism's transition from the strategy of world revolution to peaceful coexistence. Geyer states that as long as there is no ideological coexistence, a relationship based on "living next to each other" but not "living with each other" can be achieved by economic, trade, cultural, and diplomatic contacts. Thompson argues that what has been achieved by the so-called East-West détente is nothing more than military balance; nevertheless the onset of a true détente is in the making. Kohtani states that Japan's security is threatened because the United States is concerned about Japan's weak defense policies and because of the neoisolationist tendencies in the United States. Lombardo fears that the Communists are going to use the strategy of peaceful coexistence to destroy democracy. Erna Wolfensberger defines the European security system, describes the development of the Soviet security concept, and analyzes the recent proposals for a European security conference and security system.

512
Jervis, Robert. THE LOGIC OF IMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. [Princeton, N.J.] Princeton University Press, 1970. 281 p. JX1395.J45

"Written under the auspices of the Center for International Affairs, Harvard University."
Includes bibliographical references.

Discusses "the ways states can affect the images others have of them and thereby exercise influence without paying the high cost of altering their major policies." Although many studies have been made of the main instrumentalities of power little has been written about the role of diplomatic skill and the other techniques by which a nation can influence the opinions and inferences others are making about it. Jervis concludes that conflicts center more around the interpretation of events and the images of the actors than around the intrinsic value of pieces of territory.

513
Jones, Roy E. ANALYSING FOREIGN POLICY: AN INTRODUCTION TO SOME CONCEPTUAL PROBLEMS. London, Routledge & K. Paul [1970] 157 p. JX1395.J65

Includes bibliographies.

Contents.--The fabric of foreign policy.--The units of foreign policy.--The arena of foreign policy.

Examines several approaches to the problem of understanding foreign policy. The author contends that each coherent concept of foreign policy de-

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mands its own set of assumptions and analysis. Jones refuses to favor any particular approach, for in his view there is no single key to understanding foreign policy. "The nature of foreign policy is not agreed, and one is tempted to believe that in political societies it never will be agreed." These are merely "imperfect approaches to imperfect understandings."

514
Kortunov, V. WORLD POLITICS AND CONFRONTATION OF IDEAS. International affairs (Moscow) no. 10, Oct. 1970: 72-78. D839.I465, 1970

The ideological and political dividing line that marks the basic direction of today's developments is the clash first of the two class antipodes of modern society--the bourgeoisie and the proletariat--and then of the two opposed social systems--communism and capitalism. Under the monopoly domination of capital, international conflicts arose and were defeated by the balance of forces between the capitalist groupings. Today such conflicts develop against the background of two differing social systems and have an ever more pronounced social and class content. However Socialist foreign policy is slandered by the argument that the policy of peaceful coexistence is incompatible with the ultimate goal of shaking off the power of capital. Hence the insistent demands by the apologists of capitalism that the Communists should disarm ideologically. Leftist and rightist critics alike wrongly think the Soviet Union's political (state) and ideological (class) interests are in conflict, when actually Soviet foreign policy is an organic blend of the Socialist state's ideological and political, international and national goals. As Lenin pointed out, the supplanting of one system by another can take place only as the result of the internal development of the country concerned. Where the required conditions do not exist, outside interference cannot create a revolution. While safeguarding the Soviet people's interests, the foreign policy of the Soviet Union also meets the basic interests of all the other peoples of the world. Ever-broader sections of the capitalist world have become aware that anti-communism is actually the ideological basis of imperialism.

515
Lifton, Robert J. HISTORY AND HUMAN SURVIVAL; ESSAYS ON THE YOUNG AND OLD, SURVIVORS AND THE DEAD, PEACE AND WAR, AND ON CONTEMPORARY PSYCHOHISTORY. New York, Random House [1970] 404 p.
BF57.L5
Includes bibliographical references.

Partial contents.--pt. 2. On survivors: The Hiroshima bomb. On death and death symbolism. Atomic-bombed children. Jews as survivors.--pt. 3. Deceptions of war and peace: America in Vietnam--the counterfeit friend. Reason, rearmament, and peace. What ails man?

Selections from the author's articles (published during the 1960's) on man's psychological adjustments to catastrophic events of the 20th century. In part 2 Lifton offers a psychohistorical framework to explain the reactions of survivors of Hiroshima and Nazi extermination camps to the experience of death and dying. Part 3 discusses the reactions of Americans and Vietnamese to the Vietnam War, the question of Japanese rearmament, and Arthur Koestler's neurophysiological theory of human behavior.

516
McClelland, Charles A. CURRENT SOVIET AND AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES ON THEORY AND RESEARCH IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. Studies in comparative communism, v. 3, Jan. 1970: 158-168.
HX1.S74, v. 3

A review of Soviet Perspectives on International Relations, 1956-1967, by William Zimmerman. McClelland is concerned about the consequences of a recent sharp decline in support for international relations research in the United States. This trend, worrisome in itself, becomes even more disturbing when viewed in the light of evidence offered by Zimmerman that the Soviet Union is making a major effort in this field and may soon be in a position to challenge the heretofore unquestioned leadership of Western scholars. The timing of the decline is disappointing in another respect, in that, with recent improvements in information processing systems, the international relations discipline may be on the verge of major breakthroughs in quantitative analysis. In this regard, Americans "cannot afford to lose sight of the persistence of the global problem of international conflict with its accompanying nuclear threat and of the need to develop more intelligent and more effective social controls over it."

517
Mates, Leo. THE LASTING GOALS OF NON-ALIGNMENT. Review of international affairs, v. 21, Aug. 5/Aug. 20, 1970: 1-3.
D839.R4, v. 21

Reviews the origins and early history of nonalinement, relating the first two conferences of the heads of nonalined states to the upcoming Lusaka conference. Nonalinement developed not as the collective diplomatic activity of a certain group of states but as a set of practical attitudes responding to present realities, particularly the division into power blocs and the increasing differentiation between have and have-not nations. Mates thinks that the Belgrade conference began one phase of the development of nonalinement and ended another. The prior failure at Bandung to approve and implement a platform for action on a purely regional basis demonstrated the need for the kind of international action taken at Belgrade.

518
Mitscherlich, Alexander. [THE CONCEPT OF PEACE AND HUMAN AGGRESSIVENESS. FOUR ESSAYS] Die Idee des Friedens und die menschliche Aggressivität. 4 Versuche. [Frankfurt a.M.] Suhrkamp [1969] 137 p. (Bibliothek Suhrkamp, Bd. 233)
BF575.A3M52
Includes bibliographical references.

Contents.--Aggression.--Aggression and tolerance.--Theses on terror.--The concept of peace and human aggressiveness.

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Approaches the problems of war and violence from the psychoanalytical image of man. Mitscherlich argues, for example, that if there were no death wish, death on the "field of honor" would be inexplicable. Easily aroused aggressive behavior is an ineradicable human characteristic. "The sources of aggression are sources within us belonging to our nature."

519
Mitscherlich-Nielsen, Margarete. [AGGRESSION--REFLECTIONS AND EXAMPLES] Aggression--Überlegungen und Beispiele. Neue Rundschau, v. 81, no. 4, 1970: 734-757. AP30.N5, v. 81

Suggests that since hate is a specific form of aggression, people must learn to recognize their motives and understand the defense mechanisms of suppression, projection, and displacing in themselves and others in order to avoid becoming victims of the dangerous effects of aggression. It is necessary to distinguish between external and internal motivations for hate in order to determine whether it is justified or not. Mitscherlich uses the psychoanalytic method to explain the development of aggression in individuals, and gives three case histories. Parents should help their children deal with ambivalent feelings of love, hate, and fear, let them learn to establish different relations with different people, and satisfy their need for identification. Thus the child will feel understood and accepted despite his faults, and he will not need belligerence to get rid of internally motivated hate, nor will he regress later by looking for an ideal, a drive that often is aggressive, as shown by the provocative attitude of protesting students.

520
North, Robert C. THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SYSTEM: THE FUTURE. In Toward century 21; technology, society, and human values. Edited by C. S. Wallia. New York, Basic Books [1970] p. 169-182. HM221.T67

"Differential rates of population growth in combination with differential rates of technological growth contribute to conflict insofar as individual human beings and nation states have differential--grossly unequal--access to food, housing, health, education, work, justice, and general influence or control over their environments." Now that the Western frontier that provided an outlet for large numbers of Europeans is closed, mankind has no choice but to limit population growth and conserve resources, which will inevitably lead to greater social controls. Competition between great powers, especially between established and rising powers, for control over scarce resources has been a major source of conflict. Whether men will be able to master the technological and social revolution or whether it will lead to nuclear catastrophe or some form of totalitarian rule remains an open question.

521
Paterson, Thomas G., comp. THE ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR. Lexington, Mass., Heath [1970] 126 p. (Problems in American civilization) D843.P37
Bibliography: p. 122-126.

Contents.--Introduction.--Chronology.--Conflict of opinion.--pt. 1. The participants debate the origins: The Iron Curtain dropped by Russia, by Winston S. Churchill. The hostile Anglo-American alliance, by Joseph Stalin. American military firmness vs. Soviet aggression, by Clark Clifford. The American double standard, by Henry A. Wallace. The failure of the peacemakers, by Walter Lippmann. The imperialism of America and Britain, by V. M. Molotov. The peaceful course of the United States, by Harry S. Truman.--pt. 2. The troublesome issues: security and economic recovery: The atomic bomb as a diplomatic weapon, by Gar Alperovitz. The continued tension of atomic diplomacy, by Walter LaFeber. The use of economic power in diplomacy, by Thomas G. Paterson. The creation of the Soviet satellites, by Samuel Flagg Bemis. Uncertainty in Eastern Europe, by Gar Alperovitz. Soviet military aggression reappraised, by Fred Warner Neal. The division of Germany, by Klaus Epstein. Curbing Communist expansion: the Truman Doctrine, by Joseph Marion Jones. The misconceptions of the Truman Doctrine, by Richard J. Barnet. The magnanimity of the Marshall Plan and the obstructionism of Russia, by Robert H. Ferrell. The Marshall Plan reconsidered, by Thomas G. Paterson. The extension of the cold war to Asia, by Norman A. Graebner.--pt. 3. Whose responsibility? the scholars debate: Leninist ideology and Stalinist paranoia, by Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. American innocence questioned, by William A. Williams. Stalin's rationality and domestic imperatives, by Melvin Croan. Revisionism and the futility of the question, by Adam B. Ulam. The impact of revisionism, by Walter LaFeber.--Suggestions for additional reading.

522
Petković, Ranko. NON-ALIGNMENT IN LATIN AMERICA. Review of international affairs, v. 21, Aug. 5/Aug. 20, 1970: 3-4. D839.R4, v. 21

Finds growing interest among the nations of Latin America in nonalinement, despite their (sometimes forced) membership in superpower-dominated organizations. Petković lists the conferences of the nonalined nations participated in, or observed by, the Latin American nations since the 1961 Belgrade conference and calls attention to the increasing tendency of these countries to vote with the nonalined countries on security, disarmament, and economic problems at the United Nations. He forecasts the broad dissemination of the nonalinement principle during the 1970's as part of the general opening up of Latin America to the world.

523
Quaroni, Pietro. [THE RUSSIANS AND THE CHINESE. THE CRISIS OF THE COMMUNIST WORLD] Russen und Chinesen. Die Krise der kommunistischen Welt. Frankfurt a.M. Verlag Heinrich Scheffler [1968] 318 p. DK68.7.C5Q315
Translation of Russia e Cina.

Contents.--Introduction: Before and after the intervention in Czechoslovakia.--The development of communism in Russia.--The development of Chinese communism.--Toward the rift.--The litigation concerning the borders.--The rift.--The cultural revolution.--The Communist crisis.--Appendix.

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A history of communism and the Sino-Soviet conflict. Hard-line, expansionist Soviet policies are considered unlikely to change in the near future. However the ideological conflict with China is restricting the Soviet Union's freedom of action. The satellite countries are taking advantage of this fact, and the Communist crisis should be used to further Western interests. Since Quaroni thinks that the present West German Ostpolitik is self-contradictory, he suggests that the United States seek a rapprochement with Russia and that a united Europe concentrate on contacts with the satellite countries to contain and liberalize communism by proving that democracy is better able to solve present social, political, and economic problems.

524
Reed, Evelyn. IS MAN AN "AGGRESSIVE APE"? International socialist review, v. 31, Nov. 1970: 27-31, 40-42. HX1.F65, v. 31
Bibliographical footnotes.

Argues against the hypothesis that the biological aggressiveness of human nature, rather than economic or social factors, causes modern wars. Reed contends that writers like Ardrey, Lorenz, and Morris attempt to cover up the criminal course of imperialism with the biological figleaf. She rejects the assumption that humans are governed by irrepressible inherited instincts and points to evidence of racism and sexism in these "neo-Darwinist" writers.

525
Ritter, Klaus. [EUROPEAN PEACE ORDER AS A DEVELOPMENTAL PROBLEM OF THE WORLD POLITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE] Europäische Friedensordnung als Entwicklungsproblem der weltpolitischen Infrastruktur. Europa-Archiv, v. 25, Aug. 1970: 541-558. D839.E86, v. 25

No new means of achieving détente have yet been found that can regulate international development dynamics. Cooperation and communication between the two systems are essential to the development of a new peace order. In the attempt to improve East-West relations, Germany, particularly Berlin, presents the major stumbling block, but not all concessions should come from the West. Moreover, the Soviet Union must solve the dilemma posed by the principles of its political system and the prerequisites for participating in economic and technical competition; the desired reform need not be to the detriment of "the system." Overall, it is essential to security that troop reductions and other arms control measures be bilateral and that their implementation be inspected. China and the newly independent countries aggravate a political situation that can be improved only by more constructive policies. In its foreign policy Germany must strengthen the West European community to which it belongs, maintain the Atlantic partnership as a basis for West European security and détente, and scale down conflict so that West Europe may become an example of a sensible modern society and thus play a decisive political role.

526
Robinson, Thomas W. GAME THEORY AND POLITICS: RECENT SOVIET VIEWS. [Prepared for U.S. Air Force Project Rand] Santa Monica, Calif., Rand Corp., 1970. 118 p. (Rand Corporation. Memorandum RM-5839-PR) Q180.A1R36 no. 5839

Examines the development of game theory as applied to political science in the Soviet Union; traces the further development of game theory after official approval was denied the study of this subject; and analyzes a number of articles to determine "specific and changing Soviet attitudes toward the political science and international relations applications of game theory." Robinson contends that the Russians are interested in game theory because they fear that the free world "might have a new weapon for overcoming Leninist socialism" but that they are suspicious of game theory because of its Western origins and spend most of their time criticizing it. Appended are the English versions of Russian articles dealing with this topic.

527
Rose, Günther. [WHAT'S HIDDEN BEHIND THE CONVERGENCE THEORY?] Was steckt hinter der Konvergenztheorie? Berlin, Dietz, 1969. 57 p. (Deine Frage) HB501.R745
Bibliography: p. 57.

The convergence theory grows out of efforts toward the ideological reorientation of the strategy of anticommunism, the imperialist reaction to the fundamental change in the balance of forces between socialism and capitalism. While convergence theory is variously defined by theoreticians of different points of view, in all its variants it is an ideological weapon to prop up the historically obsolete capitalist system internally and to wage war against communism externally. The fundamental errors of the convergence theory originate in its distorted understanding of the nature of socialism, its vulgarized depiction of the dialectic of productive forces, production relationships, and the productive structure, and its ignorance of the laws of social formation. Bourgeois liberals who would like to use the convergence theory as a means of criticizing their own society are misled by talk of the managerial revolution or the ideological effects of science and technology into failing to see that the two systems continue to diverge.

528
Scheidt, Jürgen vom. [OBEDIENCE WITHOUT ALTERNATIVE] Der ausweglose Gehorsam. Westermanns Monatshefte, Dec. 1970: 69-71. AP30.W5, 1970

Can there be war when those receiving orders refuse to exercise violence? If no obvious alternative exists, obedience can lead to deadly aggression, even in a simple situation. This became evident in a series of tests based on the work of the American professor Stanley Milgram and undertaken by the Research Institute for Psychopathology and Psychotherapy at the Max Planck Society in Munich. Volunteers representing a cross section of the West German population were asked to test the effect of punishment on the learning ability of a fake "student." The "teacher" could punish by administering a series of 30 surges of electrical current up to 450 volts. The "teacher" received a shock of 45 volts to see how it felt.

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The percentage of "teachers" who mercilessly and, apparently, compulsively pushed all 30 buttons remained extremely high, even when the authority of those conducting the test was questioned. Not a single person refused to use pain as a means of punishment. Among those displaying the most reluctance to punish were an extreme rightist and a future professional soldier, while among the most obedient were anarchists and college graduates. The findings suggest that human behavior being what it is, it is best to avoid placing people in such situations.

529
Scott, John F. PREVENTION OF WAR. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 50, Nov. 1970: 44-48.
Z6723.U35, v. 50

Argues that a knowledge of the causes of war can contribute to the prevention of war and that military men, whose responsibilities include war prevention, should take a professional interest in the study of these matters, perhaps even to the point of establishing "a specialty in the military forces akin to research pathology in medicine." To illustrate the complexities of the problems and "to stimulate interest," Scott outlines two major etiologies of violence--the frustration-aggression theory, and the evidence derived from ethology. He calls for military participation in peace research in order to avoid a repetition of the situation that arose in the late 1950's, when the military found itself playing second banana to civilian strategists.

530
Shukow, Jurij A. [ALL-EUROPEAN SECURITY AND COOPERATION] Gesamteuropäische Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit. Europa-Archiv, v. 25, Oct. 10, 1970: 703-713. D839.E86, v. 25

Two basic issues are of decisive importance for guaranteeing all-European security and cooperation: Europe as a homogeneous whole and the meaning of its national frontiers, and cooperation in all of Europe. These security objectives can be realized, as the Moscow treaty shows, by recognizing current political realities and peaceful cooperation among all European states regardless of their social order. Europe should be seen as a geographical unit rather than as groups of countries belonging to various political, economic, or military organizations. Yet all present borders must be honored. Brandt has recognized this necessity and interpreted it as a chance to make a new beginning. The Soviet Union has restated its interest in creating an all-European security system in which both Germanys are equal; the proposed European security conference must deal constructively with the renunciation of the use or threat of force. Europe is also capable of answering the American economic challenge through cooperation.

531
Silvestri, Stefano. [HYPOTHESES ON EUROPEAN SECURITY] Hypothesen zur Europäischen Sicherheit. Europa-Archiv, v. 25, Sept. 25, 1970: 685-690.
D839.E86, v. 25

Examines the models regarding European security developed by the Foreign Policy Study Center in Paris, the Institute for Strategic Studies in London, and the Research Institute of the German Society for Foreign Policy in Bonn. All studies for the 1970's conclude that the existing political systems will remain different and that Europe will continue to seek security formulas to maintain peace. Some studies predict the disintegration of one or both of the two blocs, others expect evolution and reform within the two blocs, and some foresee reestablishment of the blocs. Outside factors influencing domestic policies, such as the Third World, China, and the Israeli-Arab conflict, are also discussed. The author concludes that the search for security models is desirable since only ideas and new thought processes influence history.

532
Smoker, Paul. SIMULATING THE HUMAN WORLD. Science journal, v. 6, July 1970: 49-53.
Q1.S57, v. 6

Discusses the use of man/computer simulations for the study of international relations. Smoker devotes most of his attention to an examination of the design, construction, operation, and performance of the International Process Simulation (IPS). When the aim of a simulation is to approximate the "real" world, it serves as a valuable tool for testing theory and predicting events. But a simulation may also be used to approximate not the real world but some "preferred" world, in which case it is a useful device for generating and testing alternative futures.

533
Sommer, Theo. DETENTE AND SECURITY: THE OPTIONS. NATO's fifteen nations, v. 15, Dec. 1970/Jan. 1971: 79-84. UA646.F5, v. 15

The next decade in foreign affairs will be plagued with ambiguities. It will be a time of neither peace nor war; a time of reassessment for the United States, and, to a lesser degree, for the Soviet Union; a time in which Europe's uncertainty about its role in the world and its future will become acute; and a time of seeking for an alternative to current alliance systems in collective security. The most troublesome issues will be those relating to the U.S. military presence in Europe, to the more efficient military organization of Western Europe, to the conference on the security of Europe, and to the détente process. The shape of the world in 1980 will depend very much on how these ambiguities and problems are resolved. There might be a restoration of the cold war, though this is unlikely. There might be a "Brave New World," where all problems of significance have been resolved, but this too is improbable. A withdrawal of the United States from Europe, followed by the slow "Finlandization" of the West, is also conceivable, but the most probable world is one in which the issues of the 1950's and 1960's will have been settled along the lines of the status quo, modified by such improvements as a guarantee for Berlin, a blurring of the dividing line between the two Germanys, more open communications between East and West, troop reductions on both sides, expanded economic and ecological cooperation, and de facto abandonment of the Brezhnev

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doctrine. Perhaps this "would not be a very tidy world but one that could be immeasurably more livable than the world of 1970."

534
Sontheimer, Kurt. [WHAT CAN POLITICAL SCIENCE DO FOR SOCIETY?] Was kann die politische Wissenschaft für die Gesellschaft leisten? Die Mitarbeit, v. 19, June 1970: 97-107.
N&CPR

The social sciences in their development are not merely products of the prevailing power relationships but override them to become the initiators of social reform. Political science, as a kind of continued thinking over of the question of the proper ordering of a social and political existence worthy of man, performs an inestimable service. In this age of scientific revolution, the general program of studies must include political science if we are to avoid breeding a generation of "idiot specialists," and the specialist in political science must be given increased opportunities for public service. Particularly significant is the function now opening up of providing advice and counsel to the decisionmakers. In this connection it is not sufficient for the political scientist empirically to conduct his analyses and estimate the results of his recommendations. He must take the further step of applying to the practice of politics his own professional values.

535
Streufert, Siegfried, and Susan C. Streufert. EFFECTS OF INCREASING FAILURE AND SUCCESS ON MILITARY AND ECONOMIC RISK TAKING. Journal of applied psychology, v. 54, Oct. 1970: 393-400.
BF1.J55, v. 54
"References": p. 399-400.

The effect of success, failure, and time spent in decision making on the degree of military and economic risk taking was investigated. A complex experimental simulation technique was employed as the research method to permit comparison of data obtained in a more "real world-like" setting with results reported by investigators using small-scale laboratory techniques. It was found that risk taking increases with the length of time that decision-making groups spend in working on a task. After some time, risky decision making may become concentrated in one decision area at a time, even though risks could be taken in more areas. Comparisons to laboratory results suggest some commonalities as well as some differences with regard to risk-taking results. (Abstract supplied)

536
Swomley, John M. AMERICAN EMPIRE; THE POLITICAL ETHICS OF TWENTIETH-CENTURY CONQUEST. [New York] Macmillan [1970] 250 p.
E744.S995
Bibliographical footnotes.

Contents.--Introduction.--The risks of realism.--Ethics and foreign policy.--Power and aggression.--Pearl Harbor and the war with Japan.--The Munich myth.--World War II: illusions and realities.--Postwar planning.--Origins of the cold war.--The Korean War.--Latin American policy.--Cuba.--Southern Asia.--Vietnam: intervention.--Vietnam: escalation.--Conclusion.--Index.

Examines the causes and consequences of the major U.S. foreign policy actions since 1939 from an ethical point of view. Swomley criticizes the concept of "realism" as a guide to foreign policy decisions, contending that self-styled realists who rely on power politics are often at least as unrealistic as their idealistic critics. He concludes that the primary thrust of U.S. foreign policy since 1939 has been "to thwart political or social change that interferes with a narrowly conceived national interest." American financial and military circles have found it in their interests to make war and establish overseas garrisons and bases. What is needed is a person-centered foreign policy that encourages social change instead of futilely attempting to suppress it.

537
Targ, Harry R. CHILDREN'S DEVELOPING ORIENTATIONS TO INTERNATIONAL POLITICS. Journal of peace research, no. 2, 1970: 79-98.
AS9.J6, 1970

Examines international political orientations of 244 fourth, fifth, and sixth grade American children (nine to twelve years) in an attempt to discover what orientations are held at each grade level and what developmental patterns appear to emerge across grades. The children increasingly developed beliefs that the United States was strong and the Soviet Union and China were important by grade. Military alliances were increasingly viewed as aggressive, wars as non-aggressive and legal. Children tended to develop positive evaluations of the United States and negative evaluations of the Soviet Union and China. Positive evaluations of Canada were maintained over all three grades. Expectations about the future were decreasingly optimistic with specific predictions of a war that would destroy the world as well as the continuation of the cold war. Finally, children increasingly favored United States interaction with other nations but children in all three grades were less likely to have action preferences that included trust of other countries, disarmament, and supporting majority views in the United Nations. (Abstract supplied, modified)

538
Tetzlaff, Rainer. [THE LUSAKA CONFERENCE OF NONALINED COUNTRIES] Die Konferenz der Blockfreien in Lusaka. Aussenpolitik, v. 21, Nov. 1970: 684-696.
D839.A885, v. 21

Reviews the proceedings, results, and perspectives of the third conference of nonalined countries, held in Lusaka, Zambia, in September 1970. The statesmen of the Third World stated that the world is no longer bipolar but has become multipolar through China's ascension to nuclear power. They praised current efforts toward détente, peace, and coexistence and expressed their disappointment at not being able to exercise a greater moral influence on the international community. Their goal will continue to be "to break the political monopoly of the superpowers, become invulnerable to outside pressure, and create new structures in the international system." They con-

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demned racism and imperialism, appealed for disarmanent and the prohibition of nuclear arms, and spoke in favor of granting U.N. membership to China and the divided countries. The author believes that the developing countries face many difficulties because their efforts are insufficiently coordinated, and their economies are too similar to complement each other. The most important trend of the conference was the focus on achieving economic self-reliance, a task in which the industrialized countries can play an important role.

539
Wallace, Michael. THE USES OF VIOLENCE IN AMERICAN HISTORY. American scholar, v. 40, winter 1970-1971: 81-102. AP2.A4572, v. 40

Offers evidence from American history to support the propositions that in the United States violence has been more often repressive than insurrectionary and that, in a significant number of cases, it has been committed not by the state against its citizens, but by one group of citizens against another. Wallace draws his evidence from studies of the oppression of blacks by whites, labor by capital, and later immigrants by earlier ones. He concludes that violence is largely a manifestation of majority tyranny. Many aspects of this problem need further study, among them the interaction of domestic violence and violence perpetrated abroad, but "it is not too early to suggest that the use of violence has been a fundamental and grim characteristic of the American past."

540
Zahar, Renate. [COLONIALISM AND ALIENATION--ON THE POLITICAL THEORY OF FRANTZ FANON] Kolonialismus und Entfremdung; zur politischen Theorie Frantz Fanons. [Frankfurt am Main] Europäische Verlagsanstalt [1969] 112 p. (Dritte Welt)
JV308.Z3

Bibliography of works by and about F. Fanon: p. 106-111.

Contents.--Biographic sketch.--Preliminary remarks.--Colonialism and alienation.--The colonial situation.--The function of racism.--The alienation of man in colonialism.--"Négritude," an antithesis to colonial racism.--Emancipation through violence.--Conditions of emancipation.--"L'homme neuf," tasks of the third world?--Bibliography on the works of Frantz Fanon.--Publications on Frantz Fanon.--Index of names.

Critique of Frantz Fanon's theories of revolution, decolonization, and alienation. Zahar focuses on the social and historical conditions that give rise to racism and other forms of colonial repression and expounds Fanon's conviction that emancipation from these conditions will be violent. Since this violence does not end with the outbreak of revolution, the indignation of the masses must be channeled constructively under the direction of knowledgeable leaders. Then the alienated man can find a new identity. Zahar criticizes Fanon for being too abstract in his analysis of violence and for failing to recognize that the ultimate goal of violence should be to do away with violence. Zahar agrees with Fanon that the Third World must solve its own problems and create its own values and that the individual must constantly work within the new economic and social structure without becoming dehumanized.

FOREIGN POLICIES

541
ADMINISTRATION OF NEW ZEALAND FOREIGN POLICY: 1950-1970. In New Zealand. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Foreign affairs review, v. 20, Apr. 1970: 3-12. JX1591.A35, v. 20

From a paper given at the Commonwealth seminar "Changing Patterns in the Organization and Conduct of Foreign Policy," Singapore, March 1970.

Traces the pattern of foreign policy formulation that has emerged during the 1950-1970 period and focuses on the changes in administrative structure that have affected both staff and functions. Some of the principal difficulties the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs has encountered are those involving finances, recruitment, and the maintenance of a balance between operations abroad and the support provided by the head office. It is concluded that because of its shortcomings the Ministry may well need to be reorganized.

542
Allison, Graham T. COOL IT: THE FOREIGN POLICY OF YOUNG AMERICA. Foreign policy, no. 1, winter 1970/71: 144-160. N&CPR

Asserts that the American empire is fading and that the distinguishing characteristic of the next 30 years will be the retraction of American power throughout the world. Allison interviews a group of college-educated "elites" to compare their foreign policy views, which demonstrate a disenchantment with what President Kennedy called America's obligation to "assist free men and free governments in casting off the chains of poverty" and totalitarianism--the foreign policy axioms of the postwar era. The author concludes that the real debate surrounding U.S. foreign policy today is the extent of America's political and military involvement overseas and not isolationism, which is merely a rhetorical diversion.

543
Ambrose, Stephen E. FROM KOREA TO VIETNAM: THE FAILURE OF A POLICY ROOTED IN FEAR. Progressive, v. 34, Nov. 1970: 14-20.
AP2.P8655, v. 34

History of events leading up to the Truman administration's decision to intervene in South Korea in June 1950. Ambrose contends that the commitment of U.S. troops on the Asian mainland, which marked a radical change in U.S. policy, was based on an irrational fear of communism that has had, and continues to have, disastrous effects on U.S. foreign policy and, indirectly, on American life and values. Prior to the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, the United States was prepared to accept Communist regimes in both Taiwan and South Korea, but the North Korean attack enabled Truman to mobilize congressional support for what he conceived to be America's mission to contain the aggressive expansion of communism. The author finds

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the evidence for a Kremlin strategy of global conquest to be questionable at best. "The obsessive American fears, . . . not to mention the violent American reaction, were based on assumptions that were almost surely wrong. Taking into account all that flowed from those assumptions--McCarthyism, the Cold War, ABMs, Indochina, and so on--this is the major tragedy of our times."

544
Armstrong, John A. THE SOVIET UNION: TOWARD CONFRONTATION OR COEXISTENCE? [New York, Foreign Policy Association] 1970. 64 p. illus. (Headline series, no. 201)
DK274.3 1970.A74
Bibliography: p. 62-63.

Examines the areas in which Soviet domestic and foreign policies directly affect the United States. America's relation to the Soviet Union cannot be the sole basis for changes in U.S. foreign policy because domestic problems are increasingly conditioning the feasible range of foreign policy options. Armstrong analyzes the reasons for Soviet insistence on applying Leninist imperatives to the Communist-bloc nations, the sources of the Sino-Soviet dispute, and Soviet policy in Africa. He concludes by offering three alternatives for American policy--collective security, direct Soviet-American negotiations, and the bolstering of third forces--emphasizing that an effective arms limitation agreement would have to be substantiated by an American defense guarantee for most countries outside the Communist sphere.

545
Bender, Peter. INSIDE THE WARSAW PACT. Survey, no. 74/75, winter/spring 1970: 253-268.
DK1.S49, 1970

Soviet policy toward the Warsaw Pact nations varies between unyielding emphasis on the unity of that body and cautious attempts to obtain the possible advantages of détente. The Soviet Union is prepared to allow its allies their own Western European policies, within the limits made clear by the Czech intervention. Despite the common ideology, the differences in the security problems of each country within the Socialist commonwealth make for foreign policy disparities. East Germany wishes to add to the military détente provided by the alliance with the Soviet Union a political détente given by international recognition, to insure against any possible move from the West. The Polish link to Moscow holds firm largely because of Polish fear of the Germans and the unresolved boundary dispute. For the present the Czechs seek only to lull the suspicions of the Soviet leadership, and the Hungarians have deliberately bought political latitude at home by political docility abroad. Rumania is indifferent to any threat from the West, but, like the Hungarians, it must reassure Moscow on the internal stability of the Communist Party regime, and membership in the Warsaw Pact is an appropriate gesture in this connection. Bulgaria's easy assumption of the role of satellite is a calm recognition of the requirements of its geography and economy. There is an open lack of unity in Eastern Europe, either toward the Soviet Union or against it. The unanimity of opinion that neither superpower wants war parallels the unanimous advocacy of the Budapest appeal for "security and collaboration." The main problem of East European policy lies in the contradiction that "collaboration with the West reduces the external risk but increases the internal one."

546
Benson, Charles. A STRATEGIC ALTERNATIVE? National review, v. 22, Nov. 17, 1970: 1206-1210.
AP2.N3545, v. 22

Current U.S. strategy has failed to deter Soviet expansionism in the Middle East. The cease-fire engendered by the American peace proposal has given the Egyptians time to install an adequate air defense along the Suez Canal, and it is difficult to see how Israel can continue to preserve its superior force posture or even maintain an equality of forces in the area. There are many options open to the United States in the Middle East, including blockading Soviet weapons and supplies to Egypt and increasing arms shipments to Israel, but the best alternative is to invade and seize Libya, where the Soviets are now building military strength before their position in that country can be solidified. Seizure would place Egypt between Israel and its new ally, U.S.-occupied Libya, forcing the Egyptians to turn their attention from aggression against Israel to defense against the United States. Any Soviet threat to Western Europe would have to take into account America's new position in the Middle East. The acquisition of Libya would provide a staging and base area that would serve as a counterthreat to potential Soviet expansion in Europe or the Indian Ocean area. Finally, before the Soviet Union could support a war of national liberation in another area, it would be forced to consider not only the new strategic balance created by the Libyan takeover, but also the "probable establishment of a further change in strategic balance should America devise a similar countermove in the new region under consideration."

547
Brandt, Willy. [GERMAN OSTPOLITIK FIRMLY BASED UPON COOPERATION WITH THE WEST] Feste Verankerung der deutschen Ostpolitik in der westlichen Zusammenarbeit. Neue Gesellschaft, v. 17, Nov./Dec. 1970: 834-838. H5.N36, v. 17
Speech given at the meeting of the German-French Chamber of Handicrafts, Hamburg, Sept. 1970.

The Atlantic Alliance and the West European partnership remain the essential prerequisites to any settlement with the East. Peace and security in Europe are the goal of German attempts for cooperation and understanding with the East. The next phases of the economic and monetary unions will be milestones on the path toward a united Europe, which will have coresponsibility in securing world peace and creating an infrastructure for the Third World. Following the terms of the Franco-German treaty, the two nations will coordinate their policies regarding cooperation with the Soviet Union and East European states. However, it would be wrong to neglect the security of the West or deny the importance of NATO protection. The maintenance of European security, which requires an American presence in Europe, is necessary to achieving a military détente, which would be fol-

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lowed by cooperation in other fields. If all goes well, the Moscow treaty will lead not only to similar agreements with other Eastern countries and the German Democratic Republic, but also to mutual balanced force reductions, and thus to heightened security in Europe. A satisfactory answer to the Berlin question is essential. If Europeans sense their cultural and historic ties, Germans will also regain a sense of unity after having been divided for more than 20 years. It is to the French credit that they have always recognized the importance of a European peace order comprising East and West; Germany is following their example in seeking peace through Franco-German cooperation.

548
Bredthauer, Karl D. [A NEW CHAPTER OPENED; POSSIBILITIES AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE TREATY OF MOSCOW] Ein neues Kapitel aufschlagen; Chancen und Konsequenzen des Moskauer Vertrags. Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik, v. 15, Sept. 1970: 898-906. D839.B57, v. 15

Urges West Germany to ratify the Treaty of Moscow in order to improve relations between two significant European countries and further economic, social, and scientific-technical growth. The author characterizes as encouraging Brandt's statement that the economy of Europe must stretch beyond the market of the European Economic Community toward cooperation with the Socialist countries and away from dependence on the United States. Bredthauer criticizes the effort and expense put into the "great modernizing projects" for armaments and defense programs and warns of the threat inherent in Bonn's arms policy. A country can maintain a credible peace policy only if it guarantees domestic freedom and democracy; the latter, in turn, will grow from an international security policy. Although the treaty will create a conflict of interest for the West German arms industry, it can contribute to a solution of the Berlin problem.

549
Byrnes, Robert F. INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION: EASTERN EUROPE: THE UNSTABLE ELEMENT IN THE SOVIET EMPIRE. Memorandum prepared at the request of the Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations (Pursuant to S. Res. 311, 91st Cong.) of the Committee on Government Operations, United States Senate. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1970. 12 p. DR48.5.B9

Discusses Eastern Europe's effect on East-West diplomacy and negotiations. Byrnes notes the Soviet Union's political and diplomatic skill in handling the postinvasion situation in Czechoslovakia and deprecates the weak U.S. diplomatic response. He characterizes Eastern Europe as a highly unstable area threatening Soviet politico-military rule by virtue of social, economic, and intellectual forces that are not susceptible to the kinds of controls that have proved effective in the Soviet Union. America's greatest strength in the battle to wean Eastern Europe from its Soviet master is the American social vitality and freedom and its leadership in introducing scientific, technical, and social concepts into political life.

550
Chauvel, Jean. [THE MEDITERRANEAN POLICY OF FRANCE] Die französische Mittelmeer-Politik. Europa-Archiv, v. 25, July 25, 1970: 505-509. D839.E86, v. 25

France believes that the political problems of the Mediterranean are primarily the consequences of events in the Middle East and on the North African coast. In the Arab-Israeli dispute France's only interest is the cause of peace. In view of the impracticability of bilateral Arab-Israeli negotiations, France continues to think peace possible only in a United Nations and four-power context. Libya's initiative in the Mirage aircraft sale was opposed by Egypt and accepted by France only as a means of easing the drain on French currency by oil expenditures. No responsible person in the French Government is thinking in terms of a military establishment in Libya or great concessions for French oil interests. The three North African states were originally suspicious of the Libyan revolution as a reinforcement of Egyptian power. The Mediterranean policy of France has so reassured them that they would now welcome a reinforced French presence in Libya. France has no monolithic Mediterranean policy but carefully varies its actions to the circumstances of each problem.

551
CHINA AND THE WORLD. China news analysis, no. 820, Nov. 6, 1970: 1-7. DS777.55.C4469, 1970

Assesses recent trends in Communist Chinese foreign policy. With the gradual resumption of its pre-1966 foreign policy line, Peking has established better relations with the Western countries and India, and state-to-state relationships are in the process of being normalized. However, Chinese policy toward the Communist countries has not changed perceptibly, and its opposition to the Soviet Union and support for pro-Peking Marxist groups continue. Although on the whole few changes have occurred in Communist Chinese foreign policy, if the United States withdrew from Asia, yielded on Formosa, and abandoned Japan, Sino-American relations would improve considerably. These goals, however, "are far-fetched dreams." Communist China "is on the defensive against the two super-powers and is apprehensive of the immense economic might of neighboring Japan." Eventually "China will shoot her way into the international community by her growing atomic power."

552
CHRONOLOGY OF THE VIETNAM WAR. Book 1. (1941-1966) [Compiled by the] Democratic Republic of Vietnam Commission for Investigation of the U.S. Imperialists' War Crimes in Vietnam. [Paris] Association d'Amitié Franco-Vietnamienne [1969] 126 p. illus. (Vietnam information series) DS557.A6A127, v. 1

Contents.--pt. 1. [Major events]: from World War II to the signing of the 1954 Geneva agreements on Indochina. From July 1954 to late 1960. From 1961 to the end of 1964. From 1965 to the end of 1966.--pt. 2. Documents.

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Presents evidence in support of the contention that the United States has waged an imperialistic and aggressive war against the people of Vietnam. Documents include official statements and proclamations of U.S. and North and South Vietnamese leaders, extracts from treaties and declarations relating to the international status of Vietnam, and reports by the International Commission for Supervision and Control.

553
Cohen, Jerome A. CHINA POLICY. Atlantic monthly, v. 227, Jan. 1971: 12, 14, 16.
AP2.A8, v. 227

Now that even the Vatican has decided to seek reconciliation with Communist China, the United States is under more pressure than ever to revise its China policy. The Nixon administration has demonstrated more flexibility toward Peking than any of its predecessors, but it has also gone out of its way to emphasize support of the Chiang Kai-shek regime. The case of Peng Ming-min, a leader of the Taiwan independence movement, illustrates the difficult position of the United States. Peng was arrested by Chiang's secret police and sentenced by a Nationalist military tribunal on charges of "subversive" activities, but he managed to escape and applied for an American visa in order to accept a teaching offer in the United States. Both Nationalist and Communist China fear that Peng may galvanize support for a Taiwan independence movement. The U.S. decision to admit Peng reflects the change in opinion within and outside Government in favor of some form of accommodation on the question of Taiwan's status.

554
Copper, John F. US-CHINA RAPPROACHMENT AND TAIWAN. China report, v. 6, July/Aug. 1970: 27-30.
DS777.55.C4484, v. 6

The general U.S. military disengagement from Asia, the partial lifting of the U.S. trade embargo against China, and the reversion of Okinawa to Japan, coupled with rising Sino-Japanese and Sino-Soviet tensions, indicate that the prospects for decreased Sino-American tensions are good. In fact, tensions between the two countries have declined considerably over the past few months, and both sides have elected to tone down the Taiwan issue as a factor in the U.S.-China relationship. However, while many of the barriers to Sino-American rapprochement have been overcome, and while Taiwan is no longer an obstacle to Sino-American cooperation over the short run, cordial relations will be blocked by China's determination to "liberate" Taiwan over the long run, the unacceptability of the two-Chinas approach, and the impossibility of realizing any other type of permanent settlement in the near future.

555
Cutler, Neal E. GENERATIONAL SUCCESSION AS A SOURCE OF FOREIGN POLICY ATTITUDES: A COHORT ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN OPINION, 1946-1966. Journal of peace research, no. 1, 1970: 33-47.
AS9.J6, 1970

This study analyzes generational trends in American foreign policy attitudes over the 1946-66 period. Through the secondary analysis of old public opinion polls, each of which can be sorted on the age variable, it is possible to adapt the demographer's concept of cohort analysis for the investigation of longitudinal attitude trends. While isolating the generational effects, the logic and technique of cohort analysis eliminate the maturation effects of the age variable. Eight question-sets, representing cognitions, evaluations, and policy preferences germane to foreign policy, were subjected to cohort analysis. Several identifiable generational trends were located. The historically more recent generational cohorts are correlated with greater salience of foreign policy, greater the expectation of war, and greater the support for various foreign policy alternatives. In general, the data support the image of historically older generations as being somewhat isolationist, in the sense of desiring minimal contact with the outside world, while the more recent generational cohorts support a multifaceted engagement with the outside world. (Abstract supplied)

556
Deakin, James. WHO IS MAKING U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: THE 'NEW' OR THE 'OLD' NIXON? War/peace report, v. 10, Dec. 1970: 3-7. illus.
JX1901.W38, v. 10

Questions the sincerity of President Nixon's foreign policy. Deakin sees Nixon's proposal to replace an era of confrontation with an era of negotiation as more rhetoric than substance, and doubts whether the key component of this policy--the strategic arms limitation talks--will lead to any basic change in the arms race. The Nixon or Guam doctrine, by which the administration hopes to reduce the Nation's overseas military commitments, may constitute a fundamental change in U.S. policy, as Nixon claims, or it may be designed primarily to undermine domestic opposition to unpopular military involvements.

557
Dönhoff, Marion, Gräfin. [THE GERMAN OSTPOLITIK] Die deutsche Ostpolitik. Erlenbach-Zürich, Stuttgart, Rentsch [1968] 28 p. (Schriftenreihe zu aktuellen problemen aus Politik und Wirtschaft, 3)
DD259.4.D583

Traces the evolution of West Germany's Ostpolitik from Adenauer to the Grand Coalition, dealing with the Oder-Neisse boundary problem, the recognition of East Germany, and the renunciation of atomic weapons. Dönhoff believes that the Adenauer regime had a unifying concept (the Hallstein doctrine) and no practical policy, while the Kiesinger government had a policy (that is, many small pragmatic policies) but no unifying concept. He concludes that it is not possible for Bonn to execute a long-term policy, since the superpowers who manage the world's affairs themselves "live from hand to mouth and do not know their own next step."

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558
Drummond, Stuart. THE GERMAN FEDERAL REPUBLIC'S POLICY TOWARDS EASTERN EUROPE. Army quarterly, v. 101, Oct. 1970: 30-35.
U1.A85, v. 101

Reviews the major developments of West Germany's Ostpolitik. Drummond feels that the federal government has done everything conceivable to seek Allied approval of its policies. France and Great Britain have expressed their conviction that Brandt's policy is in the general interest of Europe. Only the United States seems concerned that any change in Europe may upset the balance to America's detriment and that the Ostpolitik will create a deep division in West Germany, ending bipartisanship in foreign affairs. As to the West German-Soviet renunciation-of-force agreement, the West German Government has stated that the treaty neither precludes future peaceful reunification nor affects the rights of the four powers concerning Germany and Berlin.

559
End, Heinrich. [THE FOREIGN AND MILITARY POLICY OF SPAIN] Die auswärtige Militärpolitik Spaniens. Europa-Archiv, v. 25, Oct. 25, 1970: 747-756.
D839.E86, v. 25

Besides the preferential agreement with the European Economic Community and the beginning of a dialog with the Eastern bloc, two treaties reveal Spain's new foreign policy: the military agreement with France and, more importantly, the treaty of cooperation with the United States. The treaty with Paris gives Madrid an opportunity to diversify its foreign and military policy and serves as a model for European bilateral initiatives, which might be important in light of American troop reductions in Europe. For Paris the treaty is a means to realize its hope of becoming a Mediterranean power neutralizing the two superpowers. Spain's treaty with the United States guarantees the American presence on the Iberian peninsula for 5 additional years. Therefore it strengthens NATO, the security of the West, the strategic balance in Middle Europe and in the Mediterranean, and the position of the West in possible mutual balanced force reduction negotiations. To make this treaty more successful it would be desirable for the Americans to use the civil aspects of this treaty to further the necessary internal reforms in Spain.

560
Fabricius, pseud. THE SINO-AMERICAN CONFRONTATION. AN ANALYSIS. Réalités [Eng. ed.] no. 240, Nov. 1970: 31-33, 94. AP4.R2164, 1970

Traces the causes of the Sino-American conflict. Although the fundamental issues will remain unresolved in the immediate future, this does not necessarily preclude the possibility of a renewed Sino-American dialogue. The United States has recently implemented several limited but important policy changes that would have a favorable impact on U.S.-China relations over the short run. For example, trade and travel restrictions involving Communist China have been eased, military patrols in the Formosa Strait have been reduced, and U.S. policy vis-a-vis the Sino-Soviet border dispute has been kept neutral. Although the Chinese have not officially responded to these initiatives, preferring perhaps to withhold concessions pending a clarification of U.S. intentions in Asia, and although the general tone of their propaganda remains hostile toward the United States, they obviously welcome these changes. Sweeping changes in American attitudes toward China will have to be grounded on a more knowledgeable assessment of Communist Chinese interests in Asia, which could only grow from a formal U.S.-China understanding.

561
Goodman, Elliot R. NATO AND GERMAN REUNIFICATION. Survey, no. 76, summer 1970: 30-40.
DK1.S549, 1970

NATO must be concerned with the prospects and possible terms of a German settlement, because the West must identify itself with the legitimate aim of self-determination for the entire German nation. If the Western democracies refuse their support to this cause, West Germany may return to its autocratic traditions. Bonn's break with NATO would end its 1954 renunciation of the use of atomic, biological, and chemical weapons. The concept of German reunification has been basically transformed over time. In the effort to foster the liberalization of East Germany that has been inspired by the hope of alleviating living conditions there, West Germany has advanced unreciprocated concessions. The Brezhnev doctrine should finally dispel the illusion that East Germany will be permitted to find its way to a democratic regime. Bonn's present initiatives toward the East might result in recognition of the East European status quo and the disruption of the West European situation. Only the close and continuous association of West Germany's Ostpolitik with the policies of its NATO allies can prevent the estrangement of Bonn from the West and the disintegration of the West itself.

562
Hayter, Sir William. RUSSIA AND THE WORLD; A STUDY IN SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY. New York, Taplinger Pub. Co. [1970] 133 p. ([World realities series])
DK274.H35 1970

Contents.--Foreword.--Introduction.--The theory.--The practice.--The machinery.--The personalities.--Czechoslovakia.--Germany.--The Third World.--China.--International organization.--The United States.--Conclusions.

A survey of Soviet foreign policy since 1964, the year of Khrushchev's fall from power. Hayter concludes that for the moment Soviet policy is a "tough, determined but conservative consolidation of existing positions." Nevertheless, prodded by age-old insecurities, the Soviet Union even now is providing itself "with the equipment, both ideological and strategic, for a more forward policy on a world-wide scale." The chances of a direct clash between the superpowers have been greatly reduced by mutual fear of nuclear weapons and the absence of any real conflict of interest aside from ideology. Though an overall accommodation lies far in the future, regional settlements between the two powers or limited agreements in areas like arms control should be possible. Any

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agreement that led to the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Europe would be disastrous, however.

563
Heath, Edward. INTERVIEW WITH BRITAIN'S PRIME MINISTER EDWARD HEATH. U.S. news & world report, v. 69, Dec. 21, 1970: 24-26, 29-30.
JK1.U65, v. 69

The new Prime Minister's views on the U.S. contribution to European security, the British military presence East of Suez, the Soviet naval buildup in the Mediterranean, superpower and East-West relations, the Vietnam War, the Middle East crisis, and British domestic issues. Heath believes that although the Soviet Union has by no means abandoned Leninist goals in foreign policy, it does not want war, and that "given careful exploration and negotiation, agreements on certain matters of substance should be possible in Europe."

564
Holloway, Jerome K. EAST ASIA AND THE GUAM DOCTRINE. Foreign service journal, v. 47, Nov. 1970: 40-42. JX1.A53, v. 47

Reviews the circumstances that made President Nixon's pronouncement of a changed stance in East Asia necessary if an era of negotiation with the Soviet Union was to begin. Long steps toward reduced presence and a lower profile have been stimulated by domestic pressure and such acts of enlightened statesmanship as the reversion of Okinawa. Looking beyond Cambodia, and even beyond Vietnam, Holloway predicts the persistence of the Guam doctrine, because it is supported by Asian leaders and by much of the foreign policy establishment, and, most importantly, because it can be made to reflect the budgetary and political realities of the United States in the 1970's without needlessly exposing America or its friends in East Asia to danger. To reflect the real situation, the foreign-affairs community must be so staffed and structured as to recognize the primacy of domestic problems.

565
Hill, Norman L. THE NEW DEMOCRACY IN FOREIGN POLICY MAKING. Lincoln, University of Nebraska Press [1970] 150 p. E840.H48

Contents.--Preface.--The new democracy.--The problem.--Democratic policy making, 1914-45.--Democratic policy making, 1945-70.--The people's approach to policy.--A viable democracy.--What the people can and cannot do.--What the Congress can and cannot do.--Presidential leadership.--Index.

Advocates the restoration of Presidential primacy in U.S. foreign policy making. The United States, as a democracy, has but two options available to it: "an undisciplined type of democracy in which the people and the Congress dominate the president to the point of vitiating or destroying his foreign-policy efforts, and a more mature democracy in which the citizens are cognizant of the special competence of their elected president and willing, without excessive meddling, to give him a chance."

566
Hunt, Kenneth. SOVIET-GERMAN TREATY AND EUROPEAN SECURITY. Army, v. 20, Dec. 1970: 12-17. illus.
U1.A893, v. 20

The Soviet-German treaty marks a change of attitude by Moscow toward Bonn, but it is too early to say that it represents a full-fledged East-West détente, for implicit in the West's interpretation of détente is a modification of the political and social status quo in Europe that the Soviet Union will not accept. For Moscow, the treaty may be one way of maintaining its hegemony in the East while extending the illusion of a genuine détente to the West. The illusion appears when the Soviet Union enters into negotiations with the West. These negotiations, which are economically motivated to improve domestic conditions and enable the Russians to compete with economies more vigorous than their own, are bound to have their effects. For one, the illusion of détente makes it difficult to justify military expenditures, because "Soviet capabilities are less regarded than intentions, which are too easily assumed to be benign." However, the invasion of Czechoslovakia will have stunned many nations out of their euphoria for some time to come. The Soviet-German treaty suggests that the Soviets want a period of quiet in Europe. On the other hand, they may want to wean West Germany away from the West to weaken a potentially strong West European economic bloc. The West must continue to talk with caution and from a position of strength and to resist Soviet attempts to dilute the defense and security of Western Europe and America's commitment to it. But the West must continue to talk, for "détente by itself means nothing, what matters is the use that is made of it, the progress that can be won."

567
JAPANESE-AMERICAN RELATIONS IN THE 1970S. [Gerald L. Curtis, editor] Washington, Columbia Books, 1970. 204 p. E183.8.J3J35

Contents.--Introduction, by Gerald L. Curtis.--Toward a new era in Japanese-American relations, by Fuji Kamiya.--The United States and Japan in the 1970s, by Marius B. Jansen.--Growth for what? The issue of the seventies, by James W. Morley.--Japanese economic cooperation in Asia in the 1970s, by Saburo Okita.--The future of United States policy in Southeast Asia, by George McT. Kahin.--Peace in Asia in the 1970s: Coexistence and competition with the "shadow of China," by Mineo Nakajima.--American policy toward Japan in the seventies: the need for disengagement, by Gerald L. Curtis.--Final Report of the Second Japanese-American Assembly.

Background papers prepared by Japanese and American scholars for the scholars, government officials, businessmen, and communications specialists of both nations who participated in the Second Japanese-American Assembly, Shimodo, Japan, Sept. 4-7, 1969, sponsored jointly by the Japan Council for International Understanding and the American Assembly. The papers, which were designed specifically to further understanding of the outstanding issues in U.S.-Japan relations, provide a comprehensive survey of this relationship since World War II. In plenary session on the last day of the conference the participants

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reviewed the Assembly's final report. Although it was not officially adopted, "the report represents general agreement." While the participants postulated that Japan will play a more influential role in Southeast Asia in the coming decade, they urged the United States to make greater contributions to economic development programs and called on both powers to eliminate trade barriers and normalize relations with Communist China. In addition, they asked for a quick settlement of the Vietnam War and a timetable for Okinawa's reversion to Japan. A wide range of opinion existed regarding the desirability of the mutual security treaty, but at the same time most agreed that there was no immediate alternative to automatic extension. The participants predicted a possible increase in Sino-Soviet hostilities and concluded that a military confrontation between China and the Soviet Union would not be in the interest of either the United States or Japan.

568
Khalili, Joseph E. COMMUNIST CHINA'S INTERACTION WITH THE ARAB NATIONALISTS SINCE THE BANDUNG CONFERENCE. New York, Exposition Press [1970] 121 p. (An Exposition-university book)
DS63.2.C5K5
Includes bibliographic references.

Contents.--Introduction.--Communism and Arab nationalism.--Communist China and the Arab revolutionary movements.--China and the Arabs on world issues.--The Arabs and China in the Afro-Asian conferences.--China-Arab trade and cultural relations.--Conclusion.

Analyzes the Sino-Arab relationship since the Bandung Conference in 1955. By giving psychological support and economic aid to the Arab States, Communist China hopes to gain international recognition as a Great Power and the sole legitimate government of China, eliminate Western influence in the region, win wider support for its policies toward the West and within the international Communist movement, and gain further acceptance of its revolutionary developmental model. Although Arab nationalism will militate against long-term Chinese influence in the Arab world, this does not necessarily preclude short-term Chinese gains, given the unstable economic, political, and military situation in the region.

569
Kirchschläger, Rudolf. [FOREIGN POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY] Aussenpolitik und internationale Sicherheit. Österreichische Zeitschrift für Aussenpolitik, v. 10, no. 4, 1970: 245-249.
DB47.043, 1970
Speech by the Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs, given at the opening of the Diplomatic Seminar, Schloss Klesheim, July 1970.

The highest goal of politics is the maintenance of peace. The interdependence of politics and technology is now immutable, as seen in the strategic arms limitation talks. Austria's foreign policy must protect Austrian, European, and universal security. Too often governments deal only with East-West problems, but the second U.N. development decade should stimulate work on the infrastructure of the developing countries. Austria's neutrality, geopolitical position, and U.N. membership provide a basis for stability and détente in Europe. A Government memorandum supporting the proposed European security conference expresses Austria's desire for a problem-solving and opinion-clearing forum, in which Austria can participate without taking sides. The Austrian application for membership in the U.N. Security Council expresses its interest in peacekeeping activities. Austria urges European political, social, cultural, and economic cooperation, which are not incompatible with a certain measure of nationalism.

570
Loch, Theo M. [THE SPLIT IMAGE OF EUROPE] Das gespaltene Europabild. Politische Meinung, v. 15, no. 3, 1970: 36-41.
H5.P75, v. 15

What political achievements can the Federal Republic of Germany claim thus far regarding European politics? How does Bonn envision the realization of the program established at the summit conference in The Hague? Does the West German Ostpolitik endanger European politics? German policies within the European Economic Community tend too much toward procrastinating about political decisions and underrating their importance. Thus Germany is caught in the schizophrenia of wanting to act as a pacemaker in achieving a united Europe in the West and as a representative of détente policy in the East. Sooner or later Germany will have to support the basic setup of the European Economic Community as a basis for an all-European peace order, even if the Soviet Union and its satellites criticize the organization as "a capitalist attempt to construct a total anti-Soviet Western Europe." As long as Germany refuses to take a firm stand or answer the elementary question of how European unity is to be constructed, there are many reasons for concern and distrust regarding Germany's European politics and the inherent threat of a new German nationalism.

571
Maclean, Donald D. BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY SINCE SUEZ, 1956-1968. [London] Hodder & Stoughton [1970]
DA592.M3 1970

Contents.--Foreword.--pt. 1. Policy towards the other Western powers: New patterns in Western relationships. Anglo-American relations. Britain and Western Europe.--pt. 2. Policy towards the Third World: General evolution of policy. The Middle East. Africa South of the Sahara. South and South-East Asia.--pt. 3. Policy towards the Communist powers: The Soviet Union and the other European Communist states. China and the other Asian Communist states.

Examines recent trends in British foreign policy. Maclean maintains that Great Britain is still passing through a period of readjustment brought about by a relative decline in its power. Britain must find a corrective for its persistent tendency to overestimate its real power in the world and contract its radius of action accordingly. In compensation, it can expect to see its freedom of maneuver increase in Europe. Under pressure from technological imperatives, it must also work out

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better international economic relationships, particularly with the continent of Europe.

572
Mathias, Charles McC. AMERICA AND ASIA. Foreign service journal, v. 47, Nov. 1970: 46-48, 58.
JX1.A53, v. 47

In ending its wars, America has historically failed to establish the conditions of a lasting peace. The Nixon doctrine hopes to avoid future instability and war in Southeast Asia by shifting regional defense to indigenous organizations for collective security. However, the assumption that successful Vietnamization will encourage other indigenous forces capable of filling the power vacuum in Southeast Asia ignores the existence in Hanoi of a countervailing force capable of aborting any collective-security arrangement. By leaving Southeast Asia, the Americans may force the states of the region to devise their own security against Peking. The Vietnam adventure must be obliterated from American minds as a "harrowing experience, ultimately irrelevant to our real interests in Asia." The key test of the Nixon doctrine will come in breaking the Japanese and Thai psychological dependence upon a heavy American military presence. The unilateral American military engagement in Thailand should be reexamined. In the economic realm, a shortsighted American protectionism would seriously cripple whole sections of the Japanese economy and endanger the Japanese-American security treaty.

573
Müller-Hermann, Ernst. [BONN BETWEEN THE WORLD POWERS. PERSPECTIVES OF GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY] Bonn zwischen den Weltmächten. Perspektiven der deutschen Aussenpolitik. Düsseldorf, Wien, Econ-Verlag [1969] 199 p. (Econ aktuell)
DD259.4.M8
Bibliography: p. 198-[200].

Contents.--Points of departure toward a rational policy.--German interests--German policies.--Bipolar strategy of the superpowers.--Polycentrism. --Our contribution to overcoming European division.--The German problem.--Final remarks.

States that politicians have been striving to secure peace by maintaining a vacillating balance of power. The second half of this century has been marked by an acceleration, consolidation, and worldwide interdependence of changes furthered by technological and economic developments. Politicians must work within this dynamic framework, without attempting to turn back the wheel of history. This consideration holds true for German policy as well. Between the established bipolarity of Washington and Moscow there is a polycentric field of power of the smaller countries, which, in the heterogeneity of their own interests, partly supports, partly destroys, this bipolarity. Against this background the author outlines German foreign policies. He contends that these policies must be rational, taking into account the interests both of the superpowers and of the smaller powers. European division can be overcome only by maintaining the existing balance of power and by preventing Germany from becoming a threat to its neighbors. Therefore Germany must contribute to a greater united Europe, in which both Germanys can participate.

574
Neumann, Robert G. A PERSPECTIVE FROM ASIA. Foreign service journal, v. 47, Nov. 1970: 22-25.
JX1.A53, v. 47

An important requirement for a low-posture foreign policy is the skillful use of significant but not predominant power, that is, maximum control and flexibility in the management of limited resources. Notwithstanding the decision to withdraw from Vietnam, a continued American military presence in Asia remains necessary. Most Asian countries are secretly convinced of the desirability of a low-posture American military presence. A triangular big-power situation (Moscow, Peking, and Washington) is more reassuring than any possible bipolar situation. In the long run a low-posture American presence in Asia would be salutary for Soviet-American relations as well. Prospects for improvement of Peking's attitude by any means are doubtful, but a low-posture presence might restrain Peking's inclinations toward hysteria. Those who mold public opinion within America must work to disseminate the realization that the quest for instant solutions in foreign affairs is a delusion.

575
O'Neill, Robert. NEW ATTITUDES FOR A NEW DECADE: SOME CONCLUSIONS FOR AUSTRALIAN FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS ASIA IN THE 1970S. Australian outlook, v. 24, Aug. 1970: 111-123.
DU80.A947, v. 24
Paper presented to a seminar of the Australian Institute of International Affairs in late 1969.

Examines the direction Australian foreign policy may take in the next decade in light of Australia's relations with the Great Powers and with the Asian countries whose stability and needs directly affect Australia. O'Neill notes Australia's reluctance to sign the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, and he concedes that although the treaty cannot prevent cheating it is an indispensable first measure toward stabilizing international politics during the 1970's. He concludes that Australia's relations with the Great Powers will be its most controversial diplomatic element during this period. He emphasizes Australia's future relations with the United States and Communist China and the Soviet presence in Asia and the Indian Ocean.

576
Oschlies, Wolf. [WHY DOES THE USSR NEED THE TREATY WITH THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY?] Warum braucht die UdSSR den Vertrag mit der Bundesrepublik? Europäische Begegnung, v. 10, Nov. 1970: 8-11.
AP30.E78, v. 10

The Soviet Union needs the treaty with the Federal Republic of Germany because the Kremlin's foreign policy objectives, mobilization at the Chinese border, naval expansion, and other military commitments are draining the Soviet budget, and the treaty will allow the Soviet Union to import German goods, equipment, and know-how. The

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Soviet Union's attempt to reach a nuclear agreement with the United States also shows its interest in détente and peace in Europe. It is improbable that the Soviet Union had an aggressive divide-and-conquer strategy in mind, since it has high hopes that any rapprochement with the West will improve the Russian economy. Although West Germans need not fear the treaty, they should keep in mind that the Berlin problem remains unsolved and that the "enemy-state clauses" have not been renounced officially. The treaty will give Germany the chance to erase the anti-German feelings of the Soviet people created by memories of World War II and Communist propaganda.

577
Pachter, Henry M. RUSSIA AS A WORLD POWER. TRADITION AND REVOLUTION IN SOVIET POLITICS] Weltmacht Russland. Tradition und Revolution in der Sowjetpolitik. [Von] Heinz Pächter. [Vom Autor bearb. und erg. Ausg. München] Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag [1970] 398 p. (DTV [-Taschenbücher] 675)
DK66.P3 1970
Bibliography: p. 390-[394].

Contents.--Foreword to the pocketbook edition.--Introduction.--Historical perspectives.--The Soviet theory of foreign policy.--Lenin's foreign policy.--Liquidation of communism.--The great patriotic war.--The red imperium.--The nuclear stalemate and Stalin's legacy.--Khrushchev's era.--Conflicts in the Third World.--Soviet policy, yesterday, today, and tomorrow.--Index.

Analysis to determine whether expansionist interests or ideological motives influence Soviet policy. Pachter points to the almost unbroken history of Russian expansionism from the time of Peter the Great to the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Fear of China and internal political and economic difficulties have induced the Soviets to seek a rapprochement with the United States in the strategic arms limitation talks and with the West in general. However, Pachter thinks that the West is fortunate in negotiating with intelligent people aware of their interests, since otherwise diplomacy would be impossible. Present Soviet policy is based mainly on military strength, and culture is suppressed by neo-Stalinism. The West, particularly Germany, must be cautious to keep coexistence free of illusions. There is room for optimism if Europe becomes a strong unity and if the cold war is de-ideologized.

578
Park, Bong-sik. FOREIGN DIPLOMACY AND KOREA'S INTERNATIONAL POSITION. Korea journal, v. 10, Aug. 1970: 25-31. DS901.K7, v. 10

Focuses on the Korean reunification problem and South Korea's relations with the United States, the United Nations, and Japan and also surveys U.S.-Soviet rivalry in Korea at the end of World War II and other developments leading to the division of Korea. If the Japanese military buildup continues at the present rate, Japan will be in a position to contain expanding Communist Chinese influence and to exert political and military pressure on South Korea by the mid-1970's. Although the United States may never become involved in another Asian war, the implementation of the Nixon doctrine will not entail a complete U.S. withdrawal from Asia because the United States, as a power in the area, will maintain an interest in Asian problems. However the United States is anxious to have Japan assume a more active role in the maintenance of security in the region and appears willing to recognize Communist China. When taken together, these developments are likely to have a profound impact on South Korea's foreign policy, particularly its policy toward the United States. It is therefore in South Korea's interest to adopt a more independent and flexible foreign policy posture.

579
Poole, Peter A. THE EXPANSION OF THE VIETNAM WAR INTO CAMBODIA: ACTION AND RESPONSE BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF NORTH VIETNAM, SOUTH VIETNAM, CAMBODIA, AND THE UNITED STATES. Athens, Ohio University Center for International Studies, Southeast Asia Program, 1970. 59 l. (Papers in international studies. Southeast Asia series, no. 17)
DLC
Bibliographical footnotes.

Contents.--Preface.--Introduction.--Events leading to the anti-Sihanouk coup.--Initial diplomatic response.--Lon Nol-Sirik Matak government's foreign policy.--U.S. approach during first month of crisis.--President Nixon's decision to attack sanctuaries in Cambodia.

A diplomatic history of the U.S. military intervention in Cambodia based primarily on press reports and personal interviews. Poole contends that the decision to intervene was a serious blunder in terms of the goals stated by President Nixon, no matter how it affected internal political and military events in Cambodia.

580
Rahul. INDIA'S CHANGING CHINA POLICY. China report, v. 6, July/Aug. 1970: 16-20.
DS777.55.C4484, v. 6

Analyzes recent trends in Sino-Indian relations and concludes that the Indian Government has adopted a more flexible policy toward Peking. Although India's friendly relations with the Soviet Union and the United States, along with China's drive for hegemony over the Himalayan States, are major obstacles to a Sino-Indian détente, the Chinese may attempt to offset Russia's growing influence in Asia by opting for improved relations with India. India, however, would not seek a rapprochement with Peking at the expense of its more advantageous relationship with the superpowers. One thing is clear: a thaw in Sino-Indian relations can occur only if China is willing to accept and respect India's independence.

581
Schilling, Jürgen. [EUROPE'S ALTERNATIVES--POSED ANEW?] Die Alternativen Europas--neu gestellt? Merkur; deutsche Zeitschrift für europäisches Denken, v. 24, Oct. 1970: 920-928.
AP30.M43, v. 24

In light of the new German Ostpolitik, how may efforts toward integration in the West be recon-

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ciled with policies toward the East? The main question is whether the treaty with the Soviet Union will strengthen or weaken German security and the construction of the Europe of the future. The buildup of the Soviet fleet and Russia's arms race with the United States indicate expansionist tendencies; however, the strategic arms limitation talks, the Chinese threat, and the fact that the Soviet Union lags economically and technologically make it plausible that the Soviet Union is seriously interested in détente. Fears that the United States may dislike the new Ostpolitik to the extent of abandoning its European engagement seem ungrounded in light of Washington's military and economic interests in Europe. The Moscow Treaty is of vital importance for European policy. West Germany would lose its advantage by waiting for a West European political union, which would most probably be answered by an Eastern counterpart in which the German Democratic Republic becomes a province of a Soviet superstate. Germany must prove its competence to negotiate with the East--naturally, under strict consultation with its Western allies--and thus pave the way for a better American-Soviet relationship.

582
Schlamm, William C. STALIN-HITLER PACT, 1970 MODEL? National review, v. 22, Sept. 8, 1970: 946-947.
AP2.N3545, v. 22

By virtue of the West German-Soviet renunciation-of-force agreement West Germany recognizes the Oder-Neisse Line as the Polish-German border; acknowledges East Germany as a sovereign, independent "second German state"; and accepts the Brezhnev Doctrine as a valid prescription for all of Eastern Europe. These changes would be "tantamount to a demolition of the European status quo the defense of which was the sole reason, and the only justification, for America's presence in Europe." Willy Brandt has violated Germany's agreement with NATO, which forbids bilateral dealings with the Soviet Union and, despite his reassurances, has, in effect, told the United States to withdraw its troops from the Federal Republic. The treaty denies to Germany a legitimate claim to national unity, precludes the possibility of European unification, and improves Russia's chances of achieving hegemony over all of Europe. It may prove a more effective tool for wrecking the free world than was the 1939 German-Soviet nonagression pact.

583
Schmidt, Helmut. [STRATEGY OF BALANCE; GERMAN PEACE POLICY AND THE WORLD POWERS] Strategie des Gleichgewichts. Deutsche Friedenspolitik und die Weltmächte. Stuttgart, Seewald Verlag [1969] 325 p.
DD257.4.S335

Contents.--Preliminary remark.--Introduction: On the Germans and strategy.--World history in the era of bipolarity.--Consequences of modern weapons.--The Soviet concept of limited risk.--Europe in the eyes of our neighbors.--The roles of the hostile brothers.--The position of the West.--Principles of our foreign policy.--Our external security at the beginning of the new decade.--Internal stability: progress instead of stagnation.

Presents German security policy and internal relations as integral parts of foreign policy in the effort to determine the possibilities and limits of German peace politics as affected by the interests, motives, and strategies of other states. Concepts of foreign policy and military strategy are considered as determined by moral and political principles on the one hand and by the actual situation on the other. Schmidt asserts that the Vietnam War demonstrates the future importance of China and the limits of the cooperation of the two world powers. Arms control stabilizes the balance of power, but it would be much more effective if arms transfers were outlawed. Security forms the basis for détente, and it is the task of German politicians to strive for progress, freedom, and security. The dissatisfaction of youth should not be answered by drastically throwing overboard all old concepts but by attempting to achieve economic and social justice with common decisionmaking on all possible levels. The German Armed Forces need to be reformed, and the concept of deterrence must be made understandable and acceptable to soldiers and society alike.

584
Schweitzer, Carl-Christoph. [AMERICA'S CHINESE DILEMMA; CASE STUDY OF FOREIGN POLICY DECISIONS IN AN OPEN SOCIETY] Amerikas chinesisches Dilemma; Fallstudie über aussenpolitische Entscheidungen in einer offenen Gesellschaft. Köln, Westdeutscher Verlag, 1969. 341 p.
E183.8.C5S34
Bibliography: p. [321]-334.

Contents.--Introduction.--Governmental policy- and decision-making processes in foreign policy from the example of the China policy.--Influences from the intermediary group sector on policy- and decision-making process in foreign policy and opinions of these groups on the China policy.--Anglo-American interdependencies in the China policy.--Summary.--Name and subject index.

Shows the interdependence between domestic and foreign policy in the China policy of the United States between 1949 and 1951 and compares it to Great Britain's China policy. Schweitzer explains the pressures exerted by influential opinion leaders, groups, and lobbies, which have made a reversal of the American Asia and China policy increasingly difficult. Knowledge of this period facilitates understanding of the present Vietnam conflict. The important question is again whether the United States should end the war soon by escalating the indirect war against Peking, thereby risking a direct confrontation with China, or whether Washington wants to maintain its present strategy and attempt to come to a diplomatic settlement with China, including recognition and U.N. membership. Such a settlement would automatically end the Indochina war. Schweitzer points to the important interdependence between America's policies toward Asia and Europe and questions whether the triangular relationship between Washington, Peking, and Moscow will again be fateful for Germany.

585
Sethi, J. D. NEGOTIATING WITH PAKISTAN. In Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. Journal, v. 2, Jan. 1970: 309-321.
UA840.I55, v. 2

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A critical assessment of the foreign policies of India and Pakistan in light of the deterioration in their relationship subsequent to the 1965 war. Sethi emphasizes the preconditions for improved relations, the impact of Sino-Pakistani cooperation on the Indo-Pakistani conflict, and their divergent approaches to Great Power politics in the region. The lack of initiative and firmness in India's foreign policy toward Pakistan can be attributed to the mixed influence of liberalism, sentimentality, good intentions, and a false understanding of Pakistan's strategy. This "soft" approach takes a short-term view of the problem and fails to realize that concessions on individual issues will never change Pakistan's anti-Indian policy for the better. If India is to promote peace and stability in the region, it will have to adopt a more flexible, firm, and coherent policy vis-a-vis Pakistan.

586
Simmons, Robert R. THE PEKING-PYONGYANG-MOSCOW TRIANGLE. Current scene, v. 8, Nov. 7, 1970: 8-18.
DS701.C9, v. 8

"Notes": p. 18.

Traces North Korea's shifting policy toward the Soviet Union and Communist China. Prior to 1960, it was possible for Pyongyang to accept aid from both powers simultaneously. However, with the emergence of the Sino-Soviet dispute, this became more difficult. North Korea was forced to choose between Peking's revolutionary support and international respectability and the substantial military and economic aid available from Russia. Sino-North Korean relations were governed not so much by Chinese foreign policy as by Moscow's willingness to fulfill North Korean demands for aid. The possibility of renewed hostilities on the Korean peninsula should not be overlooked, but in the event of such hostilities, Communist China would probably provide only limited aid to North Korea. To develop economically, maintain its independent foreign policy posture, and sustain its policy of fomenting dissidence in the South, Pyongyang will need the support of both of its Communist neighbors. Nonetheless, North Korea still seems to favor the Chinese line on major foreign policy and ideological issues.

587
Sinha, Mira. NEPAL'S ROLE IN SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS: 1949-1969. In Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. Journal, v. 2, Apr. 1970: 456-486. UA840.I55, v. 2

A chronological survey of Sino-Nepali relations from 1949 to 1969, presented within the wider framework of the changing Sino-Indian relationship, particularly the ramifications of the Sino-Indian confrontation. Sinha maintains that India cannot continue to assume that it enjoys a special relationship with Nepal. However, since Nepal is vital to Indian security, India should attempt to cultivate a close relationship. As a first step, it should recognize Nepal's sovereignty, based on a reassessment of the Chinese threat. If India fails to implement a more effective policy in Nepal, it could jeopardize its position in Bhutan and Sikkim.

588
Sladkovskii, M. SOME LESSONS OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR IN THE FAR EAST. International affairs (Moscow) no. 10, Oct. 1970: 39-43.
D839.I465, 1970

The entry of the Soviet Union into the war against Japan led to the war's swift conclusion and a new alinement of forces in the Far East. However, the possible democratic development of Japan was aborted by American promotion of the interests of Japanese monopoly capital. Now Washington has assigned Japan a leading role in the implementation of the Guam doctrine and supported Japan's interests in the security of Korea and Taiwan. It is clear that the ambitions for leadership of Japan's ruling classes are not limited to Taiwan and Korea. The course taken by Japanese monopoly capital will encounter determined resistance by progressive forces everywhere. "Life cruelly punishes all who, ignoring the lessons of history, turn adventurism into a method of national policy."

589
THE SOVIET UNION, 1970. Current history, v. 59, Oct. 1970: 193-246.
D410.C82, v. 59

Partial contents.--The United States and the Soviet Union: the elusive peace, by Norman A. Graebner.--The Soviet Union and West Europe, by Kurt L. London.--Soviet aims in East Europe, by Vernon V. Aspaturian.--The Soviet interest in the Middle East, by Robert G. Wesson.

Essays on Soviet foreign policy and its goals. Graebner reviews the Soviet-U.S. competition for world hegemony since World War II. London contends that the Soviet Union remains committed to the goal of dominating Western as well as Eastern Europe and discounts the possibility of genuine East-West détente until there is a fundamental change in Soviet foreign policy. Aspaturian assesses the effects of the Brezhnev doctrine on Eastern Europe and explores the prospects for West Germany's Ostpolitik. Wesson finds that the Soviet Union has acquired a semi-empire in the Middle East, having expanded its influence dramatically since the 1967 Arab-Israeli War.

590
Srivastava, R. K. INDIA-ISRAEL RELATIONS. Indian journal of political science, v. 31, July/Sept. 1970: 238-264. JA26.I5, v. 31

A chronological survey and analysis of Indo-Israeli relations. Successive Indian governments have elected to maintain a minimum of contacts with Israel despite internal and external pressures for the establishment of diplomatic relations. In fact, the gulf between the two countries has widened in recent years. Although the great and small powers can cultivate friendly relations with both the Arabs and Israelis simultaneously without jeopardizing their interests, India and the other middle powers are not in such an enviable position. By improving its relations with Israel, India would undermine its friendly relationship with the Arab States and the Soviet Union as well as its efforts to check growing Pakistani

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and Chinese influence in the Near East. However, India should attempt to secure a détente with Israel, particularly through unofficial diplomacy. If Arab-Israeli relations improve, India should seek long-term entente and cooperation with Israel, for once an Arab-Israeli rapprochement comes about, the non-Arab countries east of Suez will lose their importance for the Arab world.

591
STATEMENT ON QUESTIONS OF THE STRENGTHENING OF SECURITY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF PEACEFUL COOPERATION IN EUROPE. Current digest of the Soviet press, v. 22, Jan. 5, 1971: 2-3.
D839.C87, v. 22
Translated from Pravda and Izvestiia, Dec. 4, 1970. Slav Rm

Statement made following the Berlin Conference of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Member States and signed by Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and the Soviet Union. The conference participants welcomed the new West German Ostpolitik, expressed their solidarity with East Germany, and demanded West German recognition of the invalidity of the Munich agreement. They reaffirmed their call for an all-European security conference and the general positions on European security and disarmament set forth in the Bucharest Declaration of July 5, 1966.

592
Thornton, Thomas P. THE NIXON DOCTRINE AND BEYOND. Foreign service journal, v. 47, Nov. 1970: 19-21.
JX1.A53, v. 47

The first problem Washington faces in implementing a low-posture policy is making clear to other actors on the international scene how much of its role it is prepared to relinquish. A low-posture policy does not mean a low-risk policy, and the credibility of continuing U.S. commitments must be made clear if another Korea is to be avoided. America must reject the idea that the security of other countries is more important to it than it is to them, or that nations assuming its responsibilities will not also take over such benefits as it may have derived. The most difficult area for application of the new policies is Europe, where the decline in the U.S. political and security function should not be paralleled by a decline in its economic and cultural roles. In Latin America a low posture will mean something quite different from what the United States will be doing in Africa. A low-posture policy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union is possible only to the extent that it is reciprocated, which in turn can be the result only of hard negotiation backed by adequate military strength. The Nixon doctrine does not provide detailed and immediately useful guidance on the questions of the mechanisms that will effect this shift. Leadership in executing the new policy will probably remain within the U.S. National Security Council framework, while the Foreign Service and the Department of State will provide the political rationale and guidance for the period when diplomacy is reasserted as "the coin of the realm in [America's] international relations."

593
Timmermann, Heinz. [THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF FRANCE BETWEEN POPULAR-FRONT STRATEGY AND INTERNATIONALISM: FOREIGN RELATIONS PROBLEMS OF THE FRENCH COMMUNISTS] Die KPF zwischen Volksfront-Strategie und Internationalismus. Zur Problematik der Aussenbeziehungen der französichen Kommunisten. Europa-Archiv, v. 25, Nov. 25, 1970: 827-836.
D839.E86, v. 25

Asserts that the Communist Party of France is working to form a popular-front government in order to loosen the Western bloc. The author examines the degree of independence the party has achieved and its foreign-policy ideas. The French Communists give priority to French interests but more strongly support Soviet policies, condemning only interventionist and anti-Semitic tendencies. They want to use the proposed European security conference to dissolve the military blocs. Within the European Economic Community they want to set new economic and social trends to induce the member states to take up trade relations with all countries, including the Socialist countries. The French Communists criticize Pompidou's foreign policy more than the Soviets do. The Party fears American influence but welcomes the Bonn-Moscow treaty and supports West Germany's Ostpolitik. Although Moscow can still count on the French Communists, it recognizes the relationship between successful domestic strategy and a certain freedom of movement in foreign policies. Should the Soviets, for economic reasons, seek a rapprochement with a supranational organization, a controversy with the French party could arise.

594
U.S. Library of Congress. Legislative Reference Service. SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND AMERICAN DIPLOMACY: A SELECTED, ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF ARTICLES, BOOKS, DOCUMENTS, PERIODICALS, AND REFERENCE GUIDES. Prepared for the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, by the Science Policy Research and Foreign Affairs Divisions, Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress. [Compiled by Genevieve Johanna Knezo] Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1970. 69 p.
Z7405.P8U48
At head of title: Committee print.

An annotated bibliography (part of an extended study, two volumes of which are cited elsewhere in the current issue of this bibliography) containing approximately 330 selected books, documents, periodicals, and reference guides on science, technology, and diplomacy. Although several works published before 1965 are noted, the time period covered is 1965 through 1969. Items are arranged alphabetically in the order of articles, books, periodicals, and bibliographic tools.

595
U.S. Library of Congress. Legislative Reference Service. SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND AMERICAN DIPLOMACY: TOWARD A NEW DIPLOMACY IN A SCIENTIFIC AGE [by Franklin P. Huddle] Prepared for the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, by the Science Pol-

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icy Research and Foreign Affairs Divisions, Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1970. 28 p.
JX1417.U5
At head of title: Committee print.
Includes bibliographical references.

Outlines a project (part of an extended study, two volumes of which are cited elsewhere in the current issue of this bibliography) that will analyze the interaction of American diplomacy with science and technology to "define organizational requirements for the effective formulation of important policies to direct and control activities involving this interaction" and "discover ways in which science and technology can better support foreign policy objectives." Huddle proposes to employ the case-study method to assess issues and cases detailing the interactions of science and technology with diplomacy. Among the issues that will be examined are the evolution of international technology, world medicine, the brain-drain problem, and food and population; while the cases will include the international control of atomic energy, the United Nations and the seabed, the outer space treaty, and the NATO science program.

596
THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA: THE NEXT DECADE. Edited by A. Doak Barnett and Edwin O. Reischauer. New York, Praeger [1970] xxi, 250 p.
E183.8.C5U47

Contents.--Introduction, by Edwin O. Reischauer. --Political trends in China--today and tomorrow.--China and world security.--China's development, trade, and the world economy.--On America's China policy: two Senators speak.--Other countries, different views.--The United States and China: policy options for the future.--Concluding remarks, by Edwin O. Reischauer.

Speeches and discussion by officials of the U.S. and other governments, scholars, journalists, and businessmen at the first national convocation on "The United States and China: The Next Decade," which was held in New York City, March 20-21, 1969, under the auspices of the National Committee on United States-China Relations. While the conference did not produce any conclusions or solutions to the China problem in U.S. foreign policy, the wide range of views revealed that the United States needs to develop more expert knowledge on China and that the American public needs to acquire a broader understanding of the issues in the Sino-American relationship.

597
Valkenier, Elizabeth K. NEW SOVIET VIEWS ON ECONOMIC AID. Survey, no. 76, summer 1970: 17-29.
DK1.S549, 1970

Soviet economic policy in the Third World has moved from supporting national economic development through politically motivated institutional changes to relying on gradual reforms based on the maximum application of economic criteria. Soviet development theory as originally conceived favored expansion of Third World economic relations with the Soviet Union. The failure of some overambitious projects, difficulties over repayment of loans, and the formation of more realistic ideas about the capabilities and needs of the Third World forced a rethinking of original attitudes. Today Soviet economists in positions of responsibility are arguing for a dynamic policy, and they are cautioning against projects involving prolonged subsidies. Specifically, instead of opening new plants in the public sector, the Soviet Union now prefers to grant its clients credits for the modernization of existing enterprises. However, economic rationality is not the only motivating factor in Soviet relationships with the Third World. Consequently Moscow will not accept any economic reforms that imply reorienting the politics and economics of the assisted country away from the Soviet Union.

598
Van der Kroef, Justus M. [SOVIET SECURITY STRATEGY IN ASIA] Sowjetische Sicherheitsstrategie in Asien. Aussenpolitik, v. 21, Aug. 1970: 492-503.
D839.A885, v. 21

Surveys the responses of Asian countries to the Soviet proposal for a collective security system in Asia. Van der Kroef explains the Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean as a means of furthering Soviet security interests in Asia. The main goal of this policy, however, is to maintain a presence in the area and make sure that all countries in the Far East see the Soviet Union as a new and important element in the balance of power in view of the changing roles of Great Britain and the United States and the rising fear of China.

599
Vernant, Jacques. [GENERAL DE GAULLE AND FOREIGN POLICY] Le Général de Gaulle et la politique extérieure. Politique étrangère, v. 35, no. 6, 1970: 619-629. JX3.P6, v. 35

General de Gaulle's actions are inextricably linked to his political thought. They are based on the recognition of the fact of nationhood. The nation, a sociological reality, manifests its existence externally by a foreign policy, which, by definition, must be independent. As for its content, foreign policy is doubtlessly a function of the historical divergencies that give to each state its own distinctive physiognomy and special assets. But foreign policy recognizes also the intervening changes in the world, particularly since 1945. It is in relation to these changes, which do not all take the same direction, that the role of France is conceived, a role proportionate to its means. (Translation of supplied abstract, modified)

600
Vernant, Jacques. [PROGRESS IN FRANCO-SOVIET COOPERATION] Progrès de la coopération franco-soviétique. Revue de défense nationale, v. 26, Nov. 1970: 1678-1683. D410.R45, v. 26

Summarizes Franco-Soviet relations during the past few years. Vernant contends that De Gaulle's visit to the Soviet Union in 1966 marked a turning point in these relations, and he describes the growth of commercial, cultural, and scientific co-

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operation between the two countries. He concludes that despite the growing accord between Moscow and Paris, France remains faithful to its alliances.

601
Vladimirov, T. USSR-FRANCE: IMPORTANT STEP IN DEVELOPMENT OF RELATIONS. International affairs (Moscow) no. 12, Dec. 1970: 57-58.
D839.I465, 1970

The October 1970 Soviet-French protocol proves the similarity of their attitudes on the peaceful development of the European and world situation. Both powers regard the present boundaries of all European states as inviolable; both are working positively toward the convocation of an all-European conference; and both approach the problem of peace in the Middle East from the same position. In the course of the talks the conviction was expressed and approved that the Great Powers should meet to discuss nuclear disarmament. The Soviet Union and France similarly condemn chemical and bacteriological weapons and the use of the seabed for military purposes.

602
Wasan, R. P. PAKISTAN--INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: A SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY. In Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. Journal, v. 2, Oct. 1969: 219-239.
UA840.I55, v. 2

An unannotated bibliography of 310 entries culled from domestic and foreign periodicals, newspapers, books, studies, and documents published from 1947 through 1969. The materials include general studies of Pakistan's foreign policy, as well as analyses of Pakistan's relations with the United Nations, Great Britain, India, Iran, Turkey, China, the Soviet Union, and the Near Eastern and Southeast Asian countries.

603
Wechmar, Rüdiger, Freiherr von. [FOR DETENTE AND PEACE; ON THE TREATY OF MOSCOW] Für Entspannung und Frieden; zum Abkommen von Moskau. Neue Gesellschaft, v. 17, Sept./Oct. 1970: 551-555.
H5.N36, v. 17

The signing of the Moscow treaty marks the beginning of a better understanding between the German and Russian Governments, improved relations between East and West, and a new spirit of European cooperation. From now on, conflicts arising from the existing differences between the two systems will be resolved without violence or threat of violence. Although Berlin is not mentioned in the treaty, the signatories understand that their interests require not only that the Berlin question be settled satisfactorily, but also that Berlin play a role in future cooperation between East and West. The treaty does not affect the efforts of the Federal Republic of Germany to strive peacefully for the unity of all Germans, nor will it preclude an eventual peaceful abolition of frontiers in a European union. The two governments also dealt with topics of multilateral interest, such as the proposed European security conference, balanced troop reductions, economic cooperation between the European Economic Community and the Warsaw Pact countries, and peacekeeping in other parts of the world. It is the task of the West German Government as a whole to develop all possibilities contained in this treaty with patience, care, and objectivity.

604
Welch, William. AMERICAN IMAGES OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY; AN INQUIRY INTO RECENT APPRAISALS FROM THE ACADEMIC COMMUNITY. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1970. 316 p.
E183.8.R9W43
Includes bibliographical references.

Contents.--Preface.--pt. 1. Description: The literature in survey. Major types.--pt. 2. Evaluation: The ultra-hard image: the great beast. The hard image: the mellowing tiger. The mixed image: the neurotic bear.--pt. 3. Melioration: Method: some suggestions. Illustration: an analysis of Soviet faithlessness.--Epilogue: Reconciliation: The mediation of differing views.--Index.

Describes and evaluates the various images and perceptions of Soviet external conduct developed by the American academic community during the postwar era. Welch identifies precise points of difference between these images, assesses their validity, and outlines rules and procedures for producing more accurate generalizations about Soviet foreign policy and for narrowing the gap between the existing divergent images.

605
Wilcox, Wayne. IMPLICATIONS OF A FOREIGN POLICY OF RESTRAINT. Foreign service journal, v. 47, Nov. 1970: 26, 37-39. JX1.A53, v. 47

The dramatically active post-World War II American diplomacy restored the European nation-state model of international relations. Now that the old order has been restored, America finds that less control, power, and influence come at higher and higher costs. By retaining the old goals of diplomacy while changing its means to restraining and conciliating, President Nixon has come into conflict with elements with a vested interest in the old diplomacy. The strategic arms limitation talks, for example, were accepted by some foreign-policy decisionmakers only because their prospects for success were considered small. The perils of proclaiming constancy and practicing change may be seen clearly in the Vietnamization of the Indochinese war. Executive-legislative relationships have been worsened and the bureaucratic ethos shattered by the new diplomacy of restraint and the economics of austerity. Mr. Nixon inherited a disorderly country and a weakened presidency, and the diplomacy of restraint seemed inevitable. However, a true diplomacy of restraint should aim to utilize the best expressions of the American managerial and technological genius for the global public purpose.

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TENSION AREAS

606
Basiouni, M. Cherif, and Eugene M. Fisher. THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT--REAL AND APPARENT ISSUES: AN INSIGHT INTO ITS FUTURE FROM THE LESSONS OF THE PAST. St. John's law review, v. 44, Jan. 1970: 399-465. LL

Unlike most international conflicts, in the Arab-Israeli dispute virtually all the issues are susceptible to juridical determination and adjudication. A schematic statement of the 16 apparent issues demonstrates that a juridical solution is possible, because the facts giving rise to these issues are for the most part uncontroverted. The reason why adjudication, or any other substitute for force, has not been resorted to clearly lies in the psychopolitical origins of the real conflict, as opposed to the formal legal questions. There are two underlying issues: the first is Areb nationalism versus Zionism, the second, equally important, is Arab revolutionism versus reaction. A formulation and comparison of the Palestinian and Jewish claims to sovereignty in the same territory proves that the Arabs have been despoiled under laws and rules made by their adversaries. The Palestine Mandate and the Balfour Declaration seized an ancient country to make it into a bastion of an alien culture in Arab lands. The military confrontation may wither away in the rapidly proceeding Arabization of the Zionist state, but the Arab revolution will go on to its completion.

607
Berton, Peter. BACKGROUND TO THE TERRITORIAL ISSUE. Studies in comparative communism, v. 2, July/Oct. 1969: 130-148. map.
HX1.S74, v. 2

A survey of the Sino-Soviet territorial dispute. Following the Second World War, the Soviets hoped to regain their traditional economic and strategic spheres of influence in northeast and northwest China, even in the face of the new Chinese Communist regime. The latter took "determined countermeasures," and the situation led to serious irritation between the two countries. The Communist Chinese succeeded in liquidating the Soviet Union's economic interests in both Manchuria and Sinkiang, and while Manchuria is once again an integral part of China, Sinkiang is not yet ethnically Chinese. Until it is, Chinese control there will be insecure. "Here is the most explosive area of all the borderlands between Russia and China, and it is in the light of Sinkiang that all border incidents between the two neighbors have to be seen." Berton does not, however, foresee a major alteration of the existing frontier; he suggests that the Soviet Union might offer to make minor adjustments to the present border in China's favor in exchange for a formal Chinese renunciation of all its claims to disputed territories.

608
Bölke, Joachim. [THE ERFURT MEETING--THE STAKES AT THE INTER-GERMAN TALKS] Zur Erfurter Begegnung. Die Interessenlage in den zwischendeutschen Gesprächen. Europa-Archiv, v. 25, Apr. 10, 1970: 233-236. D839.E86, v. 25

East German Prime Minister Willi Stoph indicated in his first meeting with West German Chancellor Willy Brandt that the German Democratic Republic intended to continue the talks with Bonn in West Germany. The initial dialogue served to clarify each other's relations to Moscow. Stoph emphasized the need to solve the problems of security and stated that the German Democratic Republic, if recognized as an independent state, would expect reparation payments to compensate for the economic loss resulting from the imposition of customs duties. Both agreed to leave the problem of Berlin to the four-power talks. This dialogue opens West Germany to the risk of emotional domestic pressure for greater ties with the East and fewer contacts with its Western allies. East Germany runs the similar risk of pressure for greater contacts with the West and negotiations with a rather unsympathetic Social-Democratic government. Although Moscow's intervention in Czechoslovakia proved that the Soviet Union will maintain a regime it sponsors, the German Democratic Republic may still not wish to take this risk and may take measures to prevent a continuation of the talks in West Germany.

609
Brezarić, Dr. THE BIG POWERS AND TIMELY TOPICS. Review of international affairs, v. 21, Aug. 5/Aug. 20, 1970: 7-9.
D839.R4, v. 21

The bleakness of the outlook for a political solution in Southeast Asia is somewhat mitigated by the improvement of the general atmosphere in which the Great Powers conduct international relations. Cases in point are the Bonn-Moscow agreement and the improved Middle East situation, where the position of the United States has steadily declined since the 1967 Israeli aggression. The strategic arms limitation talks are being conducted in a serious and business-like manner and seem to be progressing. Peking and Moscow are groping toward a normalization of relations. Although American aggression in Cambodia has irritated existing problems, it is clear that the United States does not wish to provoke China, and the Sino-American dialog at Warsaw continues. However, the improvement in the overall situation does not mean that the Americans can be certain of a satisfactory completion of the Southeast Asia conflict. Washington's assumption that time is on its side may be as fallacious as its hope for a viable regime in South Vietnam. The nonalined countries at the Lusaka conference must extend pledges of full support to the just struggle of the Vietnamese, Khmers, and Laotians.

610
Burchett, Wilfred G. THE SECOND INDOCHINA WAR; CAMBODIA AND LAOS. New York, International Publishers [1970] 204 p. map.
DS557.C28B85

A history of postwar political and military developments in Cambodia and Laos focusing on overt and covert U.S. intervention in these countries. Burchett contends that the recent U.S. escalation

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of the war in Cambodia and Laos "represents a logical extension of policies followed by the United States in the area since 1954--policies deliberately planned to 'fill the power vacuum' created by the collapse of French colonialism in Indochina."

611
Clemens, Walter C. HOW THE U.S.S.R. BROUGHT PEACE TO THE MIDDLE EAST IN 1972, by Genri Kisingirsky (with Walter C. Clemens, Jr.) War/peace report, v. 10, June/July 1970: 14-22.
JX1901.W38, v. 10

A scenario for peace in the Middle East, together with critical commentaries by Ahmed R. Elkashef and Geoffrey Kemp and a reply by the author. The scenario, which is based on an interpretation of the results of a political-military exercise conducted by the Humanities Department of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in late 1969, is presented in the form of a report by a Soviet "Politburo advisor," who gives a Soviet interpretation of the series of events that produce world crisis and then a compromise settlement and peace. It is "meant to serve as a heuristic device that [will] stimulate a deeper understanding of the problems and possibilities of conflict resolution in the Middle East."

612
Cottrell, Alvin J. CONFLICT IN THE PERSIAN GULF. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 51, Feb. 1971: 33-41. Z6723.U35, v. 51

Predicts a period of increasing Soviet pressure and dangerous revolutionary instability for the Persian Gulf area following the withdrawal of British forces. Neither Saudi Arabian-Iranian cooperation nor the Federation of Arab Emirates can provide the necessary stability. Even a British decision to keep some forces in the region might be insufficient at this stage. The Soviet Union is determined to make itself the dominant power in this area of traditional Russian aspirations. The United States should consider deploying a more impressive naval force in the Gulf, even if political necessities compel it to operate from bases outside the area.

613
Cottrell, Alvin J. RUSSIA NEARS DOMINATION OF MIDDLE EAST--FROM MOROCCO TO INDIAN SUBCONTINENT. Navy, v. 13, Nov. 1970: 10-17. illus.
VA49.N28, v. 13

Reviews the steps by which the Soviet Union has extended its influence over the eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East, and the area East of Suez. A judicious use of seapower has been the major factor in the success of this Soviet thrust. The United States, by relying on a land-based strategy and allowing its naval strength to decline, has played into Soviet hands. The key now is the Suez Canal. If the Russians succeed in opening the canal and then controlling it, the area will be open to Soviet power from Aden to Singapore.

614
Dinstein, Yoram. THE LEGAL CAUSES OF "PARA-WAR" AND PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. St. John's law review, v. 44, Jan. 1970: 466-482.
LL

Justifies Israel's initiative in the June 1967 war and insists on the need for direct negotiations. Dinstein concedes that Article 51 of the United Nations Charter precludes countermeasures legitimate under customary international law and argues that the 1967 Israeli act was interceptive rather than preventive. In discussing today's hostilities, a distinction is made between "reprisal," force used against the hostile state, and "execution," force used against individuals domiciled in a state but acting without that state's involvement. Dinstein concludes that Arab assaults may reach a point at which Israel's resort to total war, rather than reprisal or execution, would be justifiable. Since the United Nations has no effective peacekeeping authority, the Israeli obligation to honor its pacific objectives is conditional. The 1967 Security Council resolution is a recommendation, not a decision. Peace will come in the Middle East when the Arabs "awaken from their day-dreams," not through the intervention of any outside power or group of powers.

615
Decken, Klaus von der. [CHINA AND THE INNER INDOCHINESE CONFLICTS] China und die inner-indochinesische Konflikte. Aussenpolitik, v. 21, Aug. 1970: 504-512. D839.A885, v. 21

The expansion of the Vietnam War into a new Indochina war has revived the old rivalries between the people in this region. The old struggle for economic interests and political power continues under ideological banners. Klaus von der Decken of the Institut für Asienkunde, Hamburg, begins with the traditional dominion of the Vietnamese in Indochina, defines Peking's sponsorship of Prince Sihanouk as a chess move against the formation of a bloc or great power under the leadership of Hanoi, and sees in the Indochinese summit conference a Chinese policy of balance, which will, in turn, invite countermoves from Russian diplomacy. (Translation of supplied abstract)

616
Dommen, Arthur J. LAOS IN THE SECOND INDOCHINA WAR. Current history, v. 59, Dec. 1970: 326-332, 364.
D410.C82, v. 59

History of U.S. involvement in the war in Laos since 1962. Dommen notes that U.S. military aid to Laos has been extensive, although until recently the United States maintained official silence about its activities there. He reviews the effects of the U.S. intervention in Cambodia on the military and political situation in Laos and concludes that neither North Vietnam nor the United States has an interest in continuing the war in northern Laos even though U.S. bombing of the Ho Chi Minh trail in southern Laos remains necessary.

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617
Drambiantz, G. THE PERSIAN GULF: TWIXT THE PAST AND THE FUTURE. International affairs (Moscow) no. 10, Oct. 1970: 66-71.
D839.I465, 1970

The Anglo-American imperialists obviously consider the oil-rich and strategic Persian Gulf area worth their continued criminal playing with fire. Despite the Labor Government's talk of withdrawal, Wilson was careful to maintain intact the colonial bureaucracy that administers London's "banana republics" and sufficient military means to combat the national liberation movement. The Conservative government's intention to continue a military presence was obviously ordered by Washington, which is squeezing the British in the area militarily, politically, and economically. The difficulties of the federation of Arab emirates, which are attributed to historic antagonisms, are actually due to the crude pressures exercised on the Arab sheiks by the oil interests. The balance-of-forces doctrine promoted by England is in effect the old divide-and-conquer policy.

618
Ellis, Harry B. THE DILEMMA OF ISRAEL. Washington, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1970. 110 p. (Middle East Research Project. Analysis no. 18)
DS119.6.E43

A history of Arab-Israeli relations from Biblical times to the present. U.S. and West European interests in the Middle East, particularly America's relations with Israel, are discussed. Israel's dilemma is whether to remain an occupation power or give citizenship to a million Arabs and lose its identity as a Jewish state. By extension, this dilemma is passed on to the United States: should it maintain its protective policy toward Israel, or should it continue to preserve its interests in the Arab world?

619
THE EXPLOSION OF A MYTH--CHINA, THE SOVIET UNION AND THE MIDDLE EAST. New Middle East, no. 27, Dec. 1970: 32-45. DS63.1.N48, 1970

Contents.--The Chinese intrusion, by Sevinc Carlson.--Communist China's strategic weakness limits foreign policy commitments, by Neville Brown.--The "soft under-belly" of the Russians in the Middle East and the Mediterranean, by Robert A. Kilmarx.

Analyses of Chinese and Soviet policy in the Middle East. Carlson summarizes China's diplomatic relations with the Arab States and gives statistics on Chinese eocnomic aid to, and trade with, the Arab world. He contrasts Soviet and Chinese policies toward the Palestinian guerrillas and concludes that China places its hopes on the appeal of revolutionary doctrines to the future generation of Arab leaders. Brown emphasizes China's economic and military weaknesses vis-a-vis the Soviet Union as limiting factors in Chinese Middle East policy. Kilmarx accuses the Soviet Union of imperialist ambitions in the Middle East but predicts that Soviet misjudgment of the strength of capitalism and the forces of nationalism may frustrate this objective.

620
[FRANCE AND THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT] La France et le conflit du moyen-orient, [by] ***. L'ordre français, no. 143, July/Aug. 1970: 15-17.
DC1.072, 1970

Assesses the Middle East situation, calling for greater French influence in the area, and warns of internal subversion in Western Europe. The author contends that the Anglo-Saxons must bear the primary responsibility for the present Middle East crisis. He asserts that if Sino-Soviet relations were better, and if the problem of German reunification did not exist, war would break out between the superpowers over the Middle East.

621
Francis, P. G. TOMORROW'S WAR IN AFRICA. Army quarterly, v. 101, Oct. 1970: 96-103.
U1.A85, v. 101

Contends that the threat of an anticolonial war in Africa is not as great as the threat of a continental war between democracy and communism, which would split Africa into two blocs, one Western-democratic, the other "African" Communist. Francis believes that "a fully developed, democratic, National Africa, properly armed, could be a new powerful defender of world freedom." He describes tactics and techniques suitable to Africa's terrain and climate and stresses the effectiveness of guerrilla air warfare. The author recommends the use of light, standardized, mechanically simple, easy-to-handle aircraft, backed by good intelligence and constant infiltration of guerrillas on the ground, who could take advantage of Africa's open spaces and favorable climate to effectively defend National Africa. Since concerted action by a number of African countries is easier to achieve than total national agreement inside one, the unification prospects of an all-African defense should be considered. Military unity could eventually lead to political unity of National Africa.

622
Henderson, Gregory. KOREA: CAN COLD WAR GROUND THAW? War/peace report, v. 10, Aug./Sept. 1970: 3-7. JX1901.W38, v. 10

Although the situation in Korea today presents a greater threat to world peace than did the situation there just prior to the outbreak of the war in 1950, "Korea has become a half-forgotten realm. Dangerous before, such neglect tempts serious misjudgments again." Since renewed warfare on the Korean peninsula is probably not in the interest of any of the powers directly concerned, a large-scale military confrontation does not appear to be imminent, yet in view of the massive military buildups of both sides, war could break out through political or military miscalculations. "One million men in 85,000 square miles is too many not to use. A third to a quarter of two national budgets is too much, year after year, to be squandered without benefit. Such forces create their own expectancy of use." So while reunifica-

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tion is still the fundamental long-range goal, the international community must first attempt to reduce the awesome tension there. In addition, if the United Nations is to play an effective role in the reunification effort, it must assume a more detached position on the whole Korean question, which it relinquished by joining in the Korean war to repel the North Korean attack. The U.N. Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea and the U.N. command in Korea should be abolished, North Korea should be admitted to observer status in the United Nations, the Military Armistice Commission at Panmunjom should be assigned the task of opening new channels of communication between North and South Korea, and the United States should withdraw one of its two divisions. Furthermore, the superpowers should supplement the strategic arms limitation talks with negotiations aimed at restricting the flow of arms into Korea and should persuade both sides to implement gradual troop reductions. Lower tensions and military budgets and greater communication should reduce the possibility of another war, but only time will tell whether these measures can bring about reunification. One thing is certain: reunification will not be possible unless Korea is disarmed and neutralized along the lines of Austria.

623
Hertzberg, Arthur. PALESTINE: THE LOGIC OF PARTITION TODAY. Columbia forum, v. 13, fall 1970: 17-21. AS30.C59, v. 13

Apologists for Israel who deny the existence of a Palestinian Arab national consciousness today on the grounds that it did not exist as such in 1917 are utilizing debaters' rhetoric. Arab propagandists who proclaim the myth of peace before 1948 and the happy Jewish-Arab symbiosis throughout the ages cannot disguise the fact that the Arabs' ultimate goal is to make Israeli Jews a minority subjected to majority Arab pressure. It is true that without Zionism there would have been an Arab majority and ultimately an Arab State in Palestine. It is also true that the Arabs have refused to accept the decisions of the international community that created and legitimized Israel. The promise made by Jewish theology is not a claim in law to the land of Israel, but the existence of this belief is a powerful and undeniable fact. In this conflict between two nationalisms, the only possible solution is the implementation of the decree calling for partition. "If we are concerned about the suffering and rights of two substantial aggregates of individuals, is it really just to start a process, if it were feasible (which it is not, short of total war) of moving both Jews and Arabs around again?"

624
Kapur, Harish. ASIA IN 1970'S. United Asia, v. 22, July/Aug. 1970: 167-172. DS1.U55, v. 22

Describes the rise of Soviet and American influence in Asia as a response to the post-1949 growth of Chinese communism in the area. Kapur asserts the superpowers' policies in Asia have had a negative impact on the Asian nations' achievement of regional balance or maintenance of some foreign-policy leverage. He predicts that China will become the major political factor in Asia, that the non-Communist nations of the area will become part of an unstable situation, and that the Soviet Union will avoid any direct military involvement in Asia. He concludes that, in light of the increase in leftist movements in Asia, those states that have depended on U.S. protection will experience more internal political pressures toward disengaging from the superpowers.

625
Kilmarx, Robert A. CHALLENGE OF THE MEDITERRANEAN: CROSSROADS OF UNITED STATES-SOVIET RELATIONS. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 50, Nov. 1970: 81-89. Z6723.U35, v. 50

Maintains that despite changes in economic and communications patterns and in U.S. national priorities, U.S. interests in the Mediterranean area remain as strong as ever, largely because the Soviet Union has decided to make it "the testing ground for a general readjustment of East-West power relationships." A lack of policy coordination among the Western powers, coupled with the intrusion of Soviet political, economic, and military power into the region, has badly eroded the U.S. position there, while strengthening that of its adversary. The United States needs a policy for the Mediterranean as a whole and not merely for individual countries, and it badly needs to institute a continuous review of contingency planning for the region "to insure that it is based on valid assumptions concerning force readiness and capabilities, deployment times, postulated encounter scenarios, and base availability."

626
Kux, Ernst. PEKING'S MIDDLE EASTERN INTERESTS. Swiss review of world affairs, v. 20, Nov. 1970: 13-14. D839.S9, v. 20

After the cultural revolution Communist China reactivated its policy toward the Middle East and Africa: embassies in Syria, Algeria, and Yemen, and later in Egypt and the Sudan were restaffed; the Palestinian liberation movement was given material assistance as well as propaganda and diplomatic support; economic and technical treaties with South Yemen, the Sudan, and Somalia were concluded; and financial agreements with Tanzania and Zambia were reached in connection with the Tanzania-Zambian Railway. While such developments indicate Peking's determination to counter "American imperialism and its lackey Israel" in the Middle East, they also reveal that China is trying to stem Soviet influence in this area. The dawning of a Sino-Soviet rivalry in the Near East may render it "illusory to hope that an opening of the Suez Canal and Soviet participation may help to bring about a peaceful settlement of the Middle Eastern conflict."

627
Labroisse, Gerd. [25 YEARS OF A DIVIDED GERMANY; A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY] 25 Jahre geteiltes Deutsch-

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land; ein dokumentarischer Überblick. Berlin, Colloquium Verlag [c1970] 159 p.
DD257.25.L3
Bibliography: p. [149]-153.

Contents.--Introduction.--The origin of Germany's division.--Establishing Germany's division.--Divided Germany.--Retrospect and prospect.--Bibliography and table of abbreviations.--Chronology.--Name and subject index.

Traces the historical and political background of the two Germanys, starting with Hitler's attack on Poland on September 1, 1939, through the second Brandt-Stoph meeting in May 1970 in Kassel. The quest for a modus vivendi has become increasingly difficult. The problem has its roots not only in the East-West confrontation, but also in the conflict between West Germany's Government and the opposition parties. In pointing out the consistency of the policy of the East, the author warns of Soviet expansion politics. The most important political problems, the security of West Berlin and the recognition of the Oder-Neisse border, remain unsolved. Whether the recognition of the German Democratic Republic by Brandt is to be seen as a first capitulation to long-standing demands of the East or a concession to create a basis for negotiations and détente that will elicit goodwill remains to be seen. The Federal Republic of West Germany should not settle for anything less than detailed agreements with a precise description of concepts so as to protect freedom and security and to have good relations with its allies, East Germany, and the other Eastern countries.

628
Langer, Paul F., and Joseph J. Zasloff. NORTH VIETNAM AND THE PATHET LAO; PARTNERS IN THE STRUGGLE FOR LAOS. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1970. xiv, 262 p. illus.
DS557.L28L3
Bibliography: p. 251-255.

Contents.--Introduction.--pt. 1. The past: The setting of the Lao revolutionary movement. The growth of the Lao revolutionary movement and the Vietnamese role. The drive for independence: the Viet Minh and the Pathet Lao, 1949-1954. North Vietnam and the Lao Communists' bid for power, 1954-1962.--pt. 2. The present: The context of the current struggle. North Vietnamese advice and support. The North Vietnamese military adviser in Laos: a first-hand account. The North Vietnamese military presence. The relationship, public and secret. An assessment.--Appendixes.--Notes.--Index.

Analyzes the Lao Communist movement and assesses the extent and nature of the support it has received from North Vietnam. The authors find that North Vietnam has played a vital role in sustaining the political and military efforts of the Pathet Lao and that the latter has been led since its inception by Laotians sympathetic to the Vietnamese Communists.

629
Lee, Chae-Jin. COMMUNIST CHINA'S POLICY TOWARD LAOS: A CASE STUDY, 1954-67. [Kansas] Center for East Asian Studies, the University of Kansas [1970] 161 p. illus. (International Studies, East Asian Series, Research Publication, no. 6)
DS740.5.L3L4
Bibliography: p. 151-157.

Contents.--Introduction.--pt. 1. The Chinese Communist conception of Laos.--pt. 2. The Chinese policy of peaceful coexistence: China and the first Geneva formula on Laos. The Bandung "spirit" and Sino-Laotian relations. Peking and the peaceful unification of Laos.--pt. 3. The Chinese policy of assertive pressure: Collapse of the policy of peaceful coexistence. Assertive approaches toward Laos. The United Nations presence and its effects.--pt. 4. The Chinese policy of negotiations at the second Geneva conference: A prelude to the Geneva conference on Laos. Chinese positions and tactics at Geneva. Evaluation of the second Geneva formula.--pt. 5. The Chinese policy of reappraisal after the Geneva conference: Development of the second Geneva formula. Gradual erosion of a "neutralized" Laos. Reorientation of Chinese policy in Laos. Laos, the Vietnam war, and the Chinese cultural revolution.--pt. 6. Evaluation and implications.--Index.

Concludes that "there were no clear evidences which could support the contention that China's policy toward Laos was inherently 'aggressive' and 'expansionist.'" In the wake of the Tonkin Gulf incident, the Communist Chinese became increasingly apprehensive over the possibility of U.S. military intervention in Laos, which would have posed a serious threat to China's security and its interests in Laos. Although the Chinese expressed their determination to resist such an American move, they never made a specific and direct threat to intervene, nor did they encourage the Pathet Lao forces to attempt a swift military takeover, primarily because they realized that they were not militarily prepared to counter a massive introduction of U.S. ground forces in Laos. Barring this latter contingency, China will continue to pursue a rational and pragmatic policy toward Laos.

630
Lewis, Bernard. RUSSIA IN THE MIDDLE EAST. Survival, v. 12, Oct. 1970: 332-336.
U162.S9, v. 12
Reprinted from the Round Table, July 1970.
BV29.R68

Draws a historical analogy between the Soviet Union's penetration into the Middle East with Great Britain's and Nazi Germany's expansion into the area. The author views the current situation in terms of Soviet policy in the Middle East, Russian rivalry with the West, and the nature and purposes of the Soviet actions, and portrays the Soviet Union as an expansionist imperial power attempting to consolidate its position for the purposes of national security and power. He deprecates the apparent willingness of many allegedly nationalist Asian and African leaders "to accept the role of native prince that is . . . assigned to them" by the Russians.

631
Maievskii, Viktor. THE REVANCHIST ITCH. Current digest of the Soviet press, v. 22, Dec. 22, 1970: 15-16.
D839.C87, v. 22

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Condensed from Pravda, Nov. 26, 1970.
Slav Rm

Japanese writers fanning the propaganda fire over the "northern territories" are animated primarily by the revanchist itch. These claims are ominously coupled with increased economic penetration of South Korea and Thailand and with imperialist aspirations (inspired by America) in Indochina and other parts of Southeast Asia. The Japanese Government, like former West German governments, talks of a peace treaty when actually its covert goal is revision of the results of the Second World War. Okinawa remains under American occupation, and the American-Japanese "security treaty" places in Japan an American garrison that threatens to draw it into the adventurous American imperialist policy in Southeast Asia. Those who promote the Japanese revanchist itch and who work for a revival of Japanese militarism are deliberately trying to endanger Soviet-Japanese relations.

632
Masmoudi, Mohamed. THE MEDITERRANEAN. Survival, v. 12, Dec. 1970: 396-400.
U162.S9, v. 12
Translated from Preuves, no. 4, 1970.
AP20.P74

Discusses the consequences of the Soviet penetration of the Mediterranean, America's passive reaction to the Soviet drive into the area, and Europe's role in reestablishing a balance based on the common interests of the countries in the region. Masmoudi stresses the need to avoid viewing the regional situation in terms of such old concepts of Western defense as the struggle against communism and the confrontation between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces. He advocates that Europe resume a dialog with the Mediterranean nations "to be conspicuously and efficiently present there and thus to set an example" for the superpowers and that it invest capital in the area to take advantage of the lower wage costs. He also suggests the formation of a study group to define the basic outlines of a Mediterranean policy that is not externally controlled and that is concerned with economic stability rather than war.

633
Maxwell, Neville. MISUNDERSTANDING CHINA. Interplay, v. 3, Oct. 1970: 10-12.
N&CPR

To label Communist China expansionist and irredentist would be a misleading falsification. After the Communists took power in 1949 they were more interested in China's future than its imperial past, including some of the Kuomintang's territorial claims. They abandoned their hopes of bringing Outer Mongolia and Nepal back into the fold and negotiated boundary settlements with these countries and Burma. Although China repeatedly stated that it had no territorial claims against any of its neighbors, the question of actual boundaries remained, especially with India and the Soviet Union. The Sino-Indian dispute emerged over New Delhi's claim to Aksai Chin and not over the McMahon Line, which Peking was willing to accept de facto. Apart from its disputes with India and the Soviet Union, China has amicably settled its boundaries with five of its neighbors. Unfortunately, some China watchers maintain that Peking is irredentist and expansionist despite the evidence to the contrary. When the real story of the Sino-Indian conflict becomes known, it "may prompt a reappraisal of China's policies, in which more weight will be given to the evidence of their moderateness and pragmatism."

634
THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS. Current, no. 121, Sept. 1970: 52-64. AP2.C9259, 1970

Contents.--What is Russia up to? by Edward Crankshaw.--Is the Middle East Russia's Vietnam? by Robert Keatley.--Nuclear weapons over the Middle East? by Max Lerner.--A Quaker appeal for peace, by the American Friends Service Committee.

Articles on several aspects of the situation in the Middle East. Crankshaw argues that the Soviet Union has no desire to see Israel destroyed but, on the contrary, finds it to be "a useful, if not indispensable, piece on the board on which they are obsessively playing the imperial game." Keatley suggests that the Soviet Union may have become the political captive of its client state, the United Arab Republic, which raises the danger that it will be forced by the Egyptians into a direct clash with Israel and the United States. Lerner, speculating on the consequences of Israeli acquisition of nuclear weapons, points out that this might conceivably awaken the Arabs from their dream of destroying Israel, but it might also provoke the Arab States into demanding nuclear weapons of their own from the U.S.S.R. The Service Committee outlines a solution to the Arab-Israeli dispute based on an Israeli commitment "to withdraw from Arab territories and to aid in the search for positive solutions to the Palestinian refugee problem," and an Arab commitment, "through the United Nations, to accept an Israeli state within mutually agreed and final borders . . . and to undertake negotiations for the establishment of those boundaries and whatever demilitarized buffer zones may contribute to the greater sense of peace and security for both."

635
Miksche, Ferdinand O. [INTERIM REPORT ON THE MEDITERRANEAN] Zwischenbilanz im Mittelmeer. Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 14, Nov. 1970: 594-597. map.
U3.W38, v. 14

President Nixon's visit to Italy, Yugoslavia and Spain, Moscow's presence on the Suez Canal and in the vicinity of the Arabian oilfields, the failure of the American peace proposals and the civil war in Jordan have shown clearly enough that the most dangerous storm centre for Western Europe really is located in the Eastern Mediterranean. The sudden death of Egypt's President Nasser is also unlikely to alter the fact that Moscow still regards the Middle East as a springboard for further expansion. The author of this article analyses the step-by-step advances of the Soviet Union and its influence from Egypt to Syria and Iraq and on to the Indian Ocean. He also examines the arms situation in the Middle East and the Soviet policy re-

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garding military bases, and draws the relevant strategic consequences for Western Europe. F. O. Miksche also shows, however, that the Soviet Union's position of power conceals obvious weaknesses, and indicates possible courses of action which would bring about a change in the situation in this area of tension. (Abstract supplied)

636
Müller, Christian. AMERICA'S FAREWELL TO THE ASIAN MAINLAND. Swiss review of world affairs, v. 20, Sept. 1970: 9-11. D839.S9, v. 20

The progressive development of strategic missiles and reconnaissance and communications systems, which has lessened the chances of a surprise nuclear attack on the United States, has thereby reduced the significance of the chain of American bases through the world, particularly in the Far East. Parallel to this development, carefully woven alliances have progressively declined politically. Because of the new and less expensive means of observation the United States may be tempted to yield to isolationism, "a drive which is nourished by the contrast between the high messianic ideals of the great Republic and the evils of the outside world." The withdrawal to tighter lines and the self-defense policy in Asia may be considered by Americans as a redemption from the ingratitude of allies and the pusillanimity of the enemy, but it may bring a political catastrophe that would affect every free Asian state. The United States has failed to defeat the enemy in Vietnam, and in the wake of its withdrawal it leaves South Vietnam with virtually insoluble problems, fighting the odds against a tough and determined opponent that, in the long run, is likely to gain the upper hand. The denouement will reveal Communist China, which is increasing its diplomatic initiatives in the peripheral Asian states, as the real victor. Japan is the only country in the region that could contest Peking's expansion, but it remains to be seen whether Tokyo "will not in the process turn out once more to be dragon's seed and take the 'Eastern policy' of [its] former German allies as a model on which to build [its] own relations to Peking." A power vacuum is developing in the area without any effective regional cooperation scheme. But Great Britain, whose presence is desired from Malaysia and Singapore to Australia and New Zealand, and whose feats in Malaya and Borneo are still cherished by free Asia, may give the island states enough time to prepare for the Chinese deluge.

637
Murphy, Cornelius F. THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS. St. John's law review, v. 44, Jan. 1970: 390-398.
LL

Criticizes the major points made in papers by M. Cherif Bassiouni and Eugene Fisher and by Yoram Dinstein (cited elsewhere in this issue) and suggests the use of an intermediary in obtaining Middle East peace. Murphy thinks Dinstein's presentation is weakened by his tendency to conceptualize problems exclusively in terms of his nation's interest and by his failure to comprehend the "jural significance of Israel's membership in the United Nations." Dinstein's justification of war as an absolute defensive means is irreconcilable with continued allegiance to the United Nations. The Bassiouni-Fisher suggestion of adjudication, while attractive, is not appropriate to the present situation. Realistically, the jurisdiction of the World Court should be called upon only when the general relation is a friendly one. Murphy concludes that negotiations through a United Nations intermediary are the only path to lasting peace. The Arab world must accept the machinery for peaceful settlement envisaged by the 1967 Security Council resolution.

638
Nasmyth, Jan. IF THE BRITISH LEAVE THE GULF . . . Interplay, v. 3, Sept. 1970: 4-8.
N4CFR

Great Britain's withdrawal from the Persian Gulf would end the smaller sheikdoms in the area that owe their survival to British protection. These states command the strategic Strait of Hormuz, which is more important than the Suez Canal to the oil trade. In recent years Great Britain has been able to cope with the threats to peace in this area, including the nationalization of British oil properties by the Iranian Government in 1951. However, the 1951 dispute was resolved by a coalition of Anglo-American and French politicomilitary and diplomatic forces that no longer exists. The United States is unable to support the oil companies, the British are leaving, and the oil industry is no longer a unified front supporting the West's oil interests. These factors are creating a power vacuum in the Gulf, and the Western world cannot feel that its oil supplies are secure. The West should welcome attempts by the oil-producing states to find markets in the Communist world. Since the Western oil companies cannot satisfy the needs for revenues of the Persian Gulf states, and since the Soviet Union by itself could not supply even one-tenth of the revenues, the two power blocs have a shared interest in keeping the Persian Gulf stable.

639
O'Grady, Joseph P. CZECHOSLOVAKIA DID NOT REVIVE THE COLD WAR. South Atlantic quarterly, v. 70, winter 1971: 22-33.
AP2.S7, v. 70

U.S. policymakers in the early postwar period assumed not only that the Soviet Union was harboring aggressive designs on Western Europe, but also that it possessed the power to effect those designs unless the United States intervened directly to bolster tottering Western economies and military establishments. NATO and the containment policy were the results of this outlook. Originally confined to Europe, containment was extended during the 1950's to include Asia and then the whole world. Under Kennedy this global interpretation was sustained, and by the mid-1960's "Americans were everywhere." In the meantime, however, the pillars upon which the original policy had rested were crumbling. The Soviet Union, faced with unrest in Eastern Europe and open schism with Communist China, saw its power and its overseas designs evaporate together. At the same time, powerful new economies were on the rise in Western Europe. NATO's relevance to these new conditions began to be questioned. Then came the invasion of

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Czechoslovakia. Many claim that the invasion has recreated the conditions of 1947 and has once more underwritten a continuation of NATO and the containment policy. Nothing could be further from the truth, however; the invasion has only complicated Soviet difficulties and exposed its impotence abroad to all the world. All in all, the prospect of finding some reasonable justification for a continuation of NATO seems dimmer than ever.

640
Pierre, Andrew J. RECONCILIATION IN EUROPE: A WESTERN APPROACH TO THE EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE. Interplay, v. 3, July 1970: 16-20. illus.
N&CPR

Outlines a reconciliation plan that includes arms-control, political, and nonpolitical proposals, and that would provide the framework of a Western policy toward a European political settlement. A reconciliation plan would not only demonstrate to the Soviet Union and its satellites that the West has some clear objectives concerning European security and how they might be achieved, but it would also place the West European governments that advocate détente in a more favorable light vis-a-vis the youth of Eastern Europe, who are less concerned about the political or military threat to Western Europe than they are about healing European wounds. Further, it would provide a list of issues that, if agreed upon, could be placed before a formal security conference for ratification. The plan's arms control measures call for a mutual reduction of armed forces in Central Europe, a reduction of Soviet medium-range and intermediate-range ballistic missiles, the establishment of observation posts on both sides, and an East-West renunciation-of-force agreement. Pierre warns that a reconciliation plan should not impede the politicoeconomic integration of Western Europe or be employed to justify a reduction in NATO's forces.

641
Rhee, Tong-chin. THE SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT AND THE BALANCE OF POWER. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 50, Nov. 1970: 23-31.
Z6723.U35, v. 50

Gages the prospects for war between the Soviet Union and Communist China and speculates on the consequences of such a clash for world politics. For the Soviet Union, a military solution has many attractions, and the temptation to use force can only grow stronger. For China, however, the weaker power, the best course would seem to be delay. A Soviet victory would upset the world balance of power, eliminating the principal counterweight to Soviet influence in Asia and giving the Soviet Union a possible decisive advantage over its remaining foes. A different kind of danger exists in the possibility that Soviet involvement in Asia might so diminish Soviet strength in the West as to create a dangerously fluid situation in Eastern Europe, one that could escape from the control of the major powers and lead to disaster.

642
Rhee, Tong-chin. THE SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT AND ITS INFLUENCE ON THE MIDDLE EAST. NATO's fifteen nations, v. 15, Oct./Nov. 1970: 70-75. illus.
UA646.F5, v. 15

Warns that Communist China's entry into the Arab-Israeli dispute as a supporter of extremist Palestinian guerrillas may deprive the Soviet Union of the flexibility it will need to take part in a political settlement. Peking would like to see both superpowers involved in a Middle East quagmire. Even better would be a direct clash between the two, and by radicalizing the Arab guerrillas the Chinese hope to provoke one.

643
Robinson, Thomas W. THE SINO-SOVIET BORDER DISPUTE: BACKGROUND, DEVELOPMENT, AND THE MARCH 1969 CLASHES. Santa Monica, Calif., Rand Corp., 1970. 74 p. (Rand Corporation, RM-6171-PR)
Q180.A1R36 no. 6171
Bibliographical footnotes.

Summarizes the role of the Sino-Soviet border conflict in regard to the relations between the two countries; describes in detail the two military clashes on an island in the Ussuri River in March 1969 and presents plausible reasons for the occurrence of the battles; places the clashes "in the context of Soviet and Chinese foreign policy and domestic politics; and speculates on future developments as the two states move into renewed negotiations over the border." Robinson examines various explanations of these two incidents ranging from possible local initiatives to national politics and foreign policies. He finds that the Chinese probably initiated the first incident and the Russians the second, but he emphasizes that in a larger sense both sides were responsible for both incidents in view of their border policies.

644
Rodolfo, Claudine. [THE PERSIAN GULF (II): THE PRESENT SITUATION AND FUTURE PERSPECTIVES] Le Golfe Persique (II): situation actuelle et perspective d'avenir. Politique étrangère, no. 5, 1970: 547-586. JX3.P6, 1970

The Persian Gulf, with its immense reservoir of oil and its contrasts of ultramodern colliding with ancient, is becoming one of the sensitive regions of the world. All sorts of tensions are brewing there, ready to be developed under cover of the almost inevitable withdrawal of British forces. Territorial disputes, political, socio-ideological, and racial conflicts, economic covetousness, and the strategic ambitions of the superpowers combine to make the destiny of the region uncertain. Taking advantage of this confusion, the progressive Arab forces will perhaps find an occasion to consolidate their positions and seriously modify the balance of this part of Asia, stretching from the Near East to the Far East. (Translation of supplied abstract, modified)

645
Röper, Erich. [TOUCHSTONE BERLIN] Prüfstein Berlin. Politische Meinung, v. 15, no. 3, 1970: 21-35. H5.P75, v. 15

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Discusses the decisions, binding in international law, that firmly establish the international legal security of Berlin and secure its ties to the Federal Republic of Germany. In light of current questions and the new negotiations regarding Berlin, Röper concludes that the status of Berlin, which is still under occupational rule, can be changed only by the Allies, but even they cannot make it into a separate state.

646
Roucek, Joseph. [LAOS ON THE CUTTING EDGE OF THE KNIFE] Laos auf des Messers Schneide. Europa-Archiv, v. 25, July 25, 1970: 497-504.
D839.E86, v. 25

Describes the geographic position, history, and international political situation of Laos, and the development of American interest there. Roucek points out the relative smallness of the American expenditure in men and money in Laos. He concludes that the destiny of Laos "will depend on the game of power politics in which Washington, Moscow, and Peking are engaged."

647
Schulz, Eberhard, and Hans D. Schulz. [DOES THE EAST NEED THE DDR?] Braucht der Osten die DDR? Opladen, C. W. Leske, 1968. 119 p. (Aktuelle Aussenpolitik) DD261.4.S4

Contents.--The problem.--The political, ideological and psychological significance of the German Democratic Republic (DDR).--The economic significance of the DDR.--The military significance of the DDR.--The future.--Tables.--List of abbreviations.--Listing of persons.

The possibility of peaceful reunification of the two Germanys will depend on the Soviet Union's evaluation of the advantages of East Germany's continued existence. Three areas of interest, the economic, military, and political, including the ideological and psychological elements, must be considered. The manifest benefits to the Soviet Union so far outweigh any possible disadvantages that the hope of unifying Germany by a gradual politicoeconomic policy must realistically be considered doubtful.

648
SEARCH FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. Philadelphia, American Friends Service Committee [1970] 75 p.
DS119.7.S38

"Prepared by a working party, initiated by the American Friends Service Committee and the Canadian Friends Service Committee and acting in association with the Friends Service Council (London), the Friends World Committee for Consultation, and the Friends Peace and International Relations Committee (London)."

Reviews the historical background of the Arab-Israeli conflict, examines the viewpoints of all participants in the conflict and of the United Nations and the Great Powers, and proposes a basis for a practical peace settlement. The authors assert that the preconditions for peace include psychological and emotional factors as well as military disengagement by all parties, a concerted effort to structure a political settlement, and peace development in the form of economic aid and better utilization of human resources.

649
Shepherd, Naomi. ISRAEL'S DILEMMA. New statesman, v. 80, Oct. 2, 1970: 404.
AP4.N64, v. 80

Israel's dilemma in the wake of the Jordanian civil war and President Nasser's death is to keep two options open simultaneously: the cultivation of the nonextremist Palestinian leadership on the West Bank and the possible resumption of talks with King Hussein. Israel would like to reach an accommodation with the Palestinians themselves instead of with those who claim to represent them in other Arab States. Except for extremists, most Israeli leaders agree that the population of the West Bank should be returned to Jordan and that an Israeli protectorate in this area is neither politically nor economically feasible. The absence of West Bank leaders with whom Israel could negotiate to settle the dispute with Jordan has created a vacuum filled ultimately by the terrorists, and it has hindered Israel's attempts to cultivate moderate nationalist elements. Despite Israel's incipient dislike for King Hussein and growing Palestinian nationalism, the Israelis continue to hope because they "would rather contemplate across the Jordan American guns in the hands of the Bedouin than Russian missiles manned by Palestinians." If peace talks do not materialize the Russian presence might be extended to Lebanon. Unfortunately, the continuing division between the Jordanian Government and the Palestinian guerrillas makes it difficult to see how Israel will be able to keep its two options together for long.

650
Simon, Sheldon W. A SYSTEMS APPROACH TO SECURITY IN THE INDIAN OCEAN ARC. Orbis, v. 14, summer 1970: 401-442. D839.068, v. 14

Abridged version of a study prepared for the Strategic Studies Department of the Research Analysis Corp., McLean, Va.

Employs a systems framework to focus "on the relations between threat perception inputs . . . and such behavior outputs as attitudes toward regional security cooperation and budgetary allocations for defense" in the Indian Ocean area. Simon finds a foundation for broad cooperation among non-Communist regional states, stemming partly from their apprehensions over Communist China's potentialities and intentions. He contends that such countries as Japan, Australia, and India, which have the capacity for increased defense commitments, are unlikely to establish a formal security arrangement, to avoid exacerbating tensions with China and the Soviet Union. The formulation of such an arrangement would depend on the degree of changes that occur within the political environment. Tables representing military expenditures for the Indian Ocean states and a frequency-distribution matrix of transactions among these countries are included.

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651
Sinha, Mira. SOVIET MAPS AND THE MOSCOW-DELHI-PEKING TRIANGLE. China report, v. 6, Sept./Oct. 1970: 16-25. DS777.55.C4484, v. 6

Assesses Sino-Indian and Soviet-Indian relations in light of the recent introduction of Soviet military aid into Pakistan, the re-publication of "unfriendly" Soviet maps of the Sino-Indian border, and the intensification of the Sino-Soviet crisis during the 1960's. The changing role of territorial disputes within the Moscow-Delhi-Peking triangle is emphasized. The author concludes that these developments will reduce India's foreign policy options vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, China, and Pakistan. Kremlin support for limited Indian territorial goals would undermine Soviet boundary policy in relation to the Eastern European countries, China, and Japan. Although India might improve its relations with Communist China, it should try to find new points of common interest with the Soviet Union, for India cannot afford to forego Soviet friendship.

652
THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE. Studies in comparative communism, v. 2, July/Oct. 1969: 149-382. HX1.S74, v. 2

Partial and full texts of approximately 120 Soviet and Chinese documents, including diplomatic notes, government statements, and newspaper and radio reports, and several statements by other Communist Parties. These materials, published in 1969, offer a representative selection of the polemics surrounding the 1969 border incidents and their amplification in the domestic and foreign propaganda of both countries.

653
SOUTHEAST ASIA, 1970. Current history, v. 59, Dec. 1970: 321-370. D410.C82, v. 59

Partial contents.--U.S. policies in Southeast Asia, by Bernard K. Gordon.--Laos in the second Indochina war, by Arthur J. Dommen.--Changing Cambodia, by David P. Chandler.--Burma: the obscure domino, by Richard Butwell.--Creeping self-reliance in Malaysia, by Stephen A. Douglas.--Thailand and the Cambodian conflict, by Kenneth T. Young.--Political processes in the two Vietnams, by Charles A. Joiner.

Analyzes the security problems of Southeast Asia. Gordon assesses post-World War II developments in Indonesia, the Malay peninsula, and Thailand. Dommen sketches the history of U.S. involvement in the war in Laos since 1962. Chandler reviews Sihanouk's role in Cambodian politics and the factors that led to his overthrow in March 1970. Butwell focuses on Burma's self-imposed isolation and the basic instability of the present Ne Win regime, Douglas stresses the relevance of domestic unrest and tension to Malaysia's foreign policy, and Young discusses Thailand's security problems, which he contends have increased significantly as a result of the U.S. intervention in Cambodia and the intensification of the war in Laos. Joiner examines the internal politics of North and South Vietnam and their implications for the future of Indochina.

654
Tu'mah, Jūrj. LEGAL STATUS OF ARAB REFUGEES. Beirut, Institute for Palestine Studies, 1969. 26 p. (Institute for Palestine Studies. Monograph series no. 20) LL

Examines the legal status of Arab refugees in Palestine, their rights, the basis of their rights, how their rights have been affirmed or denied, and the recourse open to the refugees.

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II. THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

MODERN WAR

655
THE FOURTH DIMENSION OF WARFARE. v. 1. Intelligence, subversion, resistance. Edited by Michael Elliott-Bateman. New York, Praeger [1970] 181 p. (Books that matter)
U21.2.F68, v. 1
Includes bibliographical references.

Lectures on the use of intelligence, subversion, and resistance by irregular forces in the recent and remote past. Although conventional warfare has continued, unconventional warfare has emerged as the most common form of warfare in the post-World War II period, and since it can be employed most advantageously by technologically inferior forces to effectively harass the conventional forces and to paralyze the political will of the leadership of the technological superior side, it will continue to be the most common form of conflict in the future.

656
Garnett, John C., comp. THEORIES OF PEACE AND SECURITY: A READER IN CONTEMPORARY STRATEGIC THOUGHT. [London] Macmillan; [New York, St. Martin's Press, 1970] 272 p. illus. (Readings in international politics) UA11.G37
Bibliography: p. 262-265.

Contents.--Acknowledgements.--Preface.--pt. 1. Introduction, by John Garnett.--pt. 2. The role of force in international politics: Military power and international order, by Michael Howard. The international purposes of military power, by Klaus Knorr. The diplomacy of violence, by Thomas C. Schelling.--pt. 3. Peace and Security through deterrence: The anatomy of deterrence, by Bernard Brodie. Deterrence: a theoretical introduction, by Glenn Snyder. Ballistic missile defence and the strategic balance, by Laurence W. Martin.--pt. 4. Peace and security through disarmament: Disarmament as an approach to peace, by Inis L. Claude. Disarmament and the international system, by Hedley Bull. Tensions, political settlement and disarmament, by J. David Singer.--pt. 5. Peace and security through arms control: Basic requirements of arms control, by Robert R. Bowie. Surprise attack and disarmament, by Thomas C. Schelling. The problem of verification, by Wayland Young.--pt. 6. Peace and security through limited war: Limited war, by Bernard Brodie. The limitations of central war, by Morton H. Halperin. The concept of escalation, by Herman Kahn.--Notes on contributors.--Select bibliography.--Index.

A collection of theoretical readings designed specifically to introduce students to the essentials of modern strategic thought, especially basic approaches to peace and security. The authors outline concepts of deterrence, arms control and disarmament, limited war, and escalation; discuss the importance of military power in the conduct of international relations; assess the effects of the ABM on assured-destruction capabilities; describe the technical and political obstacles to arms control and disarmament; question the desirability and practicability of general and complete disarmament; delineate the relationship between armaments and political tensions; and comment on the role of nuclear weapons in limited war.

657
Gott, Richard. GUERRILLA MOVEMENTS IN LATIN AMERICA. [London] Nelson [1970] 452 p. illus.
F1414.2.G65
Bibliography: p. 406-416.

Contents.--Introduction.--Soldiers and peasants in Guatemala.--Revolutionary failure in Venezuela.--Violence in Colombia.--Disaster in Peru.--Tragedy in Bolivia.--Epilogue: defeat of the revolution?--Appendices.--Chronology.--Index.

A history of Latin American guerrilla movements since the victory of the Cuban revolution. Gott distinguishes three periods of guerrilla activity: 1959-61, when victory was expected in a matter of months; 1962-65, when several important guerrilla movements were supported and in some cases controlled by orthodox Communist parties; and 1966-69, when the Communist parties gradually abandoned interest in guerrilla movements. He concludes that the guerrilla movements have thus far failed to create the conditions for revolution because of U.S. intervention, lack of unity and commitment on the left, and ignorance of local conditions.

658
Jacobs, Ruth H. THE WHY OF WAR. War/peace report, v. 10, Oct. 1970: 10-11.
JX1901.W38, v. 10

War is a cultural invention of man, an institution made legitimate in certain societies as an instrument of national policy. Man fights wars because society tells him to fight, not because he has an innate need to kill. Nations that share friendship could become enemies in a war in the absence of cultural inventions to arbitrate conflicts. Until war is viewed as an institution, man's invention, people will be unable to consider how man can invent better institutions for resolving conflicts.

659
Otterbein, Keith F. THE EVOLUTION OF WAR; A CROSS-CULTURAL STUDY. With a foreword by Robert L.

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Carneiro. [n.p.] H[uman] R[elations] A[rea] F[iles] Press, 1970. 165 p.
U21.2.088
Bibliography: p. [150]-165.

In a cross-cultural study of primitive war, tests a series of hypotheses concerning the causes and the conditions under which wars are fought. Otterbein discovers that the sociopolitical system has a stronger influence on warfare variables than do ecological and economic factors. He concludes that "the higher the level of political centralization, the higher the degree of military sophistication" and the more likely that the political communities will be militarily successful. Appendices deal with methodological aspects of the military-sophistication scale along with alternative hypotheses and assumptions.

660
Pelliccia, Antonio. THE EVOLUTION OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF WAR. NATO's fifteen nations, v. 15, Dec. 1970/Jan. 1971: 56-59, 62-63.
UA646.F5, v. 15

Surveys some recent contributions to the theory of war. Pelliccia is highly critical of civilian military strategists, both for the general meagerness of their product to date, and for their bias against military men who contribute to this subject. He praises Clausewitz for having made insights into war that are still the most penetrating available. Today three different theories of war exist side by side and in competition: a free-world view, in which war is conceived as "a human relationship to be repudiated"; a Soviet view, in which it becomes "a possible human relationship arising from certain political situations"; and a Chinese Communist view, in which it is "something necessary and inevitable in the obtaining of political aims." In addition, one must consider technology, which, independent of these three "philosophical" approaches to war, imposes its own conditions on the uses of violence.

661
Pennsylvania. University. Board of Trustees. [THE ESCALATION AND DE-ESCALATION OF CONFLICT] Prepared for U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. [Philadelphia] 1969. 2 v.
DLC
"ACDA/ST-149."

Contents.--v. 1. Conflicts and their escalation: metagame analysis.--v. 2. The analysis of options: a computer aided method for analyzing political problems.

Develops a theoretical model to facilitate the prediction and explanation of conflict. The authors proceed from the simplest possible conflict situation and theory to successively more complicated environments and arrive at a metatheory of real-world conflicts. In volume 2 this theoretical model is applied to several political problems in a demonstration of the value of computers in analyzing conflicts.

662
Preston, Richard A., and Sydney F. Wise. MEN IN ARMS; A HISTORY OF WARFARE AND ITS INTERRELATIONSHIPS WITH WESTERN SOCIETY. 2d rev. ed. New York, Praeger [1970] xv, 424 p. illus., maps.
D25.P7, 1970
Bibliography: p. 377-404.

Partial contents.--Introduction.--Warfare and society.--The beginnings of modern warfare and modern armies.--The limited warfare of the eighteenth century.--The nation in arms and the Napoleonic wars.--The nineteenth century: the illusion of limited war.--Approach to total warfare.--Total war begins.--The modern war lords.--Cold war.--Nuclear strategy and arms limitation.

A history of warfare in the Western world. The book is meant to provide the professional military student with background for further reading in military history and to go beyond the usual treatment of this subject in explaining the interaction of military trends and events with social processes and technology. It being a further object of this book to forward the search for means to control or limit international conflict, the authors, in a final chapter, address themselves directly to that issue as posed by the current military confrontation between East and West. They conclude that until effective arms control measures have been worked out, which is bound to be a long-term process, the Western powers must continue to depend on a balance of political and military might to preserve peace. In this, they will "put to the ultimate test their social discipline, strength of will, political aptitude, and all the values implicit in the western tradition."

663
PROBLEMS OF MODERN STRATEGY. New York, Published for the Institute for Strategic Studies [by] Praeger [1970] 219 p. (Studies in international security, 14) U162.P76 1970
Includes bibliographical references.

Contents.--The evolution of modern strategic thought, by Raymond Aron.--The classical strategists, by Michael Howard.--Social systems analysis and the study of international conflict, by Kenneth E. Boulding.--The reappraisal of limited war, by Robert E. Osgood.--The ethical problem of modern strategy, by Carl Friedrich Freiherr von Weizsaecker.--Arms control: a stocktaking and prospectus, by Hedley Bull.--Technology, politics, and strategy, by Bernard Brodie.--Great Power intervention in the modern world, by Urs Schwarz.--The strategic uses of revolutionary war, by Brian Crozier.

Traces the evolution of strategic ideas, doctrines, and policies over the last two decades. The papers were originally presented in 1968 at the Institute for Strategic Studies annual conference and later revised to incorporate related discussion.

664
Richardson, R. P., and others. AN ANALYSIS OF RECENT CONFLICTS. Arlington, Va. Institute of Naval

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Studies, Center for Naval Analyses, 1966, reissued 1970. 304 p. illus. (CNA research contribution, no. 144) DLC
"Contract N00014-68-A-0091."

380 conflicts initiated during the years 1946-1964 were analyzed. The analysis of recent conflicts has three major objectives: (1) to confirm or counter assumptions about limited warfare situations in the period 1946-1964 in order to provide greater validity in predicting such situations in the future; (2) to identify the major variables involved in the various kinds of recent conflicts so that these variables will be used appropriately in the analysis of future conflicts of a similar type; (3) to provide a data base from which important implications about the nature of recent conflicts may be derived so that effective processes of deterrence and control may be perceived for future application. (Abstract supplied)

665
Vorwerck, Erich. [GUERRILLAS IN THE PRESENT AND IN THE FUTURE--ATTEMPT AT AN EXPLANATION] Guerillas in Gegenwart und Zukunft--Versuch einer Deutung. Wehrkunde, v. 19, Jan. 1970: 21-26. map.
U3.W396, v. 19

Discusses the types and intensity of guerrilla actions in Indochina, the Near East, Africa, and America, and Europe's prospects of becoming a fifth center of guerrilla activity. Most actions are Communist-backed and take place in Western countries or within their spheres of influence. Guerrillas of all sorts threaten to unbalance Western industrialized states and their economic spheres of interest. These countries must coordinate their resistance and take initiatives to eliminate social injustices within their borders and assist the developing countries while there is still time.

666
Wilson, Andrew. THE BOMB AND THE COMPUTER. London, Barrie & Rockliff, Cresset Press [1968] 180 p. illus. U310.W5

Contents.--Introduction.--The Prussian legacy.--From the Marne to Midway.--The end of amateurism.--Politico-military games.--Tacticians in the laboratory.--Computer war games.--The war-gamers.--The systems analysis debate.--Gaming the un-gameable.--Game-theory.--War games on the campus.--Vietnam--the game that failed.

Traces the development of war games from their origin in the Prussian Kriegsspiel of the early 19th century to the present state of the art, which rests on the application of game theory, computers, and other fruits of modern science and technology. Wilson finds an imbalance between the efforts expended on planning for war and those devoted to the discovery and control of its causes. He holds war gaming partly responsible for several serious military blunders committed by the United States in recent years, including the failures in Vietnam, and faults gamers for failing to see the limitations of war games, "the number of factors they necessarily ignore, and the importance of the area where judgements have to be made on the fallible basis of intuition." Recognizing the fallibility of military judgment would open the way to a consideration of alternative, nonmilitary solutions to the problem of national and international security.

MODERN WEAPONRY AND RELATED TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS

667
Australia. Atomic Energy Commission. REPORT. 18th; 1969/70. Canberra, Govt. Print. Off., 1970. 128 p. HD9698.A8A3, v. 18

Deals with the problems of nuclear power and such related subjects as civil uses, research, reactors, production, and services. Included is a study of Australia's views on the International Atomic Energy Agency's safeguards program.

668
Barnaby, Frank. IS NUCLEAR POWER WORTH THE RISKS? Science journal, v. 6, Aug. 1970: 40-45.
Q1.S57, v. 6

The ever-widening use of nuclear energy throughout the world poses grave dangers, particularly in the form of great accumulations of radioactive waste. This does not argue against the greater use of nuclear power: the world's demand for energy is growing at an explosive rate, and a portion of this demand must be met by the atom. On the other hand, it does call for responsibility and reason. At the national level, there would seem to be little to complain of: "most of what we would reasonably expect to have been done has been done." But in the international field, there has been little progress, and this is disturbing. The International Atomic Energy Agency has responsibility in this area, but lacks financial and political support. Yet "there is no doubt that eventually all nuclear technology will have to be internationalized. National and political boundaries are simply too restrictive for the continued progress of nuclear technology, or for dealing with the problems it produces." Meanwhile, until international controls have been established, the benefits of nuclear power may not outweigh the risks.

669
Booda, Larry L. NAVY'S PLAN TO COUNTER THE GROWING UNDERSEA THREAT. Undersea technology, v. 11, Nov. 1970: 18-20, 30-31, 36.
V210.A1U5, v. 11

Describes recent additions to Soviet submarine strength and outlines U.S. countermeasures. The most important new addition to the Soviet undersea fleet is the "Yankee" class ballistic-missile-firing, nuclear-powered submarine, of which 13 have now been completed, with 8 more under construction. The most significant U.S. countermeasure, which is only in the planning stage, will be the new Moored Surveillance System, an air-deployed arrangement that will combine the technologies of

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several older systems. Research and development work continues on deep-diving submarines, the sea-based antiballistic missile intercept system, non-acoustic detection methods, and oceanography.

670
Cohen, Paul. THE EROSION OF SURFACE NAVAL POWER. Foreign affairs, v. 49, Jan. 1971: 330-341.
D410.F6, v. 49

Surface naval power is increasingly threatened by advances in submarine technology. Although only the Soviet Union now possesses a submarine fleet sufficiently strong to pose a major threat to the United States, other nations could construct effective submarine fleets without great difficulty. Submarine warfare could conceivably sever all surface naval communications either in a particular region or throughout the world. Nations that are heavily dependent on shipping, such as Japan and Britain, would suffer much more than the Soviet Union or China. Given the nuclear parity between the Soviet Union and the United States, the threat of nuclear retaliation might be too risky or ineffective. A review of the technical evolution that has led to this situation reveals that submarine capability is growing more rapidly than antisubmarine capability. Cargo planes could not replace merchant vessels in a crisis, and hydrofoils are vulnerable to submarine attack; "the only viable substitute for the merchant ship is the nuclear-propelled cargo submarine."

671
Colby, Carroll B. COUNTDOWN: ROCKETS AND MISSILES FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. [New and rev. ed.] New York, Coward-McCann [1970] 48 p. illus.
UG633.C57 1970

Describes various U.S. tactical and strategic missiles capable of being launched from underground silos, naval craft, and helicopters. The book includes photographs of each weapon, together with explanatory captions.

672
Foster, John S. [interview] RUSSIA VS. U.S.--COMING CRISIS IN ARMS. U.S. news & world report, v. 69, Nov. 30, 1970: 24-26, 29-30.
JK1.U65, v. 69

Warns that the United States is on the verge of losing its strategic and technological superiority over the Soviet Union. The United States, "across the board," is still 2 to 3 years ahead of the U.S.S.R., but in general technological competence, in strategic and naval weapons, and in the quality of military hardware supplied to allied powers, the U.S. lead over its rival is rapidly evaporating. The reason: the Soviet Union now devotes 40 to 50 percent more effort than the United States to research and technology. A massive effort, on the order of $3 billion annually, which admittedly does not look practical in today's political environment, would be needed to prevent the United States from falling behind in several critical areas by 1974-75. A strategic arms limitation agreement also might prevent the balance between the two superpowers from being upset, but the United States "cannot afford an interminable wait for such an agreement, while Soviet momentum in deployment and development continues," nor can it "unilaterally stop those programs designed to preserve [its] security in the absence of an agreement."

673
Fuchs, Georg. RAY RESEARCH AND WORK FOR PEACE. Peace and the sciences, no. 1, July 1970: 42-47.
JX1901.P25, 1970

Radiation experts have a responsibility to keep the public informed of the true extent of the danger posed to life and health by nuclear weapons and to oppose all tendencies toward a blurring of the distinction between military and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The work of enlightenment has already met with some success. Radiation researchers and other progressive forces made major contributions to the negotiation of the nuclear test ban treaty. Unfortunately, there are some, undeterred by the conclusive evidence that radiations released by nuclear bombs cause serious disease and genetic damage, who are trying to minimize the fear of nuclear weapons and atmospheric testing. At the same time, others are spreading exaggerated accounts of the danger posed by peaceful uses of nuclear technology. These errors must be combated, for the "line between the useful and destructive use of rays and nuclear energy" is "the frontier which divides life in health and well-being from atomic destruction."

674
Higatsberger, Michael. [THE PEACEFUL USE OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS] Die friedliche Verwertung von Kernexplosionen. Österreichische militärische Zeitschrift, v. 8, Sept./Oct. 1970: 369-371.
U3.034, v. 8

Asserts that since conventional sources of energy will be exhausted by the year 2000, peaceful applications of nuclear energy will have to cover the needs of more than 6 billion people. The author describes the effect of nuclear explosions and gives examples of such economic and scientific applications as the construction of an alternate Panama Canal, the building of underground tanks to safely store valuable raw materials for industry as well as undesirable waste products, the improvement of efficiency in mining and oil and gas production, construction of traffic tunnels, production and use of hydrocarbons for the organic-chemical industry, and stimulation of new scientific discoveries. The American "Gasbuggy Experiment," conducted by the Atomic Energy Commission in New Mexico during December 1967, demonstrated the economic advantages of nuclear explosions. The number of nuclear reactors and, therefore, the volume of radioactive waste, are growing constantly. Two safety problems must thus be solved: protecting mankind from harmful radiation and devising measures against the movement of huge geological masses resulting from underground nuclear explosions.

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675
Kurowski, Franz. [THE UNDERSEA BATTLE OF THE FUTURE: ACTUALITY--POSSIBILITY--SPECULATION] Die Unterwasserkampf der Zukunft: Wirklichkeit--Möglichkeit--Spekulation. Marine-Rundschau, v. 67, Aug. 1970: 449-457. illus.
V3.M3, v. 67

The 1959 discovery of 43 radioactive Soviet devices used as buoys off the East coast alerted the Americans to the threat of undersea warfare. With buoys 80 percent of American industry could be annihilated by rocket fire. The American reaction was to erect an underwater Cape Kennedy off California. By 1972 an electronic wall will safeguard both coasts and identify and counter Soviet U-boats. Technological breakthroughs, such as an underwater camera that does not require light, have already been made. Now that the United States dominates in the depths below 1,000 m., perhaps both superpowers will renounce the use of underwater military power and exploit current research for peaceful uses.

676
Larson, Carl A. ETHNIC WEAPONS. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 50, Nov. 1970: 3-11.
Z6723.U35, v. 50

Enzymes and their inhibitors play a critical role in the chemistry of life. Enzymes serve as catalysts in organic chemical reactions; inhibitors regulate the production and specificity of enzymes. Research has now established that there are genetically determined individual and group differences in susceptibility to the operation of the inhibitors. This fact is of great significance to current efforts to produce new incapacitating agents for military use, for it should prove possible in some circumstances and with adequate preparation to deploy chemical agents to which, for ethnic reasons, an enemy is susceptible but friendly forces, immune. This is a new field of research--the genetic basis of the inhibitory mechanism was discovered in 1969--and its implications should be examined thoroughly.

677
Schrader, Gene. ATOMIC DOUBLETALK: A REVIEW OF MATTERS WITHHELD FROM THE PUBLIC BY THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION. Center magazine, v. 4, Jan./Feb. 1971: 29-52. illus.
N&CPR

Documents a charge that the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) has been less than candid with the public concerning the dangers of military and civilian uses of nuclear energy; that, in fact, it "has operated for so many years under a system designed to withhold more information than it releases that, although it will not tell a lie, neither can it tell the truth." The AEC's handling of early weapons development programs, the civilian control issue, uranium mining, atmospheric and underground testing, power reactors, Project Plowshare, and other problem areas are discussed. Much uncertainty exists as to the real extent of the danger posed by many of these activities. In these circumstances, the public has a right "to be currently and honestly informed when risks involving human lives are weighed and coldly calculated (by a few) in favor of benefits to be obtained (for whom and how great?)."

678
U.S. Library of Congress. Legislative Reference Service. SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND AMERICAN DIPLOMACY: THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY [by Franklin P. Huddle] Prepared for the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, by the Science Policy Research and Foreign Affairs Divisions, Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1970. 70 p.
DLC

At head of title: Committee print.
Includes bibliographical references.
Part of an extended study, two volumes of which are cited elsewhere in the current issue of this bibliography.

Reviews technology as a factor of change in international relations and describes the ways in which technology has influenced diplomacy. Huddle delineates trends in nuclear weaponry, space development, agriculture, and technological infrastructure and the problems they have generated for diplomacy. He concludes with a study of the impact of future technology and how it can be exploited to serve the purposes of diplomacy.

DEFENSE POLICIES AND MILITARY STRATEGIES OF NATIONS AND ALLIANCES

679
Amme, Carl H. THE NEED FOR ASSAULT CAPABILITIES. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 50, Nov. 1970: 12-22.
Z6723.U35, v. 50

Argues for the retention of strong air-assault and amphibious forces by the United States. Since the primary purpose of a defense establishment is to maintain an international environment in which the resort to force in the pursuit of national objectives will be unnecessary, it is essential that the United States possess a force of sufficient size and flexibility to place beyond question its capacity to deal with any threat to its interests. More specifically, it must have readily available the capacity to project its power in politically acceptable ways into crisis situations in the Eurasian rimland. For this purpose, air-assault and amphibious forces are indispensable.

680
Angenfort, Jupp. [MISSION AND ESSENCE OF THE BUNDESWEHR] Auftrag und Wesen der Bundeswehr. Marxistische Blätter, v. 8, May/June 1970: 77-83.
HX6.M32, v. 8

Marxism teaches that the character of any army depends on the social relations prevailing in the

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state whose military expression it is. Since West Germany remains as it was, the answer to the question of whether or not the Bundeswehr has a new character is clear. Despite the changes obviously wished by those who voted for the new government, Bonn's long-range goal remains the reversal of the results of Hitler's lost war. The apologetic talk of the defensive nature of the Bundeswehr is contradicted by the fact of its "forward position" in NATO's military doctrine. The same military leaders who have refused to recognize the existence of the German Democratic Republic continue in their plans to acquire nuclear weapons. The recent reorganization of the Bundeswehr reinforces its offensive capability. The internal mission assigned the Bundeswehr remains the assurance of order and the subversion of the state in preparation for a takeover by the colonels.

681
APARTHEID AND THE ATLANTIC DEFENSE SYSTEM. Africa today, v. 17, Sept./Oct. 1970: 40-42.
DT1.A22, v. 17

Examines the assumptions underlying South Africa's role in NATO defense strategy in the South Atlantic region and concludes that none is valid from either a military or moral point of view. Since South Africa's racial policies pose a far greater threat to international security than do either the Soviet or Communist Chinese threats to the South Atlantic sea lanes, the United States and Great Britain should terminate existing defense agreements with South Africa.

682
Ashcroft, Geoffrey. MILITARY LOGISTIC SYSTEMS IN NATO: THE GOAL OF INTEGRATION. London, Institute for Strategic Studies, 1969-70. 2 v. (Adelphi papers, no. 62, 68)
U162.A3 no. 62, 68

Contents.--v. 1. Economic aspects.--v. 2. Military aspects.

Assesses the prospects for integrating military logistics in NATO. In part 1 Ashcroft examines the U.S. and British cost-reduction programs and their potential applicability in other NATO countries, as well as proposals for international cooperation. He concludes that neither significant savings nor cooperation is possible without full military participation by NATO members. In part 2 he criticizes the logistics activities of Supreme Allied Command Europe (SACEUR) from the viewpoint of logistic integration and presents a program that would provide for an active SACEUR role in increasing logistics integration.

683
Baldwin, Hanson W. RUSSIA'S BIG RED FLEET. Reader's digest, v. 97, Nov. 1970: 155-156, 158, 160.
AP2.R255, v. 97

Argues that the Soviet Navy has made great strides in weaponry and technology; compares the Soviet and the American navies; describes the growth and range of the Soviet submarine fleet; and examines some of the Soviet Navy's weaknesses. Baldwin asserts that "gun for gun and ship for ship, most Soviet naval vessels outrange [America's], and they have a one- to three-knot advantage in speed." He concludes that unless the United States meets the Soviet naval challenge, Moscow may achieve its goal of controlling the world's waterways.

684
Birgi, Nuri. THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE: ITS PRESENT PROBLEMS AND ITS AIMS. NATO's fifteen nations, v. 15, Dec. 1970/Jan. 1971: 31-33, 36-38.
UA646.P5, v. 15

Examines some main problems of the Atlantic Alliance in the 1970's. Defining its role in a period of reduced tensions, implementing the strategy of flexible response, devising a satisfactory system of nuclear decisionmaking, finding the most productive approach to East-West détente, guiding the conduct of inter- and intra-bloc negotiations, and extending alliance cooperation into economic, social, cultural, and technical fields will be the chief tasks facing NATO during the next decade.

685
[BLUE RIBBON DEFENSE PANEL PROPOSALS] Navy, v. 13, Sept. 1970: 9-27. VA49.N28, v. 13

Contents.--Packard comments on Panel Report.--Fitzhugh Panel proposes radical revamping of Pentagon, by L. Edgar Prina.--Minority members sharply disagree with major Fitzhugh proposals, by John G. Norris.--The "Blue Ribbon Panel's" recommendations for reorganization of the Pentagon.

Assessments of the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel's Report to the President and the Secretary of Defense on the Department of Defense, a study of Defense Department organization and procurement practices, together with extracts from the Report. Prina offers a recapitulation of the report and a survey of early reactions in Congress, the Defense Department, and elsewhere. Norris reports the views of those who object to panel proposals to downgrade the separate service secretaries and remove the Joint Chiefs of Staff from the operational chain of command, and who fear that the panel recommendations will lead to overcentralization and a single service.

686
Bonder, Seth. SYSTEMS ANALYSIS: A PURELY INTELLECTUAL ACTIVITY. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 51, Feb. 1971: 14-23.
Z6723.U35, v. 51

Accuses the U.S. Department of Defense of misusing systems analysis and suggests corrective action. Bonder develops a contrast between the scientific method as traditionally practiced and the very different procedures of systems analysis. As used by the Department of Defense, systems analysis is not scientific. It is a purely intellectual discipline, proceeding deductively without empirical verification of its models and hypotheses. This limitation is generally overlooked, however, and as a result systems analysis is used to make choices or predict outcomes in situations where

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the data base is wholly inadequate. Properly understood and applied, systems analysis can be a useful tool: it can help to identify problems, analyze complex situations, and devise alternative solutions, but in all cases it ought to be used "as a learning vehicle and not as an instrument for advocacy."

687
Booth, Richard. THE ARMED FORCES OF AFRICAN STATES, 1970. With an introd. by William Gutteridge. London, Institute for Strategic Studies, 1970. 27 p. map. (Adelphi papers, no. 67)
U162.A3 no. 67

A statistical survey of military personnel and equipment of African states and regions. In the introduction, Gutteridge summarizes African military developments between April 1966 and May 1970 and concludes that no radical changes have occurred despite substantial growth of the armed forces of a few countries.

688
Brown, William M. ON THE POSTATTACK VIABILITY OF AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS. Santa Monica, Calif., Rand Corp., 1970. 29 p. (Rand Corporation. Paper. P-4275)
Sci RR
Microfiche AD 699 831

"Submitted as one of the working papers for a study of alternative civil defense programs (known as Lincoln Study) under the sponsorship of the Office of Emergency Planning."
References: p. 26.

This paper attempts to: (1) delineate a set of crucial problems which could develop if a nuclear war collapsed the federal government as an authoritative presence; and (2) discuss some that might be insurmountable even if the federal government survived. The first set represents the threat to viability from the dependence on the suddenly missing presence of the federal government; the second because the government would not be skilled at its vital postattack functions. The author concludes that: (1) The problems of the early survival period and the reorganization period may be intangible ones rather than ones involving shortages of material sources. (2) If the federal authority disappeared after a nuclear attack, reconstituting it could be very difficult. (3) An alternative approach to postattack federal functions is needed to provide a desirable orientation for postattack planning. (4) Some countermeasures are possible that might be implemented in a future crisis if planned for in peacetime. (Abstract supplied)

689
Buck, James H. JAPAN'S DEFENSE OPTIONS FOR THE 1970'S. Asian survey, v. 10, Oct. 1970: 890-899.
DS1.A492, v. 10

Bibliographical footnotes.

Analyzes Japan's defense options for the next decade in light of Communist China's growing nuclear capability and the possibility of local conventional wars in Asia. Buck summarizes the Japanese military posture, emphasizing force development under the third 5-year defense plan, and calculates present and future defense expenditures. In less than a decade Japan "has tripled absolute dollar expenditures for defense while simultaneously reducing these expenditures as a proportion of the national budget." Japan could allocate $5 billion to defense in 1980 without increasing the proportion of the national product. The author concludes that Japan's response to a threatening Chinese nuclear posture could be the deployment of U.S. nuclear missiles on Japanese soil or the purchase of ABM's. Its reaction to continuing political instability in Southeast Asia could consist of relying on unilateral action by the United States or cooperating with other Asian states, either in ad hoc arrangements or as part of a regional security system.

690
Buntinx, Henry M. V. SYMMETRICAL FORCE REDUCTIONS VERSUS EUROPEAN COLLECTIVE SECURITY. NATO's fifteen nations, v. 15, Oct./Nov. 1970: 29-33.
UA646.F5, v. 15

Compares two current proposals for dealing with the security problems of Europe--the proposal for mutual and balanced force reductions, and the call for an all-European security conference. Buntinx contends that it would be disastrous for the West European powers to sacrifice NATO and their relationship with the United States for a European system of collective security and that the West must avoid the temptation to move toward force reductions unilaterally. Many complications, including the impact of the strategic arms limitation talks, must be considered, and NATO should "be careful and hasten slowly."

691
Cameron, John. THE ARMED FORCES' RELUCTANT RETRENCHMENT. Fortune, v. 82, Nov. 1970: 68-73, 166, 173-174. illus.
HF5001.F7, v. 82

Budgeting pressures, a changed mood in Congress, and the Nixon Administration's new strategic assumptions have all combined to impose a painful retrenchment on the armed forces. One of the effects has been that career officers are bitter and uncertain about the future. The new mood at the Pentagon was revealed dramatically in September when the Joint Chiefs of Staff unanimously advised the President against getting involved in what could have become an open-ended war in Jordan. White House strategists now want U.S. allies to take the major responsibility for their own defense against conventional attack, allowing reduction of U.S. forces stationed abroad. The strategy presupposes that Russia and Red China are not likely to attack the U.S. in unison. Therefore, the U.S. can risk reducing conventional forces while beefing up strategic nuclear armament. The gloom in the ranks is reflected in significantly lower re-enlistment rates and poor officer retention, even for elite units and among such careerists as West Point graduates. Top officers are sensitive about press criticism--and about the Fitzhugh report, whose author recently described the Pentagon as "an amorphous lump." The job

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ahead for the services is to redefine their role in believable modern terms, and to defend it in a world of systems analysis and competition for scarce national resources. (Abstract supplied)

692
Chekonin, B. REMEMBER THE LESSONS OF HISTORY. JAPAN'S DANGEROUS TENDENCIES TOWARD REMILITARIZATION. Current digest of the Soviet press, v. 22, Nov. 3, 1970: 14. D839.C87, v. 22
Condensed from Izvestiia, Oct. 8, 1970: 5.
Slav Rm

Although the Japanese Armed Forces are not large numerically, their firepower and disproportionately large officer corps make Japan the most powerful of the capitalist countries of Asia. Revival of Japanese militarism is the prerequisite for revival of the old colonial empire. International imperialism assigns Japan the forward position in the struggle against the national liberation movement and the Soviet Union. The Soviet people must be aware that Japanese official circles are directing an anti-Soviet campaign revolving around the so-called question of the return of the Kurile Islands. Progressive political parties in Japan must struggle against remilitarization and for the strengthening of relations with the Soviet Union. The Soviet people and the world cannot remain indifferent to the course of events in Japan.

693
Chopra, Maharaj K. INDIA UNDER THE SECOND DEFENSE PLAN. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 50, Dec. 1970: 13-21. illus.
Z6723.U35, v. 50

Discusses India's Second Defense Plan, focusing on the improvements that have been made within the Indian Armed Forces in keeping with the objectives of maintaining internal security and territorial integrity. Chopra contends that the Armed Forces will have a primarily defensive role, guarding against India's perennial enemies, Communist China and Pakistan. He concludes that despite external and internal pressures to go nuclear, Government officials insist that India will not produce the bomb.

694
Cleveland, Harlan. NATO: THE TRANSATLANTIC BARGAIN. New York, Harper & Row [1970] 204 p. map.
UA646.3.C54 1970
Includes bibliographical references.

Describes the effects on alliance solidarity of the French withdrawal from NATO, the efforts by some Americans to withdraw U.S. troops from Europe, and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, and discusses how alliance members, faced with these "tests of cohesion," worked to revitalize the organization through a series of tough-minded bargains that reflected the wide range and positive nature of international consultation. Cleveland notes that in the coming decade the United States will have to sort out a number of issues with its NATO allies, including nuclear planning, arms control and disarmament, the management of East-West relations, and European security. He concludes that international consultation is essential to the health of the alliance, because it gives NATO allies a way to maintain contact with each other to work out problems.

695
Danigo, F. [YUGOSLAVIA'S DEFENSE POLICY] La politique de défense yougoslave. Revue de défense nationale, v. 26, Nov. 1970: 1667-1677.
D410.R45, v. 26

Focuses on the reorganization of Yugoslavia's defense in the context of its geopolitical role and assesses Belgrade's policies following the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. A discussion of the problems and implications of this reorganization, including a study of the organization of the chain of command, the financial problems associated with modernization, and the relations between the Army and the territorial defense forces, is given.

696
DEFENCE AGENCY DIRECTOR'S VISIT TO US. Asian almanac, v. 8, Nov. 7, 1970: 4258-4259.
DS1.A4752, v. 8

During a recent visit to the United States, Yasuhiro Nakasone, director general of Japan's defense agency, told Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird that the U.S.-Japan mutual security pact should be maintained on a semi-permanent basis because it contributes significantly to the maintenance of peace in the Pacific and to Japan's security by deterring possible nuclear attacks. He urged that cooperation under the treaty be strengthened to minimize political friction engendered by economic disaccord. Nakasone also told Secretary Laird that Japan would not need nuclear weapons so long as it is covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, but since Japan is developing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, he "urged the US to study the possibility of undertaking joint production of enriched uranium with Japan," which would help to alleviate fears abroad of Japan's developing nuclear weapons. Nakasone emphasized that, due to constitutional restrictions, budgetary constraints, and strict civilian control, there is no danger of a resurgence of militarism in Japan.

697
DEFENCE WHITE PAPER. Asian almanac, v. 8, Dec. 5, 1970: 4305-4309. DS1.A4752, v. 8

Recapitulates Japan's recent white paper on defense and the domestic and international reactions to it. The report also outlines Japan's fourth 5-year defense plan (1972-1976). Since Japan's military posture will be strictly defensive, the aim of forthcoming defense programs will be the development of a defensive capability based on indigenous weapons and equipment. The possession of defensive nuclear weapons is not prohibited by the Constitution, but "in view of the danger of inviting adverse foreign reactions and large scale war, Japan will follow the policy of not acquiring any nuclear weapons at present." Lacking strategic offensive weapons, and barring unforeseen changes

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in the world nuclear balance, Japan will have to continue to rely on the U.S.-Japanese mutual security pact and the U.S. deterrent for protection against nuclear and large-scale conventional attacks. The white paper maintains that reports concerning the possibility of a revival of Japanese militarism "are groundless because this nation lives up to its policy of restricting its defence set-up and activities to purely defensive purposes." The fourth 5-year defense plan envisages military expenditures amounting to 5,200,000 million yen or about 2.2 times total expenditures under the third defense plan. Annual outlays under the fourth defense plan will represent about 1 percent of the gross national product. Japan's defense chief contends that the development of nuclear arms would undermine the national consensus while contributing little if anything to Japan's security. Given the heavy concentration of population and industry in urban areas, Japan could never hope to survive a nuclear first strike.

698
Della Santa, Jean. [ITALY, ITS ARMY, AND NATO] L'Italie, son armée et l'OTAN. Revue militaire suisse, v. 115, Oct. 1970: 473-482. illus.
U2.R5, v. 115

Describes the buildup of the Soviet Navy in the Mediterranean, focusing on the threat it poses to allied interests in the area; discusses Italy's strategic military role in NATO and its vulnerability in case of an enemy attack; and gives statistical data on the strength and capabilities of the Italian Armed Forces.

699
Deshingkar, G. D. CHINESE PLA NAVY. China report, v. 6, July/Aug. 1970: 37-39.
DS777.55.C4484, v. 6

Since China does not depend on foreign trade or imports of strategic materials, then, assuming that Peking adopts a deterrent posture based on ICBM's and a capability to fight defensive guerrilla wars, it will not need offensive naval power. At present, the Chinese Navy is incapable of undertaking offensive naval operations; it cannot even provide an adequate defense of its own coastline. During the 1970's, however, the Chinese fleet can be expected to grow steadily. On January 4, 1970, an article published in the authoritative People's Daily called for the construction of powerful naval and intracoastal maritime fleets. Initially the expansion program will concentrate on the building of coastal defense vessels and cargo ships for foreign and coastal trade. It is difficult to foresee how Chinese strategic doctrine will change over the next 10 years, but if China desires superpower status, it will have to develop an offensive naval arm.

700
Deshingkar, Giri D. PAPER TIGERS ALL? In Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. Journal, v. 2, Oct. 1969: 180-197.
UA840.I55, v. 2

At one time, the Soviet Union was apparently prepared to assist the Chinese in the event of an unprovoked U.S. nuclear attack. However, with the Russian refusal to extend nuclear guarantees to China during the Quemoy crisis of 1958 and with the further deterioration of Sino-Soviet political relations in the early 1960's, military planners in Peking must have come to the conclusion that China would have to develop an independent nuclear-weapons capability. By deploying intermediate- and long-range missiles, the Chinese hope to deter preemptive nuclear attacks, which they consider possible but unlikely. Although China will probably never achieve absolute parity with the superpowers, it could acquire an effective second-strike capability with a relatively small number of missiles, based on the concentration of industry and population in both the Soviet Union and the United States. If evolving ABM systems prove technically and strategically insoluble for the Chinese, they might resort to chemical and biological weapons. Until China deploys ICBM's, it will have to employ a regionally oriented hostage strategy based on a combination of intermediate-range ballistic missiles and conventional military power, but to deter the superpowers, Communist China will need ICBM's. Since an offensive first strike by China against any country would provoke massive retaliation by the superpowers, it will have no choice but to reserve its nuclear weapons for defense. Given China's low-risk strategy and the incalculable dangers for the superpowers if one or both launched a first strike against China, Peking will probably never have to use its nuclear weapons. However, once China has an effective deterrent force, it might possibly attempt to "liberate" Taiwan, an adventure that could produce the "worst crisis of the 20th century." In the long run, however, stable governments in Asia "need not fear a threat from China, nuclear or otherwise. The Chinese atom-bomb, too, is a 'paper-tiger.'"

701
Dmitriev, B. BEHIND THE PLANS TO REORGANIZE THE PENTAGON. International affairs (Moscow) no. 12, Dec. 1970: 78-81. D839.I465, 1970

The Fitzhugh committee, appointed to work out recommendations for reorganizing the Defense Department, was from the very first in the "iron grip of Pentagon officials, generals, and armaments manufacturers." Because the present structure of the Pentagon and its decisionmaking apparatus are inefficient, the committee recommended the division of Defense Department functions into three basic categories, each administered by a civilian deputy secretary. Other recommendations asked for the relief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from operational functions and a revised organization for the Unified Commands. Implementation of the committee recommendations will not be easy, since the interests of various components of the military-industrial complex will conflict. The reforms proposed in arms procurement are of course incapable of producing any material change.

702
Domes, Jürgen. THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN THE FORMATION OF REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES 1967-68. China quarterly, no. 44, Oct./Dec. 1970: 112-145.
DS701.C472, 1970

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A chronological analysis of the role of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) in the formation of provincial and municipal revolutionary committees during the cultural revolution. When the PLA was ordered to give direct support to the Maoist political factions in January 1967 most of the regional military leaders refused to give unqualified backing. To win its full support, the central authorities allowed the military to assume a dominant position within the newly established revolutionary committees. The central military leadership may have broadened its power base as a result of the provincial military takeovers, since the regional military authorities are still under centralized control. On the other hand, the disruption of the political and administrative chains of command during the cultural revolution may have strengthened the power position of the regional military leadership. It is too early to predict the future status of army-party relations in China, but current trends suggest that a new era of military regionalism may be in the offing.

703
Dormann, Manfred. [DEMOCRATIC MILITARY POLICY. THE ALLIED MILITARY STRATEGY AS A THEME OF GERMAN POLICY, 1949-1968] Demokratische Militärpolitik. Die alliierte Militärstrategie als Thema deutscher Politik 1949-1968. Freiburg i. Br., Verlag Rombach [1970] 296 p. (Sozialwissenschaft in Theorie und Praxis, Bd. 11)
UA11.D66
Bibliography: p. 285-292.

Contents.--Introduction.--pt. 1. The concept of strategy: Definitions of strategy. The determining factors of nuclear strategy. Strategy and foreign policy.--The concept of defense: Defense and conventional warfare. Defense in the era of nuclear weapons.--Strategy and domestic policy: Military policy and the principle of public information. Strategy and domestic policy in the era of nuclear weapons. The alternative: institutionalizing the conflict or détente attempts.--pt. 2. Discussion on the German military contribution: "Allied strategy" between 1949 and 1952. Konrad Adenauer: rearmament as a foreign policy instrument. Kurt Schumacher: rearmament as a national interest.--Military strategy as an instrument of the "policy of strength.": Allied strategy between 1952 and 1957. Adenauer's policy of strength. The defense concept of the Federal Government and the strategy of NATO. The strategy of NATO in the year 1957/58 and the nuclear armament of the German military.--Allied strategy and German defense policy in the nuclear stalemate: The strategy of flexible response. France and NATO--the special French way. Flexible response as a theme of German defense policy. Dependencies and possibilities of the defense policy of the German Federal Republic.--Appendixes.

Asserts that in order to achieve a democratic policy politicians must possess strategic knowledge. Dormann discusses the changing goals and means of German military strategy, focusing on the relationship between military strategy and politics. Part 1 is based on the ideology of nuclear balance; part 2 explains the interdependence of strategy and politics with the aid of the concept of defense and analyzes German military policy within the framework of NATO. Since there is neither strategic nor ideological consensus within NATO, the question arises of which lines of action remain open for the defense of the Federal Republic of Germany. Dormann argues in favor of a professional army and the organization of a militia-like defense unit that provides for the immediate use of tactical nuclear weapons. He criticizes the lack of domestic consensus regarding German civil defense and the resulting discrepancy between the overall defense budget and allocations for civil defense. Many tensions in the area of strategy and domestic policy result from the dilemma between national security and the constitutional right to public information. In the nuclear era the government can no longer protect life, possessions, and territories with military means, and military and political leaders must be able to recognize the inherent dangers of nuclear strategy to avoid haphazard militarism.

704
Dupuy, Trevor N. THE ALMANAC OF WORLD MILITARY POWER. [Dunn Loring, Va.] T. N. Dupuy Associates [1971, c1970] 338 p. maps.
UA15.D9

A new almanac, designed to "provide periodically all important information on the strategic situation and defense posture of every nation that possesses any significant military or politico-military influence on world or regional affairs." The main part of the almanac consists of 140 regionally arranged country reports that contain data on the military strength, organization, and policies of each country. Each regional grouping is preceded by a map and a brief description of its military geography and its strategic significance.

705
Eichstädt, Ulrich. [THE DEFENSE AND POLITICAL SITUATION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR CIVIL DEFENSE] Die verteidigungspolitische Situation der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und ihre Auswirkungen auf die zivile Verteidigung. Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau; Zeitschrift für die europäische Sicherheit, v. 20, July 1970: 361-383.
U3.W485, v. 20

Examines the function of civil defense in the national security policy of West Germany. Civil defense must be consistent with the requirements of national defense, but its own importance should not be underestimated. In an international crisis civil defense helps to maintain inner stability and credibility in deterrence and in a real defense situation protects the civilian population. The advantage of an adequate civil defense program is an informed and organized citizenry, while its disadvantage is that it entails restrictions on freedom and extra pressures on the administration and economy. Civil defense must receive the attention it deserves because of its importance for maintaining the peace and security of the people of West Germany.

XUM

706
[THE EUROPEAN AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM] Das europäische Luftverteidigungssystem. Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 14, Nov. 1970: 611-614. illus.
U3.W38, v. 14

Starting with a general account of the necessity for and the task and organization of a Western European air defence system, this article presents an overall picture of the NATO air defence ground environment (NADGE) early warning and air defence surveillance system now being built up. Thanks to a coordinated ground environment system, central control of all the air defence forces in NATO Europe at the highest level will be possible in future. The object of NADGE is to provide the kind of automated ground control system which NATO's fighters and surface-to-air defence missiles need for effective operation. This target requires a carefully planned system, comprising radar, computers and transmission facilities, which can detect an enemy formation, determine its position, speed and direction, and direct the defence forces on to an interception course within a fraction of a second. Since NATO has no power to conclude contracts, a consortium of six industrial companies of different nationalities, known as NADGECO Ltd., has agreed to act as systems leader and to place contracts with the nine countries on whose territory the equipment is to be installed. The article lists the international tasks and contributions under this programme. (Abstract supplied, modified)

707
Friel, Patrick J. THE MERITS OF A LIMITED BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE. Astronautics & aeronautics, v. 8, Oct. 1970: 24-27, 73. illus.
TL501.A688A25, v. 8

Outlines U.S. options for counteracting the Chinese Communist and Nth-nation ICBM threats and discusses the desirability, capabilities, and strategic role of the Safeguard ABM system. Although Safeguard's area-defense system might halt the proliferation of nuclear weapons by raising development costs to prohibitive levels, can offer an effective defense against accidental attacks, and could enhance U.S. policy options in the event of a confrontation with secondary nuclear powers, it would not significantly degrade the Soviet Union's second-strike capability or necessitate an increase in the size of Moscow's offensive forces. Beside providing thin area-defense coverage of population centers, Safeguard would also protect U.S. land-based strategic forces. This, the author believes, would "serve to stabilize the number of strategic defensive and offensive systems in the world." Provided the superpowers could agree to restrict the size of their strategic forces at present levels, and provided both developed terminal-defense ABM systems, each would be able to maintain a high-confidence assured-destruction capability without having to increase the number of missiles. Friel also suggests that the United Nations acquire a strategic reconnaissance capability and early warning satellite system, urges the declassification of all intelligence data on strategic nuclear capabilities, and recommends the implementation of a treaty prohibiting the development of first-strike missile systems. If the superpowers could temporarily bypass the verification problem and reach such an agreement, the Soviet Union, the United States, and the United Nations could then cooperate in a joint technical program to develop verification procedures.

708
Fulbright, James William. THE GOVERNANCE OF THE PENTAGON. Saturday review, v. 53, Nov. 7, 1970: 22-25, 57-58. Z1219.S25, v. 53

"The root cause of militarism is war, and as long as we have the one we will be menaced by the other. The best defense against militarism is peace; the next best thing is the vigorous practice of democracy." Widespread public indifference to the dangers of militarism reflects a breakdown in traditional American values; once it was not uncommon for even Presidents to denounce military excesses, whereas the present President appears more concerned about the possibility of being "humiliated." The executive has effectively usurped the treaty-making powers of Congress, especially with regard to military commitments. The Department of Defense conducts a vast public relations campaign designed more to promote the interests of the military than to inform the public. The professional military has played an increasingly significant role in domestic and foreign politics, a particularly disturbing development in view of the dehumanizing war being fought in Vietnam. Civilian control of public life must be reaffirmed, not only by youthful idealists but also by those in positions of high responsibility.

709
Garnett, John C. BAOR AND NATO. International affairs (London) v. 46, Oct. 1970: 670-681.
JX1.I53, v. 46

Reviews the role of British forces on the "Central Front in the overall context of European politics and NATO strategy" by tracing NATO's conventional and strategic military concepts from the traditional-warfare doctrine implicit in the 1952 Lisbon conference, through massive retaliation, the pause strategy, and, finally, flexible response. Garnett contends that military realities in NATO have scarcely changed; they have always been out of step with doctrine. He concludes that the precise military role of British ground forces in NATO remains ambiguous in terms of operational requirements and the alliance's overall strategic doctrine and that these forces will continue to be a compromise between a small, highly mobile unit that is capable of controlling minor altercations along the frontier and deterring the Soviet Union and a large army capable of fighting a major war on the Continent.

710
Gelber, Lionel. BRITAIN, RUSSIA AND THE OPEN SEAS. Spectator, v. 225, Oct. 31, 1970: 508-511.
AP4.S7, v. 225

Britain can play a vital role in preventing Soviet domination of the open seas. The Soviet Union has already established a strong naval presence in the Middle East and is making inroads in East Africa and the Indian subcontinent. South

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Africa, which controls the sea routes around the Cape of Good Hope and which thereby constitutes an important bulwark against Soviet expansionism, must receive Western arms to maintain its strategic position, whatever Westerners may think of its racial policies. Britain's primary role lies East of Suez, possibly in conjunction with the United States and Australia. Not since Germany's pre-World War I attempt to combine massive land and sea power with imperialist ambitions has the free world been faced with such a serious threat as that posed by the present expansion of Soviet naval forces. With the United States already tied down by major commitments in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans and the war in Vietnam, Britain and other Commonwealth countries must assume a greater burden of the defense of the Indian Ocean link.

711
Ghosh, S. K. CHINESE AIR AND MISSILE POWER. In Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. Journal, v. 2, Jan. 1970: 263-293.
UA840.I55, v. 2

A comprehensive appraisal of Chinese Communist airpower and its evolving missile capability. Given its relatively small industrial and technological base and its decision to give top priority to the development of intermediate- and long-range missiles, China will have to forgo the production of conventional military aircraft on a large scale. For the author, this seems to indicate that the defense of China will eventually rely on the power of its strategic weaponry to deter rather than the capabilities of a conventional air-defense system. A deterrent strategy, however, will minimize the conventional Chinese air threat to India while imposing significant limitations on China's capacity to conduct offensive conventional military operations beyond its borders.

712
Goodpaster, Andrew J. [interview] "FURTHER REDUCTIONS COULD DESTROY STABILITY IN EUROPE." U.S. news & world report, v. 69, Dec. 7, 1970: 61-63.
JK1.U65, v. 69

Claims that force reductions by NATO since 1965, coupled with the augmentation of Soviet strength in Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean during the same period, have exhausted the margin for further cuts in troop strength in Europe. Goodpaster cites the loss of French and Canadian contingents and the introduction by the United States of the concept of dual basing as the major steps in the decline of NATO strength. He discusses the nature, extent, and strategic implications of Soviet military activity in Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean and asserts the superiority of a forward strategy for the defense of Central Europe.

713
Gouré, Leon. SOVIET CIVIL DEFENSE REVISITED, 1966-1969. Santa Monica, Calif., Rand Corp., 1969. 111 p. (Rand Corporation. Research memorandum. RM-6113-PR)
Sci RR
Microfiche AD 700 044
Contains 171 references to open Soviet sources.

Initiated in the 1950's and upgraded in 1961, the Soviet civil defense program has increased in scope and intensity since 1966. The system is considered vital to the maintenance of crucial military, industrial, and political capabilities in the event of a nuclear attack. Because of economic constraints, special shelters have been built only for those workers engaged in critical national services. The remainder of the population will be protected mainly by means of evacuation and dispersal to preselected safety zones. Because the program relies heavily on several days' warning of attack and is primarily concerned with protecting certain population elements, the Soviet leaders might be very sensitive to economic damage strikes against their cities. This seems to be borne out by their increasing concern with recovery operations for industrial, utilities, and transportation facilities. In any case, this survey leaves no doubt that Soviet leaders are continuing to invest heavily in civil defense. (Abstract supplied)

714
Gutteridge, William. THE MILITARY IN AFRICA. African affairs, v. 69, Oct. 1970: 366-370.
DT1.R62, v. 69

Although the total strength of the armed forces of sub-Saharan Africa has increased by 255,000 men during the last 6 years, balances between neighboring states have been maintained. Given the continuing military weakness of the African states and the growing military power of white South Africa, direct African military intervention south of the Zambezi River is unlikely without substantial external assistance. Despite some guerrilla incursions in Rhodesia and Angola, the whole African liberation movement has been quite unsuccessful so far. While the expanding African armed forces have demonstrated that they are incapable of conducting effective external military operations, they have emerged as a powerful and popular internal political force during the 1960's.

715
Howard, Michael E. THE CENTRAL ORGANISATION OF DEFENCE. London, Royal United Service Institution, 1970. 63 p. illus.
UA647.H68
Includes bibliographical references.

Contents.--Retrospect.--The Thorneycroft-Mountbatten reforms, 1963.--The new ministry: "the centre."--Control of procurement.--Control of administration.--The making of policy.--Prospect.--Appendices.

Reviews changes in British defense organization during this century and assesses the reorganization of the Ministry of Defence since the publication of a White Paper on the subject in July 1963. Howard concludes that each of the three services within the Ministry of Defence must be recognized as distinct functional units that form parts of a single coherent structure.

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716
IN DEFENSE OF SWEDEN. International defense review, v. 3, Dec. 1970: 395-399. illus.
N&CPR

A general survey of the Swedish defense effort--command structure, organization, mobilization plans, strategic and tactical doctrine, major equipment and weapons systems, and materiel procurement. The Swedish defense program is carefully tailored to fit in with the country's long-standing policy of neutrality. It aims to impress upon any would-be attacker that an invasion of the Swedish homeland would be prohibitively costly.

717
Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. INDIA IN WORLD STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT: ANNUAL REVIEW, 1969-70. New Delhi, 1970. 322 p. tables.
D848.I56, 1969/70

The second annual review of regional and global strategic developments relevant to India's security and foreign policy interests. Country reports analyzing political, economic, and international events up to March 1970 and assessing the military capabilities of the Asian, Australasian, and Near Eastern nations comprise the main part of the review. It also contains chapters on recent developments in the international Communist movement, strategic weapons systems, and U.S.-Soviet relations. New features of this year's review include new chapters on disarmament and the strategic situation in the Indian Ocean, new sections on Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Republic, Jordan, Israel, and Lebanon, and generally wider coverage.

718
IRON-CLAD EVIDENCE OF REVIVAL OF JAPANESE MILITARISM, by "Renmin Ribao" commentator. Peking review, v. 13, Nov. 6, 1970: 12-13.
DS701.P42, v. 13

Japan's recent white paper on national defense and its fourth 5-year defense plan contain "iron-clad evidence of the revival of Japanese militarism under the aegis of U.S. imperialism." Although the white paper asserts that Japan has no intention of developing nuclear weapons or becoming a military power, it declares that it would not be unconstitutional for Japan to possess small, defensive nuclear weapons. A Government document that openly declares that Japan could possess nuclear weapons makes it quite clear that Japanese military men want to acquire nuclear weapons. Military expenditures during the fourth defense program will be two and one-half times larger than the previous increase, and 11 times that of the first program. The purpose of the current program is to build up Japan's navy and air force, to increase the army's firepower and mobility, and to improve missile capabilities--all to buttress a policy of expansion and aggression overseas in the 1970's. By citing in the white paper the need to preserve the pioneering spirit and patriotism, the Government is attempting to rekindle bushido, the "spiritual backbone" of Japanese militarism. When the Japanese reactionaries think it "necessary," they will reinstitute conscription. The Japanese militarists, realizing that a resurgence of old-line militarism in Japan would meet with worldwide disapproval, have attempted to disguise their aggressive intentions with the cloak of peace. However, these covert tactics will neither deceive the peoples of Asia nor allay their fears, and "the ambition of Japanese militarism to revive its old schemes and stage a come-back will absolutely not succeed."

719
JAPANESE MILITARISM BACK IN THE SADDLE. Peking review, v. 14, Jan. 29, 1971: 20-21. illus.
DS701.P42, v. 14

Attempts to demonstrate the revival of Japanese militarism through a detailed statistical breakdown of Japan's postwar military expenditures. The presence of old-line militarists in top defense-agency posts and their feverish efforts to intensify collaboration with the defense industries are offered as further evidence of the resurgence of militarism.

720
Karber, Phillip A. NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND "FLEXIBLE RESPONSE." Orbis, v. 14, summer 1970: 284-297.
D839.068, v. 14

The basic prerequisites for NATO's flexible-response strategy, which places a premium on the ability to fight both conventional and nuclear warfare, are unrealistic. The alliance's conventional forces cannot protect West Germany from a conventional attack. Even if NATO observes a strategic buildup prior to hostilities, it would have neither the time nor the will to counteract Warsaw Pact capabilities. Since the alliance cannot hold an enemy advance the only alternative would be to employ tactical nuclear weapons. However, resorting to tactical nuclear weapons would be suicidal in view of the inability of NATO troops to fight in a nuclear environment, the vulnerability of their delivery systems, and the probability that West Germany would be devastated while being defended. Unfortunately, many of the latest innovations in tactical nuclear technology that could restore credibility to the strategic doctrine of the alliance are being ignored because of the conventional-warfare bias of flexible response. The alliance should install a nuclear minebelt immediately and replace its obsolete delivery systems with a hardened land-based medium-range ballistic missile capability backed up by a Polaris force to provide itself with a realistic deterrent. This tactical nuclear strategy would in effect offer greater stability in an "era of negotiation" than does the doctrine of conventional response and would provide a nuclear umbrella under which balanced mutual force reductions could take place. If the Russians' peaceful intentions are not genuine, NATO will not have given up its ability to deter a Soviet attack.

721
Kessler, Herman E. WHAT PRICE STRATEGY? In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 51, Feb. 1971: 56-66.
Z6723.U35, v. 51

Describes the Planning-Programing-Budgeting system for managing defense resources, as intro-

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duced by former Defense Secretary McNamara and as modified by Secretary Laird. The McNamara system bridged the gap between planning and budgeting. The changes introduced by Laird are intended to further integrate these two functions with programing and to give military men a greater say in the decisionmaking process.

722
Khera, Sucha S. INDIA'S DEFENCE PROBLEM. Bombay, Orient Longmans [1968] 329 p. map.
UA840.K44
Bibliography: p. 321-323.

Describes the evolution of the Indian military establishment, focusing on reorganization and leading personalities, and explores the possibility of military coups; surveys Indo-Pakistani and Sino-Indian military relations; and analyzes India's defense expenditures, economic and technological potential, and defense problems and options. The author concludes that India should reaffirm and support the principle of nonalinement, but that it should not allow any of its defense options to be preempted by an over-hasty commitment to the nonproliferation treaty. Khera maintains that complete nuclear disarmament is the only valid and effective foundation for the nonproliferation treaty and global security.

723
Kielmannsegg, Johann A., Graf von. [CURRENT DEFENSE PROBLEMS: GERMAN POINT OF VIEW] Aktuelle Probleme der Verteidigung: aus deutschen Sicht. Revue militaire générale; general military review, no. 9, Nov. 1970: 483-506.
U2.R48, 1970
Includes summaries in English and French.

Examines the problem of deterrence in the context of West Germany's basic defense concept, ensuring the safety of the country against foreign armed aggression or foreign political incursion. Kielmannsegg argues that troop reductions and the abandonment of the massive retaliation strategy have vitiated the forward-defense policy, and he labels the flexible-response strategy risky. He contends that the nuclear balance will be maintained, if not by disarmament measures then by parallel technological development in the United States and the Soviet Union. Deterrence requires preparedness in terms of real troops and equipment, as well as flexibility and will.

724
Kintner, William R. THE PRUDENT CASE FOR SAFEGUARD. New York, National Strategy Information Center [1969] 28 p. illus. (Strategy papers, no. 1)
UG633.K48
Bibliographical footnotes.

Analyzes the various issues connected with the 1969 ABM debate, including the extent of the Soviet strategic buildup, alternative U.S. military options, missile-defense feasibility, and the character of Soviet leadership and military doctrine. Kintner contends that the Soviet Union is attempting to acquire a first-strike capability, as evidenced by its continued deployment of very large missiles capable of destroying hardened Minuteman forces, and its development of a semiorbital nuclear weapons system. He concludes that a rejection of Safeguard may jeopardize the American people and that the ABM will contribute to America's ability to withstand confrontation and to negotiate.

725
Kirsch, Marian P. SOVIET SECURITY OBJECTIVES IN ASIA. International organization, v. 24, summer 1970: 451-478. JX1901.I55, v. 24

Assesses the impact of the growing Chinese nuclear capability on Soviet security policies in Asia, focusing on Soviet efforts to boost Japan and India as counterweights to Chinese power. Kirsch examines the Soviet military and naval buildup in Asia, its attempts to prevent nuclear proliferation, and its proposal for an Asian collective security system. The author discounts the possibility of establishing an Asian security system sponsored jointly by the Soviet Union and the United States in the near future, although cooperation between the superpowers on a lower level of problems is likely.

726
Lepotier, R. [INTERDEPENDENCY OF STRATEGIES] Interdépendance des stratégies. Revue militaire générale; general military review, no. 9, Nov. 1970: 507-518. U2.R48, 1970
Includes summaries in English and German.

Comments on Adm. Raoul Castex's work Strategic Theories (written during the late 1930's), which examines the interrelationship between the various fields and concepts of strategy. Castex studied major decisions made by Germany at the end of 1916 and concluded that Germany's unrestricted submarine-warfare policy, which caused the entry of the United States into World War I, was the result of the coalescence of the specialized economic, internal psychological, and military land strategies.

727
LETTER FROM LONDON, by our London correspondent. NATO's fifteen nations, v. 15, Oct./Nov. 1970: 14-18. illus. UA646.F5, v. 15

Speculates on the probable course of British defense policy under the new Conservative Party administration. Britain's early proposals with regard to the Five Power Defense System planned for the Malaysia-Singapore region, its plans in the European theater in light of expected U.S. troop withdrawals, its problems of military recruitment and defense planning and finance, its relations with South Africa, and its initial reactions to the change in the strategic military balance occurring as a result of Soviet deployments of advanced strategic missiles are discussed.

728
Licklider, Roy E. THE MISSILE GAP CONTROVERSY. Political science quarterly, v. 85, Dec. 1970: 600-615. H1.P8, v. 85

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Reviews the statements of the Eisenhower administration and its opponents regarding the missile gap that allegedly existed between the United States and the Soviet Union in the late 1950's and early 1960's. Licklider finds that the Eisenhower administration took a calculated risk when it decided to concentrate on producing solid-fuel missiles despite the acknowledged numerical superiority of Soviet ballistic missiles. It remains unclear whether the administration had reliable intelligence that justified such a risk or whether the gamble worked because the United States was never put to the test.

729
MAINLAND CHINA, 1970. Current history, v. 59, Sept. 1970: 129-182. D410.C82, v. 59

Partial contents.--The power of the Chinese military, by Ralph L. Powell.--Chinese factionalism and Sino-Soviet relations, by Uri Ra'anan.--China and Japan: different beds, different dreams, by Walter LaFeber.--China in the Arab world, by Joseph D. Ben-Dak.--China and the United States: collision course? by O. Edmund Clubb.

Reviews recent events in Communist China and their effects on Chinese defense and foreign policies. Powell examines the political and economic role of the People's Liberation Army and foresees a Communist military regime as the probable successor to Mao. Ra'anan describes the factions that compete for power in China and their views on the Sino-Soviet dispute. LaFeber focuses on the increasing economic and military threat that Japan poses for China. Ben-Dak surveys Chinese relations with the Arab countries, pointing out that China's success in improving cultural relations has not been matched by any significant diplomatic influence. Clubb warns that tension between China and the United States is growing; he sees China's admission to the United Nations as a possibly decisive factor in its security.

730
Matsuura, Noboru. JAPAN'S DEFENSE FORCES. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 51, Feb. 1971: 48-55. Z6723.U35, v. 51

Brief survey of the history, organization, political status, manpower, and weaponry of Japan's Self-Defense Forces. The Fourth Defense Program, to be implemented in 1972-1976, is also outlined. Under this program defense spending will increase to about 1 percent of gross national product. The program, which will emphasize "accelerated development and procurement of domestically designed weapons, including the main battle tank, reconnaissance vehicles, self-propelled artillery, missiles, vessels, and special purpose aircraft," reflects Japan's determination to assume a greater share of the responsibility for its own security.

731
Menaul, Stewart. BRITAIN'S FUTURE NUCLEAR ROLE. International defense review, v. 3, Dec. 1970: 433, 435-440. illus. N&CPR

Reviews British experience with nuclear weapons from the period of early wartime cooperation with the United States on the Manhattan project to the present and speculates on the future of Britain's nuclear strike force. Menaul contends that a British nuclear force can continue to be effective only under conditions that will permit extensive collaboration with its French counterpart and close coordination with the U.S. deterrent. There is a real need for an independent, European-based nuclear force, but it must be planned "within a European framework similar to, but certainly not necessarily the same as, the present NATO alliance structure."

732
Mommsen, Ernst W. [COOPERATION IN THE ARMS FIELD] Zusammenarbeit auf dem Rüstungssektor. Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 14, Oct. 1970: 528-534. U3.W38, v. 14

Read by the State Secretary at the Federal Defense Ministry to the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik (German Society for Foreign Affairs) at a colloquium on "Peace Policies and Security in Europe," Sept. 1970.

Studies past and current cooperative arms procurement programs to determine the feasibility and limits of arms cooperation. Dr. Mommsen concludes that under the present circumstances Western cooperation in the arms field will always be restricted to finding acceptable compromises, seizing any means of standardization that presents itself, and patiently seeking partners at every opportunity for the difficult path of cooperation. This path is practicable only if national governments and responsible public opinion in the West effectively agree on a common policy; then cooperation is fruitful. But they should also make it convincingly clear that they are determined to continue on the road of permanent collective defense even if tensions are still further reduced. (Abstract supplied, modified)

733
Murphy, Charles H. MISSILE STAKES. Far Eastern economic review, v. 70, Nov. 21, 1970: 21-24. illus. HC411.F18, v. 70

A summary and analysis of the congressional debate on the Safeguard area-defense ABM system, focusing on the question of deterring Communist China and on the technical feasibility of area defense and its impact on the U.S.-Soviet nuclear balance. The President and his military advisers, having originally deemed an area-defense system against the Communist Chinese ICBM threat absolutely essential, are now disposed to give up this system rather than jeopardize the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) or the concept of mutual deterrence. For the time being the United States is prepared to assume a deterrent posture vis-a-vis China. However, the current U.S. defense posture is strictly transitional, pending the outcome of the SALT talks. In the meantime, the U.S. Defense Department is keeping the area-defense option open, and, if no arms limitation agreement is reached in the near future, the administration will pressure Congress for full deployment of Safeguard next year. Existing ABM sites protecting U.S. land-based ICBM's could easily be con-

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verted into building blocks for a complete area-defense system, and even if Safeguard's anti-China rationale is discarded, it might still be desirable for the United States to raise area defenses against the Nth-country threat.

734
Murphy, Charles J. V. OUR STRATEGIC-ARMS ADVANTAGE IS FADING FAST. Reader's digest, v. 98, Feb. 1971: 94-98. AP2.R255, v. 98

Assesses the U.S.-Soviet strategic nuclear balance in light of developments over the past 5 years: the rapid Soviet strategic-missile build-up, the standstill in U.S. strategic-weapon deployments, and the increase in Soviet investments and decrease in U.S. investments in defense-related research and development. While near-parity exists today, the overall strategic balance is shifting so rapidly against the United States that by 1975 the Soviet Union will have a substantial advantage both in numbers of launchers and in aggregate throw-weight potential. The author concludes that the unabating growth of the Soviet strategic forces indicates the Russians are moving to a first-strike posture. It was this rising prospect that induced Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird to state that the United States would make considerable increases in defense expenditures if the strategic arms limitation talks failed to produce a slowdown in Soviet deployments by the fall of 1971.

735
1970 GREENBOOK: A STATUS REPORT ON THE U.S. ARMY. Army, v. 20, Oct. 1970: 17-152. illus. U1.A893, v. 20

Presents status reports by U.S. Army commands, a special section on Vietnam in 1970, the 1970 command and staff directory, and a report on Army weapons and equipment in the 1970's.

736
Paone, Rocco M. THE SOVIET THREAT IN THE INDIAN OCEAN. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 50, Dec. 1970: 48-55. illus. Z6723.U35, v. 50

Soviet penetration into the Indian Ocean region takes political, military, and diplomatic forms, and its objectives are supreme influence in the area and the curtailment of the power of Communist China and the United States. The Russians have acquired base facilities in Yemen and have expressed interest in a base in the Andaman Islands. To this end, Soviet leaders have proposed a Soviet-Indian collective security pact, which New Delhi has rejected. Moscow is also attempting to couple African and Middle Eastern national liberation movements to its exploitation of Arab national feeling. The economic significance of the "Afro-Asian Ocean" heartland, which contains some of the main arteries of communications and commerce between the West and the Far East as well as the "rice bowl" of the world, is so great that "the nation that can influence the countries here would have predominant political power in the world." In countering the Soviet threat to this area, the United States should devise a multilateral strategy that would have as its economic goal expansion of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization to include African countries. Militarily, such a strategy would include a multinational strike force, which would, among other things, give effective protection to the heartland nations and serve to deter nuclear expansion among them. Although a multinational approach would be difficult and would involve a great deal of negotiation, it would counterbalance Moscow's increasing influence in this strategic region.

737
Perret-Gentil, Jacques. [THE EAST-WEST MILITARY BALANCE] L'équilibre des forces de l'Est et de l'Ouest [by Jacques Pergent] Revue militaire suisse, v. 115, Dec. 1970: 586-591. U2.R5, v. 115

Compares the current Soviet-American balance of forces with that existing in 1965 and 1966. Pergent notes that while the United States has entered a period of strategic stagnation (largely due to the Vietnam War), the Soviet Union has vigorously pursued strategic superiority by increasing its ICBM and atomic submarine programs. He concludes that the United States will have to spend somewhere between $50 to $100 billion to re-establish the strategic weapons equilibrium.

738
Pierre, Andrew J. NUCLEAR DIPLOMACY: BRITAIN, FRANCE AND AMERICA. Foreign affairs, v. 49, Jan. 1971: 283-301. D410.F6, v. 49

Changes in the security relationships among the Atlantic nations may eventually lead to a European nuclear role in the Atlantic Alliance. The strategic arms limitation talks could have a major impact on the security policies of Britain and France, particularly if the outcome is an agreement limiting advanced technological weapons, such as the antiballistic missile system and multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle. Britain faces several difficult decisions regarding its security policies as a result of the rapid pace of technological change. It could abandon its nuclear force altogether or go it alone, but it will probably reject both of these extremes in favor of renewing its present dependency on the United States. An entente nucléaire between Britain and France is technologically feasible but improbable for political reasons. These difficulties notwithstanding, "the time has come for making progress toward creating a European pillar with the Atlantic Alliance--one ready to bear a heavier burden of Europe's defense." Western Europe will undoubtedly continue to rely on the U.S. nuclear umbrella, but various forms of nuclear collaboration between the United States, Britain, and France could fortify the nuclear role of Europe.

739
Preston, Adrian. THE PROFESSION OF ARMS IN POSTWAR CANADA, 1945-1970. World politics, v. 23, Jan. 1971: 189-214. D839.W57, v. 23

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Purposes "to discuss the place and role of the military profession in Canadian political society between 1945 and 1970 and to show how it might be affected by present trends in Canadian defense policy." The term "military professionalism" is examined and its specific applications to the Canadian situation considered for the periods 1945-1956, 1956-1964, and 1964-1970. Preston points to the emergence of a developing consensus that the rationale behind any future Canadian military professionalism would be "less concerned with operational readiness and efficiency than with military diplomacy abroad and order and prosperity at home."

740
Ralston, Jerry W. THE DEFENSE OF SMALL STATES IN THE NUCLEAR AGE. THE CASE OF SWEDEN AND SWITZERLAND. Geneva, 1969. 255 p.
UA790.R35 1969

At head of title: Université de Genève, Institut universitaire de hautes études internationales.

Thèse--Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva.

Bibliography: p. 236-252.

Contents.--Preface.--pt. 1. Prologue: Introduction. Profile of a small country. Prevailing strategic climate.--pt. 2. Swedish national security: Origins of Swedish national security policy. National security in post-war Sweden (1945-1965). Sweden's total defense concept. Sweden's military defense system. Nuclear weapons in defense of Sweden.--pt. 3. Swiss national security: Foundations of a tradition. National security in the post-war era (1945-1965). Switzerland's integrated defense. The Swiss military defense system. Aspects of a Swiss nuclear defense.--Epilogue: The critical elements. Reflections and conclusions.--Appendix: statistical supplement.--Index.

Analyzes the security problems of Sweden and Switzerland as examples of two small states attempting political and military autonomy in the nuclear age. Ralston reviews the historical development of Swedish and Swiss defense policies and evaluates their present policies and programs. He finds that a small state can maintain effective defense forces without incurring intolerable burdens, even in the face of the probable widening of the technological gap between small and great powers.

741
Raven, Wolfram von. [CONCERN ABOUT SECURITY] Sorge um die Sicherheit. Politische Meinung, v. 15, no. 3, 1970: 9-20. H5.P75, v. 15

The euphoria that set in after the signing of the Moscow treaty presents a danger to German defense. Justifying military expenses and reform while at the same time proclaiming détente, renunciation of force, and disarmament seems paradoxical. Since history has demonstrated how easily nonagression pacts can be broken, West Germany should realize that peace in Europe can be maintained only by the political existence and the military effectiveness of NATO. Therefore Germany must ease America's burden of stationing troops there. The mutual deterrence between the United States and the Soviet Union prevents nuclear war, but the conflicts in Vietnam and the Near East demonstrate that conventional wars are still possible. While the United States is becoming tired of foreign commitments and the arms race, the Soviet Union is expanding its naval and nuclear strategy. It remains to be seen whether the strategic arms limitation talks, mutual balanced force reductions, or the proposed European security conference will have the desired results. Numerous financial, technical, and personnel problems trouble the West German Armed Forces, and legitimate concern for Germany's security should not be dismissed with the vague wish that renunciation of force will lead to a European peace order.

742
Ravenal, Earl C. THE NIXON DOCTRINE AND OUR ASIAN COMMITMENTS. Foreign affairs, v. 49, Jan. 1971: 201-217. D410.F6, v. 49

The Nixon doctrine does not alter any fundamental U.S. foreign policy objectives or military commitments; it entails the current level of potential involvement, but by cutting back on conventional forces it increases the risk of stalemate or defeat and lowers the nuclear threshold. "The root problem of the Nixon Doctrine is its abiding commitment to the containment of China" and the repression of Asian communism. Asianization, or the use of U.S.-equipped indigenous forces as a substitute for American troops, may reduce costs, but it will not increase the Nation's security or lessen its involvements. The so-called one-and-a-half-war strategy of the Nixon administration makes the early use of tactical or strategic nuclear weapons by the United States more likely, because it leaves the President fewer effective alternatives. Moreover, by placing budgetary requirements ahead of security needs, it encourages self-serving Pentagon programs irrelevant to national security. What the Nixon doctrine fails to face up to is the necessity for a genuine accommodation with China, and this will not come cheaply. It might require "(1) diplomatic recognition and admission without qualification to the United Nations and the permanent Security Council seat; (2) affirmation of a one-China policy, even allowing the eventual accession of Taiwan to the mainland; (3) removal of the U.S. military presence on the mainland of Asia, without substituting a naval cordon, a ring of nearby island bases, a host of Asian mercenary armies, or a nuclear tripwire." Such a diplomatic revolution would be difficult and would require time to implement, but it could contribute immensely to the Nation's security. In any event, accommodation may be inevitable in the long run. By attempting "to perpetuate our control of the destiny of Asia, the Nixon Doctrine may forfeit control of our own destiny in Asia."

743
Ray, Dennis M. THE CHINESE MILITARY AND THE FUTURE OF THE MAOIST VISION. China report, v. 6, Sept./Oct. 1970: 9-12. DS777.55.C4484, v. 6

Examines the relevance of Mao Tse-tung's revolutionary doctrine to modern military organization.

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Ray finds that while the importance of the officer-technocrat increases in the contemporary military organization, military establishments remain reservoirs of militaristic traditions that are in fact compatible with the romantic-heroic aspects of Maoist doctrines. Although military establishments can respond favorably to ideological appeals, their ideology is usually conservative and nationalistic. This has been demonstrated by the relatively conservative role played by the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) in the Cultural Revolution. PLA's leadership style during this period was authoritarian and arrogant rather than Maoist. Ray concludes that the ideological fervor and technical expertise of the PLA will not necessarily be in harmony with Mao's doctrines but that the PLA will probably not abandon the Maoist military line as long as it dominates Chinese politics.

744
Santamaria, Bartholomew A. THE DEFENCE OF AUSTRALIA. Melbourne, Hawthorn Press, 1970. 147 p. maps (on lining papers), tables.
UA870.S25
Includes bibliographical references.

Urges strengthening Australia's defense structure in light of Great Britain's withdrawal from East of Suez; of the new direction of U.S. policy, which limits America's commitments to those countries threatened by internal or external aggression; of the possibility of Japan's rearming; and of Communist China's growing nuclear capability. Santamaria analyzes such contingencies as cost and resources involved in increasing Australia's preparedness, and he praises the Swedish military system as an example to be followed. He notes that Australia, which cannot rely on the United States for its defense, must have an independent defense capability if it is to play a major role in establishing a Southeast Asian regional alliance dedicated to peace and security.

745
Schaffer, Gordon. NUCLEAR DEFENCE IS SUICIDE. London, National Peace Council, 1970. 8 p.
UA11.S24

Challenges the arguments of prominent British political and military leaders who advocate the use of nuclear weapons in the defense of Britain. Schaffer contends that any use of nuclear weapons, tactical or otherwise, will lead to unimaginable suffering and possibly the destruction of civilization. "A policy which commits our island with its congested population to the use in any circumstances of nuclear weapons is a policy of national suicide and a formula for world destruction."

746
Schütze, Walter. EUROPEAN DEFENCE CO-OPERATION AND NATO. Paris, Atlantic Institute [1969] 60 p.
DLC

Examines "the various forms of co-operation that Western Europe should initiate, develop and promote in the complex field of defence in the years to come." Schütze deplores the lack of defense cooperation among European NATO members and their failure even to appreciate the common threat that makes cooperation necessary. He urges the creation of a European advisory board within NATO to review developments in Eastern Europe, a European defense institute to coordinate defense research and planning, and a West European conference on arms production to modernize production methods and facilitate cooperation among the major arms producers. The need for pooling resources is greatest in the fields of aircraft and naval production and logistics.

747
Seamans, Robert C. PUBLIC CONTROL OF NATIONAL SECURITY PROBLEMS: CERTAIN DECISIONS. Vital speeches of the day, v. 37, Dec. 15, 1970: 133-135.
PN6121.V52, v. 37

What are the basic requirements for public management of national security? First, the public at large, which affords a more reliable judge than any single specialist, must be well informed. The current withdrawal from Vietnam and the cutbacks in defense spending reflect the well-considered decision of the American people to scale down U.S. military involvement. Second, the public must have an understanding of major weapons systems decisions. The need for ABM's, multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles, and other strategic weapons must be carefully explained to dispel the smokescreens thrown up by critics. Third, there must be effective public control over the administration of each major weapons program. New Department of Defense procedures have made such control easier for both the Government and the public. Finally, the Armed Forces must recruit and train high-caliber military leaders to implement the Nation's security policies.

748
Seminar on Defence, Delhi, 1966. DEFENCE OF INDIA; [papers. Delhi] Vikas Publications [1969] 102 p.
UA840.S43 1966
At head of title: Press Institute of India.

Contents.--Defence strategy, by J. N. Chaudhuri. --The Navy, by A. K. Chatterji.--The Air Force, by Arjan Singh.--Defence science, by S. Bhagavantam. --Defence production, by H. C. Sarin.--Basic factors of Indian defence, by H. M. Patel.--Defence and civil administration, by B. S. Raghavan.--Higher defence organization, by P. C. Lal.--Defence and the press, by Chanchal Sarkar.--Contributors.--Index.

Papers and speeches presented by the chiefs of India's armed services and other specialists before a seminar of journalists. The purpose of the program, which was sponsored by the Press Institute of India, was to brief the journalists on Indian military affairs and to stimulate more knowledgeable and specialized reporting on defense matters. In the final chapter, Sarkar suggests that the quantity and quality of press coverage of military developments might be improved if the government liberalized its defense information policies, introduced an effective defense news and briefing service, and implemented a general reorganization of the public relations organization within the Armed Forces.

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749
Sharp, Gene. A RADICAL APPROACH TO PEACE AND SECURITY: NATIONAL DEFENSE WITHOUT ARMAMENTS. War/peace report, v. 10, Apr. 1970: 3-10.
JX1901.W38, v. 10

Argues for the feasibility of substituting nonviolent "civilian defense" for the traditional military means of national security. Sharp notes that advances in military technology have already put military defense beyond the reach of all but the mightiest national economies; most states today depend on one of the superpowers for protection, with dangerous, sometimes disastrous, consequences for all concerned. He examines the historical experience with nonviolence and outlines a program for effecting the transition to a nonviolent defense posture. He emphasizes that civilian defense "is not disarmament, if disarmament means the reduction or abandonment of defense capacity," but rather "transarmament--the substitution of a new defense capacity that provides deterrence and defense without conventional and nuclear military power." He also cautions that his own purpose is not to win converts but to stimulate discussion and a serious consideration of this alternative by both private and public interests.

750
Subrahmanyam, K. THE CHALLENGE OF THE SEVENTIES TO INDIA'S SECURITY. India quarterly, v. 26, Apr./June 1970: 134-142.
D410.I44, v. 26

Outlines India's present and future defense programs, its security objectives, and the Asian strategic environment of the 1970's. The author concludes that although India will be adequately prepared to fight a large-scale conventional war with either Pakistan or Communist China, it will be unable to cope with encroachments by the nuclear-weapon states. During the 1970's and 1980's India will need a credible deterrent to counter increasing pressures from Communist China and the other Asian nuclear powers.

751
Szent-Miklosy, Istvan. THE NATO WARNING OF 1968. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 51, Feb. 1971: 3-13.
Z6723.U35, v. 51

Assesses the significance of the NATO Ministerial Council communique of November 16, 1968, which, in response to the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia, warned the Soviet Union that the allies "could not remain indifferent to any development which endangers their security," and that "clearly any Soviet intervention directly or indirectly affecting the situation in Europe or in the Mediterranean would create an international crisis with grave consequences." Szent-Miklosy examines Western, Soviet, and Yugoslavian interpretations of the communique and adds his own conclusion that it did create a "basic and entirely new role and responsibility for NATO by delineating a new zone of security interest." The warning, which is still in effect, contributes materially to the security of Yugoslavia and serves to remind the Soviet Union that it must not use military force to alter the balance of power in Europe.

752
U.S. Dept. of State. Office of Media Services. NATO AND THE DEFENSE OF EUROPE. [Washington, For sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1969] 1 v. (unpaged) illus. (Its Discussion guide. Issues, no. 2)
UA646.3.U47
Publication 8487. International organization and conference series, 89.

Describes NATO's force structure, political and military organization, problems and prospects, and military strategy. A comparison of the Warsaw Pact's strength and weaknesses with those of the Atlantic alliance, a historical survey of Russian interests in Central Europe, and a NATO chronology are included.

753
Vandevanter, E. HOW ALLIES COLLABORATE: THE NATO TRAINING EXPERIENCE. Santa Monica, Calif., Rand Corp., 1968. 56 p. (Rand Corporation. Memorandum RM-5847-PR)
Q180.A1R36 no. 5847
"This research is supported by the United States Air Force under Project RAND--contract no. F44620-67-C-0045."
Bibliography: p. 55-56.

Surveys NATO's experience in coordinating and training allied military forces from 1950 to 1965. Vandevanter classifies the training experience under three headings: higher training, unit training, and specialized training. He notes that international military exercises and maneuvers in the realm of higher training operated more smoothly than unit and specialized training exercises where international direction of activities had been attempted only spasmodically. The author concludes that NATO officials have reduced their efforts to stimulate collaboration in training but that this does not mean there is less collaboration, only that the central apparatus plays a smaller role.

754
Vigor, Peter, and John Erickson. THE SOVIET VIEW OF THE THEORY AND STRATEGY OF WAR. In Royal United Service Institution, London. Journal, v. 115, June 1970: 3-13.
U1.R8, v. 115
A presentation given at the Royal United Service Institution, Jan. 21, 1970.

Lectures and discussion on the Communist theory of war and the major military issues in Soviet Army-Party relations in the post-Khrushchev period. Following a description and analysis of Communist military doctrine, Vigor concludes that as long as the existing military balance is maintained, the Russians will do their utmost to avoid a nuclear war, because it is not an effective method for achieving worldwide communism. Erickson finds that the outcome of the 1965-66 debate between the political and military leadership in the Soviet Union was a compromise that forms the basis for present Soviet defense policies and programs, namely, an accelerated offensive strategic weapons program; a limited ABM system; maintenance of existing ground-force manpower levels with improvements in weapons and equipment; greater political control over strategic missile forces;

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continuation of a deterrence strategy and détente policy vis-a-vis the United States; and intensification of the technocratic approach to modern war. Erickson concludes that the Soviet command has acquired what it lacked under Khrushchev--a genuine counterforce capability and credible deterrent. However this does not necessarily mean that the Soviet Union is moving toward a first-strike capability. It does indicate that the Russians are determined to eradicate permanently their strategic inferiority. Whether this involves a definite commitment to a first-strike posture will depend on the rate of SS-9 deployment. Erickson does not foresee a military takeover, but sees evidence that the military will play an increasingly influential role in defense policymaking.

755
Wegener, Edward. [ONCE MORE: RUSSIA'S MOVE TOWARD SEA AND WORLD POWER] Nochmals: Russlands Griff zur See- und Weltmacht. Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau, v. 20, Nov. 1970: 613-619.
U3.W485, v. 20

Critique of the article "Russia's Move Toward Sea and World Power" by Fernand-Thiébaut Schneider (cited as item 252 in vol. 7, no. 1, of this bibliography). Wegener agrees with Schneider that Russia's effort to change from a purely continental power to a land and sea power is impressive and represents a challenge to the West at a time when NATO and the United States are weakened. Wegener contends, however, that the Soviet Union has by no means achieved supremacy on the seas yet, because it lacks strategic positions, aircraft carriers, and a fleet adequate to counter American maritime forces. The greatest Soviet threat is psychological. The Soviet fleet can make its presence on the oceans more strongly felt in times of peace than in war. The peacetime Soviet maritime presence can change into actual seapower only when the "maritime basis" can be changed into a "sea-strategic position." This could happen only in the Mediterranean, in which case the NATO positions would be severely threatened, but even here the American 6th Fleet can meet the Soviet challenge. Whether the West will be able to continue ruling the waves will depend largely on its willingness to expend the necessary energy and financial means and to recognize Russia's continuous drive toward sea and world power.

756
Weinstein, Martin E. DEFENSE POLICY AND THE SELF-DEFENSE FORCES. Japan interpreter, v. 6, summer 1970: 165-181. H1.J56, v. 6

Attempts to clarify the functions of Japan's self-defense forces by tracing and analyzing the evolution of Japan's postwar defense policy, organization, capabilities, and expenditures. The author argues that the role of the Japanese military forces in defense policy in the late 1960's remained essentially what it was in 1954. Japan implemented a gradual military buildup to maintain internal security and to obtain and maintain the mutual security arrangement with the United States. Although the role of the self-defense forces has been widened by law to include external defense, the Japanese Armed Forces have not assumed a primary responsibility in this area. Their function in external defense is to reinforce the American guarantee and to raise the threshold of attack. Since Japan has developed sufficient military power to repel small-scale attacks, Communist China or the Soviet Union would have to launch a large-scale attack to overwhelm the Japanese defense, which would almost certainly trigger U.S. retaliation. Japanese defense officials believe that Japan will be secure from external attack so long as the United States maintains its explicit guarantee, air and naval superiority in the Western Pacific, and its commitment in South Korea.

757
Whetten, Lawrence L. THE MEDITERRANEAN THREAT: HAS STRATEGIC PARITY BEEN ACHIEVED? Survey, no. 74/75, winter/spring 1970: 270-281.
DK1.S49, 1970

The significance of the Soviet military buildup in the Mediterranean is enhanced when it is related to the Soviet attainment of intercontinental nuclear parity. It is now possible for the Soviet Union to saturate the Mediterranean with submarines, in an area where the world's poorest conditions for sonar are known to exist. Intercontinental parity presents the U.S.S.R. with the possibility of exploiting the natural advantages of this Mediterranean posture. At a minimum cost, the Soviets now challenge NATO's naval defense in the Mediterranean and have bypassed the U.S. strategic deterrent. New concepts of naval warfare prevail in a theater where Western concepts once dominated. The introduction of this second, but lower intensity, nuclear threshold in the Mediterranean has increased the uncertainty of a superpower confrontation; the flexibility of this posture will allow Moscow to capitalize on the conventional portion of its force mix and minimize its weaknesses. The Soviets remain confronted by the overwhelming naval and tactical air power of NATO, although a sustained submarine campaign could complicate NATO defense. At present there is little likelihood that the Soviets will gain assured control of any of the access routes, and the NATO navies have distinct resupply advantages. The Soviets cannot take for granted either the political stability of the Balkans or Arab gratitude. Moscow probably still envisages a relatively constrained mission for its new naval power.

758
Whetten, Lawrence L. THE WARSAW PACT THREAT IN THE 1970'S. NATO's fifteen nations, v. 15, Oct./Nov. 1970: 20-28. illus.
UA646.F5, v. 15

Details accretions in strength of the Warsaw Pact forces over the last 10 years and compares the result with current NATO defense capabilities. The modernization of equipment, the introduction of more vigorous training methods, the expansion of the Soviet Navy, with its new offensive role, the attainment of nuclear parity with the United States, and the emplacement of troops in Czechoslovakia have added most to the strength of Pact forces. Total manpower has declined, largely as the result of a phaseout of obsolescent equipment that required large numbers of support personnel.

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Pact forces have greater mobility, firepower, and versatility than ever before, but the real significance of this is yet to be seen.

759
Wolfe, Thomas W. SOVIET APPROACHES TO SALT. Problems of communism, v. 19, Sept./Oct. 1970: 1-10.
HX1.P75, v. 19

Adduces the economic, technological, and strategic considerations influencing the Soviet strategic buildup and motivating Soviet acceptance of the proposal to enter the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT). Wolfe identifies several distinct lines of thought. He acknowledges the limiting effects of the Soviet economy but questions whether they are the determining factors. The disparity in technological progress between the defense and civil sectors of the Soviet economy is well established, but it is not readily related to the shaping of Soviet foreign policy. The buildup is seen by some as a "catch up effort," intended to achieve strategic parity with the United States and, once stability had been achieved, to share global power while concentrating on internal problems and the Chinese danger. Another possible point of view is that the buildup conformed to a long-term, well-integrated strategic plan. Wolfe subscribes to the theory that Soviet leaders embarked upon the strategic buildup without having settled among themselves the fundamentals of their strategic posture. These divergent strategic policy preferences could be reconciled only by agreement to reject anything other than Soviet-American parity. The ambivalence in the Soviet attitude toward SALT originates in the desire to keep these negotiations from aggravating the internal policy differences. Polemics against America and statements of guarded optimism have alternated in the press throughout the negotiations, and at Vienna the Soviets were prepared neither to adapt a negotiating posture unpalatable to the military or to walk out of the negotiations altogether. Since SALT will not deny the Soviet attainment of parity, the question for the future is the degree of militancy of Soviet leadership. Wolfe thinks it prudent to assume that in the new strategic equation the Soviets may feel that greater gambles can be ventured, thus introducing new elements of turbulence in international relations. As the Marxist-Leninist ideology and the example of Soviet society continue to lose their appeal to the outside world, the Kremlin may come to rely on military power for the extension of its influence.

760
ZAIBATSU STAGE COMEBACK. Peking review, v. 14, Jan. 22, 1971: 11-13.
DS701.P42, v. 14

Contends that Japanese zaibatsu groups, financial monopolies that controlled the fascist military authorities before World War II, have regained control of the economy and the Government, paving the way for the reestablishment of a powerful military-industrial complex, increased military expenditures, large-scale arms production, and an aggressive foreign policy. The main zaibatsu groups, which are colluding with U.S. imperialism, recently created a Defense Production Committee, enabling them to influence defense policies and to promote Government funding of defense-related research and development and arms production. Japan is attempting to become a leading military power, but if the Japanese militarist forces launch another aggressive war, they will be overthrown by their own and other Asian peoples.

CONSEQUENCES OF DEFENSE POLICIES AND WAR

761
AND THE COST OF IT ALL. New scientist, v. 47, Aug. 6, 1970: 282-283.
Q1.N52, v. 47

Estimates the monetary and manpower costs of developing plutonium and uranium warheads and several different types of delivery systems. An extensive table is included, giving the nuclear weapons potential of 19 key non-nuclear-weapon states. Although there has been considerable speculation recently about the ability of nonnuclear powers to produce weapons-grade fissile material by "cheap" enrichment processes, the cheapest nuclear weapon is a plutonium bomb, and a small force of medium jet bombers is still the cheapest credible delivery system.

762
Bailey, Norman A. THE ROLE OF MILITARY FORCES IN LATIN AMERICA. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 51, Feb. 1971: 67-72.
Z6723.U35, v. 51

Argues that "democratic Caesarism"--military populism--is on the rise in Latin America. In the usual view, the Latin American military is an ally of conservative social forces, such as the landowning class and the Church. Beginning with Juan Peron, however, a new type of military radicalism has emerged. There is no good reason why the United States should oppose this trend, except that military populism has led to economic disaster too often. In its own interest, the United States ought to do what it can to educate Latin American military men to a greater sense of economic responsibility.

763
Barnet, Richard J. THE ECONOMY OF DEATH. New York, Atheneum, 1969. 201 p.
UA23.B334 1969
Bibliography: p. [183]-186.

Contents.--Introduction: what is security?--The trillion-dollar misunderstanding: a look at the defense budget.--The military-industrial complex and how it works.--Choosing life: a strategy.--Index.

Analyzes the U.S. defense budget and some of the basic assumptions underlying defense expenditures, explains the role of the military-industrial complex in setting national priorities, and "offers a strategy for shifting from an Economy of Death to

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an Economy of Life." Barnet questions the necessity for most defense expenditures, arguing that this money could be better spent on social and environmental improvements that would contribute to a healthier society, the true foundation of security. He recommends various steps that the administration and Congress might take to combat the growing influence of militarism and proposes the establishment of a national conversion commission to oversee the transition from a war to a peace economy.

764
Boffey, Philip M. HERBICIDES IN VIETNAM: AAAS STUDY FINDS WIDESPREAD DEVASTATION. Science, v. 171, Jan. 8, 1970: 43-47. illus.
Q1.S35, v. 171

Summarizes the preliminary report of the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) Herbicide Assessment Commission, which was presented at the annual AAAS convention in Chicago and which was based on a review of pertinent literature, consultations with over 200 American and foreign experts, and a 6-week inspection tour of Vietnam last summer. The AAAS team made no attempt to evaluate the military usefulness of herbicides and found no definite evidence of adverse health effects caused by the spraying program, but it did find that herbicide operations have caused "extremely serious harm" to the land and lives of the Montagnards, who have been deprived of food crops. Although some participants at the convention disagreed with the commission's findings, the study has already affected U.S. policy in Vietnam. On December 26, 1970, the opening day of the AAAS convention, the White House announced that it was "initiating a program for an orderly, yet rapid, phase-out of the herbicide operations" there. Matthew S. Meselson, who heads the Herbicide Assessment Commission, has said that future efforts should concentrate on repairing the damage rather than assessing it.

765
Bourne, Peter G. MILITARY PSYCHIATRY AND THE VIET NAM EXPERIENCE. American journal of psychiatry, v. 127, Oct. 1970: 481-488.
RC321.A52, v. 127
"References": p. 487-488.

While the incidence of psychiatric casualties in Viet Nam has remained surprisingly low, the experience has allowed the correlates of psychiatric attrition in combat to be further defined, and for the first time the physiological responses of those who have successfully adapted to combat have also been studied. These represent important advances in our overall understanding of man under stress and have significant implications for civilian psychiatry. (Abstract supplied)

766
CONTINUING DEBATE ABOUT BACKDOOR SCIENCE, by our Washington correspondent. Nature (London) v. 227, Sept. 26, 1970: 1291-1292.
Q1.N2, v. 227

Reports on the continuing debate over the Mansfield amendment, which restricts Department of Defense sponsorship of scientific research to projects that bear a "direct and apparent relationship" to defense needs. Senator Mansfield's intent was to put more of the support for basic research into the hands of the National Science Foundation. Defense Department officials oppose this change on the double ground that it would introduce a middleman into the already costly and time-consuming process of converting basic research into military hardware and that it would deprive the Department of the valuable advice of university scientists. So far, the administration has not availed itself of the opportunity to effect a shift. The suggestion that a legislative-executive conference be called to arbitrate the dispute is a good one; it might even provide an opportunity to begin a much-needed discussion of national science policy as a whole.

767
Daniels, Arlene K. NORMAL MENTAL ILLNESS AND UNDERSTANDABLE EXCUSES: THE PHILOSOPHY OF COMBAT PSYCHIATRY. American behavioral scientist, v. 14, Nov./Dec. 1970: 167-184.
H1.A472, v. 14
"References": p. 183-184.

Discusses problems faced by the military psychiatrist in evaluating requests for release from combat duty on psychiatric grounds. The main difficulty is to find a definition of "normality" or "reality" in the combat situation, for it is only with this definition that a distinction can be drawn between ordinary combat difficulties and those that are genuinely too difficult to endure. The combat psychiatrist's judgment is conditioned by his primary obligation to preserve the fighting strength of the command in which he serves. The strategies he resorts to in processing requestees--for example, his appeals to their altruistic sense of duty or arguments based on the inevitability or normality of war--are meant to serve that end. In Vietnam, however, requestees and many psychiatrists are beginning to call into question the assumptions underlying these strategies, and this reflects on the adequacy of previously accepted definitions of combat reality.

768
Edinburgh Seminar in the Social Sciences, 6th, 1969. THE ARMED SERVICES AND SOCIETY: ALIENATION, MANAGEMENT AND INTEGRATION. Edited by J. N. Wolfe and John Erickson. Edinburgh, Edinburgh U. Press [1970] 170 p. U21.5.E4 1969
Includes bibliographical references.

Contents.--Introduction, by J. N. Wolfe.--The military profession in the 1970's, by W. Corelli Barnett.--Armed forces and society: problems of alienation, by Philip Abrams.--The problem of social integration in the armed forces as demonstrated in the Deutsche Bundeswehr, by R. Warnke.--Impact of the services on society, by James Dunnett.--U.S. experience: the recent INS study, by Franklin M. Fisher.--World power and population, by Colin Clark.--Management and manpower in the services, by Andrew Humphrey.--The scope and pressures for change within U.K. institutional arrangements, by D. Greenwood.--Notes on participation, by J. Barraclough.

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769
Furet, M. F. [THE POLITICAL OBJECTIVES OF THE CHINESE NUCLEAR PROGRAM] Les objectifs politiques du programme nucléaire chinois. Revue de défense nationale, v. 26, Dec. 1970: 1790-1805.
D410.R45, v. 26

Examines Communist China's rise to nuclear-power status, its strategic objectives in the context of this power, and its attitudes toward arms control and disarmament. Furet maintains that the apparent contradictions in Chinese nuclear rhetoric are logical given China's past suffering under colonial rule and its present politico-diplomatic situation. The author stresses that as long as China remains diplomatically isolated all efforts to limit strategic arms will be risky. She concludes that nuclear equilibrium, complete with rules, might be a solution to the arms race.

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HERBICIDE COMMISSION REPORTS EXTENSIVE DAMAGE, by our Washington correspondent. Nature (London) v. 229, Jan. 22, 1971: 223-224.
Q1.N2, v. 229

Reports on the findings of the Herbicide Assessment Commission that was sent to South Vietnam last year by the American Academy for the Advancement of Science to investigate the effects of U.S. defoliation and crop-destruction programs. The commission found that herbicides have caused extensive and lasting damage to the vegetation in Vietnam, but it could discover no firm evidence of harm to human life. It uncovered suggestive but inconclusive evidence of an increase in common birth defects in some parts of the country, but it found no cases of those rare and striking malformations that have been reported in the local press. The commission has not ruled out the possibility that significant amounts of dioxin, the highly toxic and teratogenic impurity found in 2,4,5-T, are entering the Vietnamese diet.

771
Hinaman, Robert T., and Nancy M. Kling. MILITARY SPENDING IN EASTERN EUROPE. In Economic developments in countries of Eastern Europe; a compendium of papers. Submitted to the Subcommittee on Foreign Economic Policy of the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1970. p. 338-347.
HC244.E242

At head of title: 91st Congress, 2d session. Joint committee print.
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Surveys "the size, structure, and funding of the defense establishments of the six presently active members of the Warsaw Pact other than the Soviet Union: Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Romania." The authors discern a general upward trend in defense spending by the Eastern European countries, which is matched by a comparable rise in overall government spending. They attribute this increase in defense spending primarily to the procurement and maintenance costs of more sophisticated weapons systems and also, in some cases, to the transfer of funds previously included as nondefense expenditures but now included in defense budgets.

772
Huffman, Robert E. WHICH SOLDIERS BREAK DOWN? In Menninger Clinic, Topeka, Kan. Bulletin, v. 34, Nov. 1970: 343-351.
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Reports the results of a study of 610 psychiatric casualties of the Vietnam War. Psychiatric casualty rates have been quite low, owing largely to an effective program to screen out those most susceptible to combat stress. In general those who have had trouble making other social adjustments are most likely to experience emotional difficulties in the combat zone. It may be that "a careful consideration and comparison of the various factors in the lives of those individuals who undergo psychic regression in wartime with those who do not can further our understanding of mankind's most crucial problem"--the seemingly endless recurrence of war.

773
Joffe, Ellis. THE CHINESE ARMY IN THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION: THE POLITICS OF INTERVENTION. Current scene, v. 8, Dec. 7, 1970: 1-25.
DS701.C9, v. 8

A chronological survey and analysis of the increasing involvement of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) in domestic politics during the 1960's. The article focuses on the PLA's role and activities in the cultural revolution and the impact of the upheaval on the PLA and army-party relations. Joffe concludes that the PLA's pervasive involvement in politics has had a profound effect on the power structure in China. As the Chinese Armed Forces assumed a wide range of nonmilitary functions, a leading position in provincial politics, and increased influence in national politics, the control of the central party over the regional military commanders has eroded. Joffe maintains that the PLA did not intervene in the cultural revolution independently but rather was ordered into the political arena by Mao Tse-tung and his supporters to regain control of the party bureaucracy and reinfuse it with revolutionary élan. The PLA did not seize political power in one single coup but gradually acquired it through a complicated process largely beyond its control.

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774
Klare, Michael. THE MILITARY RESEARCH NETWORK. Nation, v. 211, Oct. 12, 1970: 327-332.
AP2.N2, v. 211

Probes the "ways in which university life has been altered by the research priorities of the cold war, and assesses the effects of the campus movement against war research." Klare traces the origins of military research at universities and the development of independent and semi-independent research centers utilizing university resources and scholars. He cites statistics to indicate the extent to which the major universities have become reliant on Federal grants to finance educational and research programs and concludes that the Government has effectively altered the nature and purpose of the university by creating a need for military-oriented research. The protest movements that have led to the dissociation of several prominent research centers from their parent universities have not changed the basic composition of the military research network. The best hope for such a fundamental change lies in the increasing number of scientists and engineers who refuse to participate in military research.

775
Klönne, Arno. [THE ARMS INDUSTRY AND INNOVATION] Rüstungswirtschaft und Erneuerung. Marxistische Blätter, v. 8, May/June 1970: 69-76.
HX6.M32, v. 8

Although the West German desire for innovation accounts for Brandt's electoral victory, his administration continues, unchanged, the military policy inherited from preceding regimes. The military budget allocation of more than 20 billion marks shows how strongly entrenched the arms industry is in the Federal Republic. Significantly, a quarter of this military budget is earmarked for investment, so an even larger arms industry can be expected in the future. The ostensible justifications are the need to stabilize the balance of payments by producing arms domestically and the putative technological spinoff from military research. The real long-range purpose is West German domination of Western European nuclear organizations in a maneuver to obtain the prohibited nuclear weapons. The West German situation illustrates the privileges of the arms industry in a capitalist economy, where the costs of research and development are borne by the state. While the actual number employed by the German arms industry is still relatively small, West German arms capital is internationally active. During this time of scientific and technical revolution, those forces that have control of research may also take on social power.

776
Koistinen, Paul A. C. THE "INDUSTRIAL-MILITARY COMPLEX" IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: THE INTERWAR YEARS. Journal of American history, v. 66, Mar. 1970: 819-839. E171.J87, v. 66

Presents evidence for the thesis that the military-industrial complex, which commonly is associated with World War II and the cold war, is "an outgrowth of economic mobilization for World War I, of interwar planning by the armed forces and the business community for future emergencies, and of defense spending during the 1920's and 1930's." Koistinen traces this development from its beginnings in the activities of the War Industries Board during World War I up through the mobilization for World War II in the late 1930's and early 1940's. In passing, he reviews the work of the Nye Committee in making "fragmentary" but pioneering disclosures of the dangers inherent in the relationships then springing up between the military departments and U.S. industry.

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Laird, Melvin R. "PEACE DIVIDEND" FROM THE PENTAGON. Nation's business, v. 58, Oct. 1970: 40-42, 44. HF1.N4, v. 58

Maintains that the Pentagon has reduced defense spending by $6.9 billion during the first 2 years of the Nixon administration despite substantial price and wage increases due to inflation. Although defense spending constitutes a smaller percentage of Federal expenditures than at any time during the past 20 years, the Defense Department has borne the brunt of anti-inflationary measures. Further cutbacks in defense spending for the purpose of financing major social problems are unrealistic so long as world tensions remain at present levels.

778
MacDonald, N. S., and others. ^{137}Cs LEVELS IN HUMAN ADULT POPULATION IN CALIFORNIA, 1960-69. Nature (London) v. 228, Oct. 17, 1970: 283-284.
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779
Midwest Research Institute, Kansas City, Mo. AMMUNITION PRODUCTION FOR VIETNAM--IMPACT ON SOUTHEAST KANSAS. Final report, by Bruce W. Macy, Robert E. Roberts, [and] Patricia Quinlan. Prepared for the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Washington, For sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1970. 158 p.
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support employment, that is, employment serving local markets, partly because much of the additional income was spent outside the area and partly because local business and civic leaders were reluctant to make long-term investments. Because there were no basic structural changes in the local economy, deactivation of the KAAP should not pose a serious problem of adjustment.

780
National Security Industrial Association. DEFENSE ACQUISITION STUDY. Washington, 1970. 103 p.
DLC

Contents.--Summary.--Preface.--The defense acquisition process--an overview.--Planning: determining requirements and system feasibility.--Buying: the contracting process.--Administration: organization, management and control.--Public policy: the role of Congress.--Appendixes.--Bibliography.

Examines the U.S. military acquisition process with the object of suggesting economies. Problems relating to cost, schedule, and performance estimating, contracting, technical specifications, liability, management and organization, documentation, subcontracting, research and development, the Truth in Negotiation Act, the Armed Forces Procurement Act of 1947, and defense information are discussed, and recommendations for improvement are made. The report does not consider the "military-industrial complex" controversy as such. That dispute "has become predominantly an emotional rather than a factual issue" and is too closely bound up with the question of national priorities, which fell outside the scope of this study.

781
Popov, V. GREECE AND NATO'S STRATEGIC PLANS. International affairs (Moscow) no. 12, Dec. 1970: 49-53. D839.I465, 1970

The Greek coup d'etat of April 26, 1967, is an example of NATO's use of political levers to intervene in the internal affairs of its member countries. The price that the new Greek Government must pay for its CIA-aided ascension to power is complete subservience to U.S. and NATO interests in the Eastern Mediterranean. The junta's course of intensified militarization and mass terror is set by its American sponsors, who think NATO's Mediterranean position too important to be subjected to the vagaries of internal Greek politics. Despite the indignation of world public opinion, comparable secret plots are being hatched to foist the military police state on other small NATO members.

782
Reid, R. J., and W. L. K. Schwarz. SPACE AND DEFENSE SPENDING CUTBACKS: THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF SPACE AND DEFENSE SPENDING ON THE MINNEAPOLIS-ST. PAUL METROPOLITAN AREA. Minneapolis, North Star Research and Development Institute, 1970. 39 p. illus. DLC
Includes bibliographical references.

Contends that space and defense cutbacks have had a significant impact on the economy of the Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area, where per capita prime defense contract awards are substantially higher than for the Nation as a whole. Reid and Schwarz find that from 1 out of 10 to 1 out of 7 jobs in the metropolitan area and up to 4 percent of total personal income depend on defense contracts either directly or indirectly. They calculate that an estimated 1.5 percent of the labor force is vulnerable to loss of job as a consequence of defense cutbacks, which they anticipate will total between 5 and 10 percent of local contract money during the next 2 to 3 years. On the other hand, spending for space and defense programs other than the manufacture of ordnance, which accounts for approximately 25 percent of local defense contracts, will remain at the same level.

783
Russell, Kent A. MY LAI MASSACRE: THE NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL INVESTIGATION. California law review, v. 58, May 1970: 703-729.
LL

Examines the international legal implications of the alleged My Lai massacre and urges the U.S. Government to submit the case to international adjudication. Russell contends that the principal defendants in the case cannot receive a fair trial in a U.S. military court because of the adverse publicity surrounding the incident. Any embarrassment the United States might suffer as a consequence of giving the case a full international airing would be more than offset by important benefits: international laws relating to the protection of civilians in war would be revitalized, and the credibility gap created by the Government's handling of the case thus far could be overcome. An international war crimes investigation could make international law a more effective deterrent to similar incidents, remove any doubts about U.S. commitments to international justice and humanitarian principles, and, in the event My Lai proves to be not an isolated incident but the logical outcome of U.S. policy, provide justification for complete U.S. withdrawal from Indochina.

784
Schwarzkopf, Dietrich. [NUCLEAR POWER; POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE NUCLEAR ERA] Atomherrschaft; Politik und Völkerrecht im Nuklearzeitalter. [Stuttgart-Degerloch] Seewald [1969] 279 p.
JX1974.7.S24
Bibliographical footnotes.

Contents.--Introduction.--The bases of the world nuclear regime.--The classes in the world nuclear regime.--Nuclear restoration.--Nuclear weapons and domestic policies.--Nuclear diplomacy.--Nuclear weapons and the prevention of war.--War in the world nuclear regime.--Disarmament and arms control.

States that only if the effects of nuclear arms on politics are known can politics prevent their use. The author examines the impact of the atom bomb on international relations and on the international order. When dealing with national interests he adheres to Morgenthau's requirement that

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"the national interest of a nation that is conscious not only of its own interest but also of that of other nations must be defined in terms compatible with the latter. In a multinational world this is a requirement of political morality; in an age of total war it is also a condition for survival." In the nuclear era the common national interest of every state is maintaining peace while preserving its sovereignty, that is, its means of nuclear deterrence; this is true even for neutral countries. Schwarzkopf believes that a world without nuclear weapons would not be a peaceful world. Dynamic peace can be achieved only by maintaining and expanding the stabilizing and peacekeeping effects of nuclear arms while decreasing their destabilizing and dangerous effects through international cooperation.

785
Shaw, R. F., and A. P. Smith. STRONTIUM-90 AND INFANT MORTALITY IN CANADA. Nature (London) v. 228, Nov. 14, 1970: 667-669. illus.
Q1.N2, 1970

Offers evidence against the thesis, advanced by Prof. Ernest J. Sternglass, that fallout from nuclear weapons tests is responsible for a decrease in the rate of decline of fetal and infant mortality. The authors found that in Canada "the provinces with the most fallout have the least increase in excess mortality." They cite reasons for believing that, contrary to the Sternglass findings, the same relationship holds in the United States.

786
Siekevitz, Philip. SCIENTIFIC RESPONSIBILITY. Nature (London) v. 227, Sept. 26, 1970: 1301-1303.
Q1.N2, v. 227

Scientists must accept a fair share of responsibility for the consequences of scientific research. Ways must be found, too, to make this new sense of responsibility socially and politically effective. It has been suggested that scientists take an oath not to engage in research that is considered unethical or irresponsible--for example, war work--or that those who do so be excluded from the scientific community. This would work well enough where the issues raised by a research project are clear cut and the consequences readily foreseeable, but it would break down in the face of ambiguities or uncertainty. Other proposals are that scientists make a greater effort to keep the public informed about science and its consequences, that research be stopped altogether until the social and political means for dealing with its effects have been devised, or that research be redirected toward curing the ills that past research has created. The best solution for the short term might be the reminder that science is a part of the civilizing experience and not merely a source of useful technology, but, for the long haul, ways must be found to give scientists more say when decisions are made about research and development. Men must learn, too, to distinguish between artificial and real human needs; they must rid themselves of the notion that advances in technology are always beneficial, or of the truly ludicrous idea that the cure for technology is always more technology. Scientists themselves must learn to recognize the limits of their own knowledge and thereby conquer the sin of pride. Man ranks just below the angels; he is not a god.

787
Strange, Robert E., and Dudley E. Brown. HOME FROM THE WAR: A STUDY OF PSYCHIATRIC PROBLEMS IN VIET NAM RETURNEES. American journal of psychiatry, v. 127, Oct. 1970: 488-492.
RC321.A52, v. 127

Fifty patients who developed psychiatric problems after return from tours of Viet Nam combat duty were compared with a group of patients who had not had such duty. The Viet Nam returnees reported more conflicts in intimate relationships and had a higher incidence of depression and somatization than did the noncombat group. Although the returnees manifested more aggressive and suicidal threats, they did not evidence more direct aggressive or suicidal behavior. The authors suggest that although Viet Nam returnees face significant readjustment stress, their reactions are generally internalized and their potential for violent aggression is no greater than in those without Viet Nam experience. (Abstract supplied)

788
Tarr, Curtis W. [interview] HOW CONGRESS SHOULD CHANGE THE DRAFT. U.S. news & world report, v. 70, Feb. 1, 1971: 28-32.
JK1.U65, v. 70

Argues for an extension of the President's induction authority beyond its expiration date of June 30, 1971; expresses some doubt as to whether the military services can achieve independence of the draft by July, 1973, as called for in the President's plan for an all-volunteer army; recommends retention of a standby selective-service system after the changeover to an all-volunteer force; assesses various proposals for making the selective-service system more equitable; discusses selective-service policy with respect to conscientious objectors; and speculates on selective-service needs during 1971.

789
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. IMPACT OF THE WAR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA ON THE U.S. ECONOMY. Hearings, Ninety-first Congress, second session. Part 1: April 15 and 16, 1970. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1970. 121 p.
KF26.F6 1970f, v. 1

Testimony of Louis B. Lundborg, chairman of the board of the Bank of America, Eliot Janeway, president of Janeway Publishing and Research Corporation, and Gordon Sherman, president of Midas-International Corporation. All three witnesses argue that the Vietnam War has seriously damaged the U.S. economy. Lundborg asserts that the war is the primary cause of inflation, that it drains human and natural resources needed for other purposes, and that most businesses would benefit by an end to the war. Janeway contends that the war has led to the loss of America's financial initiative. He notes the formation of an Asia dollar

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market comparable to the Eurodollar market and a serious deterioration in the U.S. trade balance. He recommends the introduction of scrip in Southeast Asia to protect U.S. economic interests as long as the war lasts. Sherman compares his business operation to U.S. practices in the Vietnam War and concludes that the United States has violated basic principles of good business in its conduct of the war.

790
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. MORAL AND MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE WAR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. Hearings, Ninety-first Congress, second session . . . May 7 and 12, 1970. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1970. 108 p.
KF26.F6 1970g

Discusses the impact of the Vietnam War on America's economy and society. John C. Bennett, President of the Union Theological Seminary, considers the question of just and unjust wars and concludes that the Vietnam War has bitterly divided the American people and cut into America's ability to resolve national problems. Statements by other witnesses attest to the moral breakdown of American society, the distortion of U.S. priorities, and the danger of growing frustration and radicalization caused by the war.

791
THE WAR AND ITS IMPACT ON THE ECONOMY. Review of radical political economics, Aug. 1970: 1-72.
HC101.R43, 1970
Includes bibliographical references.

Contents.--The cost of the war to the American people: how much? who pays?--The effect of the war on Government domestic spending.--Economic interests and American foreign policy.--Political power and military spending.--The economic effects of the war in Vietnam, by Thomas Riddell.--Appendices.

Analyzes the economic effects of the Vietnam War on the U.S. economy. The first four papers and the appendices were prepared by the Ad Hoc Committee on the Economy and the War, Department of Economics, Harvard University. The first paper stresses the war's per capita costs and its impact on prices, interest rates, employment, and wages. The second examines the war's impact on Federal, state, and local spending for basic social needs. The third argues that the war is the logical outcome of a foreign policy designed to protect private American investments abroad. The fourth investigates the role of the military-industrial complex in the economy. Riddell reviews the effects of increased defense spending and challenges the view that the war is essential to the maintenance of a healthy economy.

792
WAR CRIMES AND THE AMERICAN CONSCIENCE. Edited by Erwin Knoll and Judith Nies McFadden. New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston [1970]
DS557.A67W3

Contents.--Preface.--Introduction: individual responsibility and collective guilt.--Law, morality and war: the ideals of Nuremberg.--Technology and American power: the changing nature of war.--Americans in Vietnam: the lessons of My Lai.--Individual conscience: the moral challenge.--Appendices.--Notes on the contributors.

An edited transcript of the proceedings of the Congressional Conference on War and National Responsibility sponsored by 10 members of the U.S. Congress and convened in Washington in early 1970 together with supplementary material contributed by participants. The conference focused on American war crimes in Vietnam but included discussions of the nature of modern war and U.S. war policies in general. The participants share a conviction that the United States is committed to policies that make war crimes all but inevitable, but they differ in their assessments of the precise nature of these crimes and what to do about them.

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III. INSTITUTIONS AND MEANS FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE

INTERNATIONAL LAW

793
Barberis, Julio A. [THE STATE'S RIGHT TO MAKE TREATIES AND THE JUS COGENS] La liberté de traiter des états et le jus cogens. Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, v. 30, Apr. 1970: 19-45.
K1.U753, v. 30

Points out that the recent conference in Vienna and the project of the Commission on International Law on the law of treaties have reaffirmed the importance of jus cogens in international law. The hierarchical structure of the international legal order is examined first to bring out clearly the characteristics of the jus cogens doctrine. The structure of the international juridical order and the subject matter of international treaties are then considered. The extra-normative restrictions on the right of sovereign states to make treaties are described as originating in logic or as imposed by natural reality. The conventional restrictions are categorized as invalidating contradicting treaties by the same parties with each other or with different parties. The international juridical norms originating in jus cogens that restrict the treaty-making liberty are exemplified by discussions of the prohibitions on traffic in women and slaves and on genocide. The discussions of jus cogens at the international tribunals, the Commission on International Law, and the Vienna Convention are summarized. Some theoretical considerations are developed on the sources of jus cogens and its place in the hierarchical structure of the international juridical order.

794
Clark, Joseph S., and Harry K. Schwartz. WORLD PEACE THROUGH LAW: THE LAWYER'S JOB. American Bar Association journal, v. 56, Oct. 1970: 953-956.
LL

The problem of the World Peace Through Law Center is not that it has set itself impossible goals, as Alfred C. Bowman has argued, but that it has adopted means inadequate to attain them. "The heart of the problem is that durable world peace requires a limited yielding of national sovereignty in the field of war prevention to permit the creation of effective international institutions with power to maintain peace under conditions of general and complete disarmament." There have been several scholarly attempts in recent years to develop the basic principles of world peace through law, most notably a major research project undertaken by the World Law Fund. Lawyers must take the lead in ridding the World Peace Through Law Center of its "world bar association" image and boldly present the case for "a carefully negotiated and supervised treaty of general and complete disarmament."

795
Ferguson, Yale H. REFLECTIONS ON THE INTER-AMERICAN PRINCIPLE OF NONINTERVENTION: A SEARCH FOR MEANING IN AMBIGUITY. Journal of politics, v. 32, Aug. 1970: 628-654.
JA1.J6, v. 32

Analyzes the principle of nonintervention as stipulated in the charter of the Organization of American States. Ferguson argues that international legal theorists who interpret the charter literally as an absolute prohibition on intervention fail to recognize the necessity of intervention under certain conditions. "If one thing in the record is clear, it is that the concept of intervention has defied unambiguous formulation in general international law and in the particular international law of the United Nations and the Americas." This does not mean that the principle of nonintervention is meaningless, but it does mean that the principle must be considered in its complete political and international legal context.

796
Franck, Thomas M. WHO KILLED ARTICLE 2(4)? OR: CHANGING NORMS GOVERNING THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES. American journal of international law, v. 64, Oct. 1970: 809-837.
JX1.A6, v. 64

The prohibition against the use or threat of force contained in Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter has become meaningless, primarily as the result of three factors: the increasing importance of guerrilla warfare and wars of "national liberation," the threat of total nuclear warfare, and the authoritarian domination of regional systems by great powers. "What killed Article 2(4) was the wide disparity between the norms it sought to establish and the practical goals the nations are pursuing in defense of their national interest." Only when national interest is redefined so as to be consistent with the peaceful settlement of interstate disputes will Article 2(4) regain its validity as a basic principle of international law.

797
Frowein, Jochen A. [THE INCORPORATION TREATY IN INTERNATIONAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW] Der Eingliederungsvertrag im Völkerrecht und im Staatsrecht.

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Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, v. 30, Apr. 1970: 1-18.
K1.U753, v. 30
Summary in English.

A treaty incorporating one sovereign state into another or into a federation creates specific problems in that the state incorporated loses its quality as a subject of international or constitutional law. The competence of a state to conclude a treaty ending its existence has been questioned in constitutional law, although historical examples of such treaties exist. The incorporation of a member state into a federation or community does not present this problem, since federal or state laws regulate the legality of the incorporation. An incorporation treaty can have the effect of a law of the incorporating state. If the treaty prescribes a specific status for the territory of the incorporated state, the rule of state succession concerning localized treaties could be applied. The rights of the incorporated states or of its citizens are difficult to assure after the incorporation, since the individual has no standing before international tribunals.

798
Stahnke, Arthur A. THE PLACE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CHINESE STRATEGY AND TACTICS: THE CASE OF THE SINO-INDIAN BOUNDARY DISPUTE. Journal of Asian studies, v. 30, Nov. 1970: 95-119.
DS501.F274, v. 30

A chronological review of the principal legal arguments presented by China and India on their border dispute from the early 1950's to 1962. Stahnke seeks "to determine the nature and extent of Peking's willingness to present her case against India within the framework of international law, or conversely, her propensity to offer nonlegal or extra-legal justifications in support of her position on the boundary question." He finds that China not only conformed to customary practice in its dispute with India but demonstrated a keen understanding of the principles of international law and an ability to use international law effectively to further its own interests.

799
Stiens, Heinrich. [THE CONCEPT OF PEACE PRELIMINARIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW] Der Begriff des Präliminarfriedens im Volkerrecht. München, Dissertationsdruck Schön, 1968. 148 p.
JX5181.S73
Inaug.-Diss.-Bonn.
Vita.
Bibliography: p. v-xii.

States that peace preliminaries have been a part of international law since 1641, but that the concept as such has not been scientifically defined. Part I of the dissertation clarifies the concept historically by reviewing the most important peace preliminaries from the end of the 16th century to the beginning of the 20th century, and part II gives a juridical evaluation. In part III the author discusses the role and the problems of peace preliminaries in modern times. Although parallels to peace preliminaries can be found in modern cease-fire agreements, they have become obsolete as such, because they are based on a compromise situation, such as in limited power politics or when the conflict is between royal dynasties that are related to each other. Compromise is difficult when the conflict is of a religious or ideological nature or when total war is conceivable. The only way to end an armed conflict, then, is to conclude a military stalemate cease-fire or to freeze the causa belli. The war in Indochina and the Arab-Israeli conflict illustrate this point. The United Nations has stipulated important cease-fire agreements, which play a bigger role in international law than peace preliminaries, but they cannot fulfill the same function as peace preliminaries. Therefore new ways of arriving at peace preliminaries, based on what all people have in common, must be developed if future wars are to be avoided.

800
Wald, George. CAN CORPORATIONS BE TRIED FOR WAR CRIMES? Current, no. 120, Aug. 1970: 56-63.
AP2.C9259, 1970

Some uses of napalm and herbicides in Vietnam may fall within the definition of war crimes as set forth in the Nuremburg Principles. The question arises as to whether the industrial concerns that manufacture these weapons can be held responsible for the contribution they make to these criminal acts. What distinguishes napalm from other weapons is its indiscriminate effect and its intrinsic cruelty. The case is much the same for defoliants. The Dow Chemical Company, which manufactures both napalm and defoliant chemicals, has disavowed any liability, but is it right to require fighting men to shoulder a personal responsibility that Dow so lightly disdains? Extension of the Nuremburg Principles to include corporate responsibility would bring "the civilian sector, where much of the special interest and political power is based, and where many of the pressures originate that decide foreign policy," within the scope of the law. A precedent is needed, and a promising attempt to create one is underway in the U.S. courts. Once a precedent is established, it can be extended to cover other new types of weapons; ultimately, even nuclear weapons. "Yet mitigating the effects of war is only a first, fumbling step toward eradicating it. War itself is the atrocity, by now become too dangerous for us to tolerate longer."

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

801
Bierzanek, Remigiusz. THE PRINCIPLE OF UNIVERSALITY AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION. German foreign policy, v. 9, no. 5, 1970: 360-372. D261.4.D353, v. 9

The present organization and practice of the United Nations contradicts the international legal principle of the equality of states upon which the U.N. Charter is based. Although the Charter requires only that a state be "peace-loving" and willing to accept the obligations of the Charter in order to qualify for membership, the United Nations has not yet achieved universality. U.N. members have differed primarily over three questions regarding membership: admission of new mem-

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bers, representation of the People's Republic of China, and participation in general multilateral treaties codifying international law. The Western nations, led by the United States, have consistently sought to hinder the admission of new countries whose social and political systems they oppose, most notably in the case of China. The United Nations must become a truly universal organization representing the effective governments of all peoples if it is to achieve the noble purposes of its Charter. Putting into force the universality principle will further the development of international law guaranteeing peace and security in the entire world.

802
DISARMAMENT. UN monthly chronicle, v. 7, Dec. 1970: 47-52. JX1977.A1U564, v. 7

Lists arms control and disarmament resolutions taken up by the First Committee (Political and Security) during November 1970, summarizes the Committee's deliberations, and gives a breakdown of voting on the resolutions. Among the resolutions finally adopted by the committee were measures calling on depositary governments to open the draft treaty on the nonemplacement of weapons of mass destruction on the seabed for signature and ratification; urging nuclear-weapon states to halt the nuclear arms race, cease the testing and deployment of nuclear weapons, and sign and ratify the treaty of Tlatelolco; requesting governments to improve their seismological capabilities in the interests of achieving a comprehensive test ban treaty; and asking strict observance of the 1925 Geneva Protocol.

803
Frowein, Jochen A. [THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE NONMEMBER STATES] Die Vereinten Nationen und die Nichtmitgliedstaaten. Europa-Archiv, v. 25, Apr. 10, 1970: 256-262. D839.E86, v. 25

All nations of the world, divided or not, big or small, neutral or allied, should be members of the United Nations. Yet its Charter is important for nonmembers, because significant parts of it have become international law even though the General Assembly is not a world legislative organ. The United Nations can take action against nonmembers if these actions are sanctioned by international law; it also can protect nonmembers from aggression, although nonmembers are not obliged to accept U.N. resolutions or participate in peacekeeping operations. The United Nations is working toward the codification of international law, and nonmembers should have a greater role in this process, although the big decisions are made by the superpowers. Nonrecognition should not prevent membership. The example of the test ban treaty, in which countries not recognized by one depositary can submit membership applications with another depositary, should be followed as a precedent. All countries should be admitted to the United Nations once they are recognized by a given number of members; this would not prejudice the individual position of any member. If membership of a divided country seems impossible, observer status might be substituted. The Secretary General could be given the power to declare that the attitude of the members and of the organization regarding the legal status of the country in question would not be altered by its admission as a member or observer.

804
Galloway, Jonathan F. WORLDWIDE CORPORATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL INTEGRATION: THE CASE OF INTELSAT. International organization, v. 24, summer 1970: 503-519. JX1901.I55, v. 24

Describes the organization and operation of the International Telecommunications Satellite Consortium (INTELSAT) as an example of the contribution that corporations can make to worldwide integration. Galloway finds that INTELSAT has made a positive if not dramatic contribution to the integration of international communications networks and suggests that other types of corporations might serve a similar purpose.

805
Gardner, Richard N. THE SOVIET UNION, THE UNITED STATES, AND THE UNITED NATIONS. Foreign service journal, v. 47, Dec. 1970: 17-24, 49. JX1.A53, v. 47

Outlines proposals for U.S.-Soviet cooperation to strengthen the United Nations as a peacekeeping and peace-making instrument and to deal with problems of the seabed, space, the environment, world population, and underdevelopment. Within the U.N. framework, the superpowers could work together to encourage better use of peacekeeping machinery and to make improvements thereto; to devise new machinery for factfinding and mediation; to determine what changes need to be made in the United Nations to promote progress toward disarmament; to universalize the membership; and to bring voting power into line with real power. If cooperation is to become a reality, however, both superpowers must be prepared to adopt policies of nonintervention in the internal affairs of other states.

806
Gareau, Frederick H. COLD-WAR CLEAVAGES AS SEEN FROM THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY: 1947-1967. Journal of politics, v. 32, Nov. 1970: 929-968. JA1.J6, v. 32

A statistical study of 330 rollcall votes in the U.N. General Assembly, in which the positions of various states and groups of states on cold-war issues are examined. Gareau finds a high correlation between positions taken on cold-war issues and alliance membership, with the Soviet bloc the most monolithic. He analyzes the voting behavior of Yugoslavia, Cuba, Albania, and Rumania in detail, investigates the loyalty of allies of the United States on cold-war issues, and notes the leftward trend in voting among neutrals.

807
Halasz, Louis. CHECK TO THE QUEEN. Far Eastern economic review, v. 70, Dec. 5, 1970: 25-26, 28. HC411.F18, v. 70

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Analyzes the 1970 U.N. debate and voting on the China representation question. Peking is interested in gaining admission to the United Nations, and most governments favor its admission, yet an overwhelming majority prefer a solution that would not necessitate the expulsion of Taiwan from the world organization. The "two-China" approach remains completely unacceptable to both Taipei and Peking. The only other workable compromise is the "multiple seat" formula, which would entail the creation of several Chinese seats in the United Nations, much as the Soviet Union has three seats through the Byelorussian and Ukrainian memberships. Peking would occupy the "China seat," but three other Chinese seats might be given to representatives from autonomous regions, such as Inner Mongolia and the province of Formosa. Such an arrangement, however, faces tremendous political obstacles in both the United Nations and Peking.

808
Hoffmann, Stanley. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM. International organization, v. 24, summer 1970: 389-413.
JX1901.I55, v. 24

Outlines relations between the United Nations and the international system in recent years and explores their possible future relationship. Hoffmann notes that the illusion of a world community has had several positive effects on the international system, although the realities of the system have limited the effectiveness of the United Nations. He believes that the present nation-state system will continue to form the basis of international order and argues for a moderate international system that takes this into account.

809
Holz, Hans H. [THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY AND THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC IN THE UNITED NATIONS] BRD und DDR in die UNO. Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik, v. 15, Aug. 1970: 792-801. D839.B57, v. 15

Contends that the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic should be admitted to the United Nations simultaneously. U.N. membership would facilitate the solution of the German question, contribute to international peace and security, and aid the development of the Third World. Active participation of the two Germanys in the negotiations of the United Nations disarmament commission would further an international agreement on arms limitations prohibiting weapons of mass destruction. The United Nations is the best place for transforming national power politics into international peace politics.

810
Kim, Jung-gun. DEFIANCE OF U.N. MEMBERSHIP OBLIGATIONS. India quarterly, v. 26, Apr./June 1970: 143-152. D410.I44, v. 26

Discusses the legal and political problems of compelling U.N. members to adhere to the obligations imposed by the Charter. Kim finds that wide political disagreement among U.N. members makes uniform application of Charter obligations unlikely.

811
Meyer, Wolfgang. THE 24TH U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY--CONCLUSION AND A LOOK AHEAD. German foreign policy, v. 9, no. 5, 1970: 385-396.
D261.4.D353, v. 9

Summarizes the major accomplishments of the 24th session of the U.N. General Assembly in the fields of international security and disarmament. Meyer charges the United States with obstructionist tactics because of its resistance to effective agreements on the prohibition of chemical and biological weapons and its opposition to other disarmament measures, notably a halt to all underground nuclear tests, a ban on stationing weapons of mass destruction on the seabed, and general and complete disarmament. He expresses his satisfaction over the facts that the "inalienable rights of the people of Palestine" regarding Israeli aggression were expressed and that effective measures were being worked out against nazism and racism despite the lack of American cooperation. The resolution appealing to all countries to sign and ratify the Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes was passed by an overwhelming majority, with only five delegations, including Great Britain and the United States, in opposition. It was pointed out that some Western countries are attempting to hold up decolonization, particularly in southern Africa, and an appeal was directed against them. In his discussion of economic problems, Meyer points to the danger arising from the fact that Bonn had been "smuggled" onto the Preparatory Committee of the 2d Development Decade, and states that this discrimination against the German Democratic Republic triggered the refusal of other Socialist countries to participate. Such a situation could lead to a dangerous split in the United Nations. He feels the problem of universality demands immediate solution if the organization is to be effective in the future, and the first step in this direction should be the admission of divided countries as members.

812
REPRESENTATION OF CHINA. UN monthly chronicle, v. 7, Dec. 1970: 27-40.
JX1977.A1U564, v. 7

Summarizes the 1970 U.N. General Assembly debate on the China representation question. Also included is a recapitulation of opposing views on the 19-power procedural resolution that declared the seating issue an important question requiring a two-thirds majority for adoption and the 18-power resolution that asked for the expulsion of Nationalist China and the seating of Communist China. A breakdown of voting on both motions, of which the former passed while the latter failed to obtain the required two-thirds majority, is given.

813
SAMDECH SIHANOUK DENOUNCES CRIMES OF U.S.-MANIPULATED U.N.O. Peking review, v. 13, Nov. 6, 1970: 19-20. D6701.P42, v. 13

Excerpts from a statement by Sihanouk issued on October 14, 1970, "exposing and denouncing the crimes committed by the United Nations Organization under the manipulation of U.S. imperialism."

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Sihanouk charges that the United Nations has failed to fulfill any of its responsibilities. He asserts that member states that are not subservient to the United States should attempt to revitalize the United Nations by moving it out of that country. "In fact, if this organization is to survive, it is essential that its host country must not be a champion of racial discrimination, the biggest saboteur of world peace, the most shameless violator of international agreements and treaties, of international law, of the United Nations Charter and of human rights, the biggest aggressor of the weak peoples and countries, the most criminal perpetrator of genocide and the most ferocious and obstinate imperialist of all times!"

814
Sharp, Mitchell. UNITED NATIONS PROSPECTS IN THE NEXT QUARTER-CENTURY. In Canada. Dept. of External Affairs. External affairs, v. 22, Nov. 1970: 380-385. JX351.A3, v. 22

Statement by Canadian Secretary for External Affairs Mitchell Sharp to the 25th commemorative session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. Sharp outlines the major United Nations achievements and the reasons for general dissatisfaction with the organization. Sharp suggests that the disparity between the high hopes of 1945 and the slow progress made since then, along with the replacement of the ideals and goals of the postwar era by present-day objectives, have contributed to a sense of uneasiness about the United Nations and an awareness of its shortcomings. He believes, however, that the United Nations can accomplish its goals provided its members' "will to succeed is sustained and strong."

815
Singer, J. David, and Michael Wallace. INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION AND THE PRESERVATION OF PEACE, 1816-1964: SOME BIVARIATE RELATIONSHIPS. International organization, v. 24, summer 1970: 520-547. JX1901.I55, v. 24

Investigates the correlation between the extent of international organization and the incidence of war during the past century and a half. The authors devote the first part of the article to questions of definition and methodology. They conclude that although policymakers commonly rely on international organization as a means of reducing the incidence of war, there is little if any basis for the belief that international organization is efficacious in achieving this.

816
Social Science Research Council (Gt. Brit.) RESEARCH ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION; Chairman, G. L. Goodwin & [written by] Susan Strange. London, Heinemann Educational [1968] xiv, 57 p. (Reviews of current research, 2) JX1950.S64
Bibliography: p. 56-57.

Discusses major current research schemes and possible future developments in international organizations and explains research needs in terms of men, money, and organization. The Social Science Research Council prepares reviews that, according to series editor Jeremy Mitchell, will help social scientists and students keep abreast of developments over a wider field.

817
Sohn, Louis B. POSSIBLE STEPS TOWARD THE WORLD RULE OF LAW. In Toward century 21; technology, society, and human values. Edited by C. S. Wallia. New York, Basic Books [1970] p. 183-197. HM221.T67

A number of changes in the organization and operation of the United Nations would further the rule of law for the world. U.N. membership should be made universal, and the General Assembly should be reorganized or a new body established that would reflect more accurately the population differences among member states. The jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice should be extended to include all cases of local conflict and the settlement of treaty disputes. A permanent U.N. peacekeeping force, even if small at first, would be more effective than the present practice of relying on national contingents for specific operations. This peacekeeping force could be financed by the interest on a capital development fund established by the major powers. General and complete disarmament remains a distant goal, but a superpower agreement on the control of conventional arms transfers and a freeze on strategic weapons may be possible in the near future.

818
Spröte, Wolfgang. [THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE STRUGGLE TO SECURE PEACE: ON THE 25TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE UNITED NATIONS] Die Vereinten Nationen und der Kampf um die Sicherung des Friedens. Zum 25. Jahrestag der Gründung der UNO. Staat und Recht, v. 19, Oct. 1970: 1581-1590. LL

Views the United Nations as the most important international organization in which states belonging to different social orders are equal members, cooperating in shaping international relations. The Soviet Union and the other Socialist member states play an important role in securing world peace and making the United Nations the focal point in the international class struggle between socialism and imperialism. The author analyzes the means to realize the goals and principles of the Charter, evaluates the achievements of the past 25 years, and discusses current problems and aspects of future trends. Spröte argues that now that Bonn has signed the Moscow treaty nothing impedes both Germanys becoming U.N. members. He criticizes imperialist tendencies to avoid political issues and to stress economic problems while shying away from responsibilities toward developing countries.

819
THE UNITED NATIONS: APPRAISAL AT 25 YEARS. American journal of international law, v. 64, Sept. 1970: 1-291. JX1.A6, v. 64
Proceedings of the 64th annual meeting of the American Society of International Law, New York, Apr. 24-26, 1970.

Addresses and discussions on the role of the United Nations in peacekeeping, lawmaking, the

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Arab-Israeli dispute, economic development, race relations, disarmament, and environmental pollution. Charles N. Van Doren summarizes the U.N. involvement in the nonproliferation treaty and discusses some of the problems of inspection and verification that are yet to be negotiated. George Bunn reviews the U.N. role in banning chemical and biological weapons and assesses the U.S. position on the 1925 Geneva Protocol. Morton Halperin contends that a ban on the deployment of ABM's is crucial to any strategic arms limitation agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union.

820
United Nations. Secretary General, 1961- (Thant) INTRODUCTION TO THE ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE WORK OF THE ORGANIZATION. UN monthly chronicle, v. 7, Oct. 1970: 40-79.
JX1977.A1U564, v. 7

Reviews the major issues confronting the United Nations: disarmament, outer space and the seabed, the Near East and Cyprus, economic and social development, human rights, apartheid, decolonization, U.N. finances, peaceful settlement of disputes, and hijacking of civil aircraft. In the section on disarmament, the Secretary General urges that the superpowers implement a moratorium on testing and deployment of new strategic weapons systems; that all nonsigners sign and ratify the Geneva Protocol; that states cease developing, producing, and stockpiling chemical and biological weapons for use in war; and that the nuclear powers suspend nuclear weapon tests entirely. Further progress toward disarmament in this decade will depend largely on the full implementation of the treaty to halt the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons and on strategic arms limitations to curb their vertical proliferation. To achieve far-reaching disarmament measures, all significant military powers, particularly France and China, must participate in arms negotiations. "Although disarmament is one of the highest priorities of the United Nations, its achievements in this field hardly measure up to the needs."

821
U.S. IMPERIALISM'S POLICY OF HOSTILITY TOWARDS CHINA SUFFERS SERIOUS DEFEAT. Peking review, v. 13, Nov. 27, 1970: 20-22.
DS701.P42, v. 13

A summary of the 1970 U.N. debate on the China representation question. For the first time in the history of the controversy, a majority of nations in the General Assembly approved a draft resolution submitted by Albania, Algeria, and 16 other countries to seat Communist China and expel Nationalist China. This serious defeat for U.S. imperialism, "which . . . has for the past 20 years manipulated the U.N. voting machine and installed in the U.N. the Chiang Kai-shek gang long rejected by the Chinese people," shows that "the dyke of hostility towards China built by U.S. imperialism in the U.N. has begun to collapse." Representatives of many countries have charged that the U.S. resolution declaring the seating question an "important question" is undemocratic, legally unsupportable, and politically unrealistic. The Yugoslav representative stated that this practice "is contrary to the spirit of the Charter and it jeopardizes the foundations of the United Nations." Many representatives have also asserted that the two-Chinas scheme is "untenable." Though the United States would like Communist China to play a constructive role in the international community, it opposed the expulsion of the Nationalists. In fact, then, the United States has merely changed its tone to facilitate its two-Chinas or one-China-one-Taiwan plot. This can never be permitted by the Chinese people. The outcome of this year's voting, despite an intense U.S. lobbying campaign to defeat the 18-nation draft resolution, indicates that it will be increasingly difficult for the United States to influence voting and exercise hegemony in the United Nations. "If U.S. imperialism and its accomplice continue their course of wilful action and conspiracy in the United Nations, they will either face an even more shameful defeat for themselves or lead the United Nations to fiasco, making it take the old road of the League of Nations after World War I."

INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY FORCES

822
Bloomfield, Lincoln P. THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION, AND THE PROSPECTS FOR PEACEKEEPING. International organization, v. 24, summer 1970: 548-565. JX1901.I55, v. 24

Peacekeeping proposals must take into account the changing nature and areas of conflict. Multilateral approaches to peacekeeping must replace reliance on unilateral intervention by the Soviet Union or the United States, neither of which has thus far demonstrated a sustained interest in multilateral peacekeeping arrangements as a means of preventing conflict. "The prospects for a workable system of multilateral peacekeeping remain fragile. But what the Communists call 'objective factors' make them somewhat more favorable as we go into period 4 of the age of peacekeeping."

823
Stegenga, James A. U.N. PEACE-KEEPING: THE CYPRUS VENTURE. Journal of peace research, no. 1, 1970: 1-16. AS9.J6, 1970

The United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was established in March 1964 to help deal with the explosive communal violence that had racked the tiny Mediterranean island since the previous Christmas--violence that threatened to plunge NATO allies Greece and Turkey into a war that would inevitably have involved the great powers. This latest major UN military operation reveals a great deal about the limits and possibilities of UN peace-keeping in volatile Third World trouble spots. Generally, UNFICYP has been a model of administrative efficiency. And the Force has ably, honorably, and imaginatively performed a wide array of helpful peace-keeping and civic-action functions. On the other hand, it has become clear that a military operation, even one under United Nations auspices and encompassing extensive civic-action projects, has a limited capacity to mitigate civil conflict and is no substitute for tra-

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ditional political settlement procedures. The UNFICYP experience serves to illustrate the peace-making limitations of even the most highly effective peace-keeping force to date. Finally, UNFICYP seems to be a more likely model for possible future United Nations peace-keeping forces than either the Suez or Congo operations. (Abstract supplied)

824
Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research. NATIONAL SUPPORT OF INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING AND PEACE OBSERVATION OPERATIONS. Prepared for the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. [Washington] 1970. 5 v. JX1981.P7W314
"Contract ACDA/IR-161."

Contents.--v. 1. Summary report.--v. 2. Final report.--v. 3-5. Background papers.

Examines the political, financial, personnel, and logistical support that the United States and other nations have given to U.N. and other international peacekeeping operations. The authors trace the development of the concept and practice of peacekeeping since World War II, focusing on the crucial U.S. role in sustaining both U.N. and regional peacekeeping operations.

OTHER PROCESSES, PLANS, AND PROPOSALS

825
Argyris, Chris. INTERVENTION THEORY AND METHOD; A BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE VIEW. Reading, Mass., Addison-Wesley Pub. Co. [c1970] 374 p. (Addison-Wesley series in social science and administration)
HD38.A682

Presents a theoretical framework for intervention (in the sense of consulting), focusing on "understanding the requirements for effective intervention when the targets are human social systems." In part one, Argyris describes the conditions under which interventionists work and the situations that lead to ineffective intervention. A detailed analysis of three such cases is given. In part two, the author concentrates on the problem of locating a client system and discusses two meetings with actual client systems. After selecting a system and outlining his method of diagnosis, he concludes by dealing with the problem of terminating ineffective relationships with client systems.

826
Bredow, Wilfried von. ["REALISTIC" AND "UTOPIAN" CASTLES IN THE AIR IN PEACE RESEARCH] Von "realistischen" und "utopischen" Luftschlössern in der Friedensforschung. Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik, v. 15, Nov. 1970: 1172-1182. D839.B57, v. 15

Reviews West German writing on peace research and related subjects. Von Bredow suspects all these publications awaken aspirations and mobilize goodwill but somehow work no changes. Peace research can be instrumental in achieving reasonable peace policies, but the growing number of progressive and future-oriented publications on the subject leave the reader strangely depressed, with no room for enthusiasm regarding the status of peace research in the Federal Republic of Germany. This is all the more disappointing in light of the enthusiasm for a rational peace science to end irrational politics. Peace research is ethnocentric. It cannot replace peace policies or even work them out through the force of its arguments.

827
Cowdry, R. William, Kenneth Keniston, and Seymour Cabin. THE WAR AND MILITARY OBLIGATION: PRIVATE ATTITUDES AND PUBLIC ACTIONS. Journal of personality, v. 38, Dec. 1970: 525-549.
BF1.J66, v. 38

The relationship between attitudes toward the Vietnam war and willingness to sign a strongly worded and publicized antiwar resolution was studied in a random sample of 131 male college seniors at a selective liberal arts college. Level of opposition to the war did not fully explain why many strongly antiwar subjects did not sign the resolution. With level of opposition to the war held constant, personality measures and other attitudes differentiated between signers and nonsigners. It is hypothesized that the disposition to act publicly in support of private attitudes is a separate variable, which may be independent of the content and intensity of attitudes. Studies of "activism" should distinguish more sharply between private attitudes and public actions. (Abstract supplied)

828
Dopfer, Kurt. [EAST-WEST CONVERGENCE; WILL THE ECONOMIC SYSTEMS OF EAST AND WEST COME CLOSER TOGETHER?] Ost-West-Konvergenz; werden sich die östlichen und westlichen Wirtschaftsordnungen annähern? Zürich, Polygraphischer Verlag [1970] 571 p. (Veröffentlichungen der Hochschule St. Gallen für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften. Volkswirtschaftlich-wirtschaftsgeographische Reihe, Bd. 22) HB75.D46 1970
Originally presented as the author's thesis, St. Gall.
Bibliography: p. 547-571.

Contents.--Introduction.--Roadmarkers.--pt. 1. Theoretical bases: The economic system. The development of the economic system.--pt. 2. Real factors: The North-South perspective. The real factors of advanced economic systems: structure and developmental tendencies of the industrial society. Interim balance.--pt. 3. The ideal factors: Methodical clarification. The Eastern economic system. The Western economic system.--pt. 4. The polar field of tension between real and ideal factors: The role of the economic systems in the field of international power relations. Convergence of the goals of East and West? Convergence of the property systems of East and West? Convergence of economic goal selection of East and West? Convergence of the total economic coordination and accomplishment of East and West? The control mechanisms of East and West: property ideology, system efficiency, and limits of reform. Summary. Convergence of the political systems of East and West?--Synopsis.

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Proposes a philosophical synthesis of the materialistic and ideological systems of West and East as the basis for an evolutionary, peaceful convergence of their political and economic systems. Each side must give up its monistic ideological position and tolerantly incorporate contradictory ontological theories into its philosophical outlook. Part 1 connects the formal ontological statement with economic theory. Part 2 analyzes the characteristics of the economic systems of East and West, whereas part 3 examines their ideological and social-ethical principles and the roles they play. In part 4 the author brings the premises together and points them toward the final goal. He examines the transformation of the Eastern and Western systems and interprets the transformation process, especially the convergence process, as the result of a mutual, polar, influencing process between real and ideal factors.

829
Ebert, Theodor. [NONVIOLENT REVOLT. ALTERNATIVES TO CIVIL WAR] Gewaltfreier Aufstand. Alternative zum Bürgerkrieg. [Vom Autor stark rev. und aktualisierte Taschenbuchausg. Gekürzte Ausg. Frankfurt a. M. und Hamburg] Fischer-Bücherei [1970] 237 p. (Fischer-Bücherei, 1123. Informationen zur Zeit) JC328.3.E2 1970
Includes bibliographical references.

Contents.--Introduction to the revised edition. --pt. 1. On the theory of nonviolent action: Critique of force used for liberation. Scale of nonviolent combat procedures. Scale of repression. The adversary in the role compelled by the system. The motivations of the adversary as a field of operation.--pt. 2. Basis of the revolt: Organization of power from below. Preparation for the revolt. Negotiations when action is imminent. The beginning of the conflict.--pt. 3. Form and effect of selected battle procedures: Protest action. Hunger strike and suicide. Noncooperation and constructive role innovation. Economic boycott. Civil disobedience and civil usurpation.

Criticizes the disproportionate relationships between armaments and consumer goods, on one hand, and social services, on the other, and between the industrialized and developing countries. The lower classes must initiate the necessary changes, because the ruling classes will not. Ebert argues that the power of nonviolent action is far greater than is generally believed, and that it is underrated by revolutionaries who believe they know the mechanism of nonviolent action but have not really considered it deeply. He analyzes the methods of Gandhi, Martin Luther King, and others and develops models for nonviolent action against authoritative power. He believes that the development of a satisfactory method of nonviolent revolt will be an essential discovery, since it will help solve not only domestic conflicts but international conflicts as well by providing an alternative to defense systems based on the threat or use of force.

830
EDUCATION ON WAR, PEACE, CONFLICT, AND CHANGE. Intercom, v. 12, fall 1970: 20-64.
Z7164.I8I48, v. 12

Contents.--Preface and introduction.--The present situation.--Reasons for teaching about war and peace.--Defining the field.--Specific areas which need work.--Curriculum development.--Teacher training.--Materials and resources.--The role of the community.--Organizations.--Some programs and projects.--Bibliography of selected resources.

A guide for teachers in elementary and secondary schools who desire to develop a curriculum on the causes and prevention of international violence. A major aim of the guide is to assist teachers to overcome the reluctance of the American school system to deal with this kind of subject. The information in this issue is meant to provide the user with a general survey of the field; later issues will focus on some of the more specific topics.

831
Halle, Louis J. [WHAT IS UNDERSTOOD BY A "PEACEFUL WORLD"?] Was verstehen wir unter einer "friedlichen Welt"? Schweizer Monatshefte, v. 50, Oct. 1970: 571-579. AP32.S47, v. 50

A peaceful world is more than a world free of unlimited violent military actions. Tensions, threats, and spying are signs of distrust that must disappear, and the danger of organized military violence must be limited and eventually eliminated. A world without conflict is unrealistic, but conflict can be controlled by establishing a balance of power. The goal of disarmament must be to increase the stability of the power balance. Authoritative behavioral rules, another prerequisite for peace, must be based on moral convictions and psychological restraints capable of enforcement, for instance by international law. Tolerance and restraint also play a significant role, because minority rights must take precedence over claims to power.

832
Hermann, Ingo. [PEACE RESEARCH--A UTOPIA BECOMES CONCRETE] Friedensforschung--eine Utopie wird konkret. Westermanns Monatshefte, Dec. 1970: 24-32. illus. AP30.W5, 1970

For the first time in history man's hope for peace has been given a scientific basis. Peace research coordinates the social sciences and brings them into perspective with political reality in its attempt to develop a peace strategy for crisis management. The Cuban crisis represented successful peace planning, but unfortunately politicians do not use modern conflict analysis more widely. Conflict has psychological aspects as well as social, economic, and political causes. If human stupidity is one of the main causes of the conflict between peace and aggressiveness, then education can help eradicate prejudices, taboos, automatic obedience, and social pressure and can stress the desirability of peace, rational behavior, knowledge of other societies, and social conscience.

833
Klages, Helmut. [WHAT DOES "PEACE" MEAN? ON THE PROBLEMS OF UNDERSTANDING IN PEACE RESEARCH] Was heisst "Frieden"? Zur Problematik der Verständigung über die Friedensforschung. Frankfurter

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Hefte; Zeitschrift für Kultur und Politik, v. 25, Sept. 1970: 624-630.
AP30.F555, v. 25

Peace cannot be defined as the absence of conflict, since this implies absence of progress, or as the absence of "negative" (i.e. undesirable) conflicts, since the application of violence might be legitimate or illegitimate. Elisabeth Converse has suggested that peace be defined as the absence or control of negative conflict by experimental gaming, bargaining, and crisis management. This definition extends the applicability of peace research to everyday political, social, and humanitarian issues involving the basic requirements of order. The ideal of positive peace will not be achieved automatically once there is negative peace because the present concept of positive peace is too utopian and too challenging. Peace research must deal with the future of the total human condition if it is to avoid being paralyzed by unrealistic expectations.

834
Klefisch, Johannes W. [STRATEGIC INTERVENTION BY THE GREAT POWERS IN ALLIANCES] Die Allianzstrategischen Interventionen der Führungsmächte. Frankfurter Hefte; Zeitschrift für Kultur und Politik, v. 25, Sept. 1970: 615-623.
AP30.F555, v. 25

Surveys the international conflicts in which the Great Powers intervened in the past two decades. The United States, the Soviet Union, and China are striving for geostrategic hegemony. Since the Cuban missile crisis, the prevailing conception is that the geostrategic area of the other party is untouchable and that intervention in the internal processes of alliances is dangerous. Klefisch therefore recommends that the present geostrategic areas be established by international treaties in conjunction with the recognized principles of international law. To these agreements on nonintervention a guarantee must be added to draw a line between ideology and strategy, so that a country can change its economic or political ideas without affecting global strategy and security. This would secure the safety of the world more than putting a halt to the arms race. However, indications are that China does not want to be restricted in its sphere of influence. Therefore a Soviet-American treaty declaring all territories outside the existing alliances neutral, promising not to conclude pacts of any sort with them, no matter what their ideological trends, seems advisable. The United Nations would safeguard the existence of these countries. Inspections would not be necessary, and the transfer of weapons could be detected by satellites. Breaking the treaty would not be likely, since neither prestige nor material interests of the great powers would be at stake, and other countries could be forced to adhere if they place national interests above the common interest. Germany should be willing to pay the price for world peace by settling for undesirable frontiers.

835
Mahendra Kumar. CURRENT PEACE RESEARCH AND INDIA. Varanasi, Gandhian Institute of Studies [1968] 147 p. JX1961.I5M33

Contents.--The present state of peace research.--Possibilities of peace research in India.--Recent studies in peace research.--Appendixes.

A general survey of peace research covering its scope, method, and potentialities; its past and future in India; and major titles in the literature. Peace research has not received the attention it deserves among Indian scholars; this study was undertaken with the express intent of rectifying that situation. Some 150 titles are examined individually in the chapter on the literature. The appendixes contain lists of peace research centers and funding organizations throughout the world.

836
Mathews, John A. PEACE, TOO, NEEDS SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH. War/peace report, v. 10, Aug./Sept. 1970: 14-16. JX1901.W38, v. 10

Although scientific political research could make incalculable contributions to the solution of existing international problems, and although peaceful resolution of international conflict is a stated goal of U.S. foreign policy, the U.S. Government has consistently allocated insignificant sums of money for peace research programs, and the heads of interested Government and non-Government advisory groups have failed to pressure the Government for substantial increases in such expenditures. In an effort to determine why the Government devotes so little effort to research on war prevention, a proposed study of the attitudes of Government officials toward peace research was submitted to 60 Government agencies and private institutions having a prime interest in this field; not one was sufficiently interested to act on the proposal. A massive scientific political-research program will be required to develop and establish new methods and political structures for preventing and resolving international conflicts. The introduction of the Peace Act bills, which would create a Department of Peace, a Joint Congressional Committee on Peace and International Cooperation, and an International Peace Institute, was a step in the right direction. The principal function of the proposed Department would have been to coordinate, support, and promote peace research. Proponents of the bills realized, however, that they lacked the strong congressional support given the Arms Control and Disarmament Act even though the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has not lived up to expectations in the peace research area. They therefore formed the Peace Act Advisory Council to muster support by informing the public of the potential benefits of peace research and other methods of peaceful conflict resolution.

837
Mechtersheimer, Alfred. ["PEACE RESEARCH" AND MILITARY SCIENCE] "Friedensforschung" und Militärwissenschaft. Wehrkunde, v. 19, Jan. 1970: 6-9.
U3.W396, v. 19

A utopian concept of "peace research" and "social (nonviolent) defense" is dangerous, since the Warsaw pact countries do not seem to be willing to reduce their deterrence levels. War remains a policy, and conventional wars should not be under-

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rated. The lack of sophisticated military science in the Federal Republic of Germany, with a place in the social sciences, causes peace research to be based more on wishful thinking than on an analysis of realities. The young social scientists tend toward new concepts of peace research: Krippendorf sees peace research as an instrument of a Socialist revolutionary strategy, Senghaas criticizes the deterrence system but offers no alternative, Weizsäcker points out the necessity of world peace too philosophically, and Mitscherlich, through his psychological approach, comes close to proving that violent conflicts are unavoidable. The Germans must acquire military knowledge and a familiarity with the American literature dealing with war and peace. Peace research must become the science of war prevention, and peace researchers must cooperate with military scientists. Futurology, of which peace research is a part, can help predict domestic policies, but, since power cannot be measured rationally, it cannot predict international policies. If peace research could be expanded to mean future-oriented research, it could help solve acute social problems by "technological fixes," such as water desalinization. Although peace research can hardly eliminate the paradox between the laws of reason, which command peace, and the laws of nature, to which war is inherent, it might contribute to reduce the effects of disharmony. However, if peace research distracts from the realities and disrupts the basis for possible peace, it becomes dangerous.

838
Menke-Glückert, Peter. [PEACE STRATEGIES; SCIENTIFIC TECHNIQUES INFLUENCE POLITICS] Friedensstrategien; wissenschaftliche Techniken beeinflussen die Politik. [Reinbek bei Hamburg] Rowohlt [1969] 296 p. (Rowohlt Paperback, 77)
JX1952.M357

Contents.--Foreword.--Industrial culture in the atomic era.--The role of research in the scientific civilization.--Politics and science.--Designs for peace; models for the settlement of conflicts. --Strategies of disarmament.--The theory of terror.--Peace-planning in Germany.--Index of names. --Subject index.

Provides material for a German program for world peace. Consistent planning for peace is Europe's, and therefore Germany's, only chance to play a credible role in world politics among the nuclear powers. Now, more than ever, politicians and scientists must work closely together to develop a system of checks and balances that will lead to world peace. Atomic energy, electronics, and the information revolution will compel the erection of new political structures. The basis for any planning for peace must be technological. Correct information--above all in the field of arms control--will diminish distrust and lack of communication, while the social revolution will do away with poverty and hunger. For peace planning, at least as much financial and intellectual effort and ingenuity must be expended as for orthodox military security policy. Departments for arms control and disarmament must be established alongside defense departments, and peacekeepers must take their places alongside defense experts.

839
Popper, Sir Karl R. [THE MORAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE SCIENTIST] Die moralische Verantwortlichkeit des Wissenschaftlers. Schweizer Monatshefte, v. 50, Oct. 1970: 561-570.
AP32.S47, v. 50

From a paper read at the "Internationaler Philosophenkongress 1968" in Vienna in the section "Science and Ethics."

Since all sciences potentially have applications, every scientist has a moral responsibility. If today's main political task is to reduce suffering and social injustice, the most important practical task is to avoid war. Yet it would be wrong to say that scientists are morally obliged to refuse to cooperate in armaments or that they should commit themselves to unilateral disarmament, because deterrence has actually nullified war. Politicians are responsible for the ultimate decision on behalf of the governed, but all people must be deeply concerned with modern problems and seek the aggressor in any conflict. Even justified defensive war, however, can rage out of control. Now that war crimes have been recognized as punishable, each person must decide which orders are to be obeyed or resisted, and the freedom to do so must be protected. American draft laws therefore need revision to permit conscientious objection to particular wars. Since knowledge is power, and since power corrupts, people must be kept aware of the limitations of their knowledge. Social scientists have a special duty in warning against the misuse of power, since the dangers of social technology and the manipulation of the masses are tremendous.

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IV. GENERAL ANALYSES OF, AND COMPREHENSIVE APPROACHES TO, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

840
Burns, Richard D. THE SALT TALKS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE. Revue militaire générale; general military review, no. 8, Oct. 1970: 365-384.
U2.R48, 1970
Includes summaries in French and German.

Compares the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) with the Washington naval treaties of the interwar period. Burns brings this historical experience into focus with current arms limitation issues by examining the following factors: whether there are sufficient basic technological and strategic similarities between the battleship and nuclear missile systems; the principal motivations for strategic arms limitation; the prerequisites to successful negotiations; the problems encountered in inspection and evasion of arms limitation treaties; and the risks involved in participating in these treaties. Nuclear weapons and battleships appear to affect foreign policy issues similarly in the context of arms limitation considerations. The political and economic factors that prompted the naval treaties parallel the political and economic arguments for nuclear weapons limitation, the problems of inspection and evasion may be resolved by traditional intelligence methods through the use of modern devices, and, finally, the risks of an arms limitation accord could not exceed those of maintaining the present deterrence system. The author concludes that SALT will not solve all political, ideological, and economic issues between the superpowers, but a broadly based arms limitation pact could modify Soviet-American disputes.

841
Forndran, Erhard A. G. [ARMS CONTROL; THE ORIGIN, PROBLEMS, AND INFLUENCE OF THE CONCEPT ON AMERICAN POLICY BETWEEN 1953 AND 1963] Rüstungskontrolle; die Entstehung der Konzeption, ihre Probleme und ihr Einfluss auf die amerikanische Politik zwischen 1953 und 1963. Bonn, 1969. 424 p.
JX1974.F62
Inaug.-Diss.-Bonn.
Vita.
Bibliography: p. 397-424.

Contents.--Introduction.--Arms control and the security and disarmament policies of the United States 1953-1960.--Public discussion of the problem of equilibrium in the Eisenhower administration.--Characteristics and problems of an armament control policy.--Armament control as an element of American policy 1961-1963.--Final considerations.--Literature.

Represents the initial American effort toward arms control as reaction to the worsening conditions of national security occasioned by the absence or incomplete execution of a stability policy during the Eisenhower administration. Attempts at stabilization on the basis of the rationalization of common interests are presented against the background of concomitant developments in military technology, strategy, and politics. Forndran says that the complexity of the structure and the vagueness of the forms prevent rigorous definition. The wide spectrum of public discussion depicted contains numerous, often contradictory, proposals for nullifying the nuclear threat. The changes in meaning and the flux of action and reaction of these disarmament proposals on each other and on internal politics are emphasized. The intermediate position of armament control between military policy and disarmament is examined on the basis of the events of the Eisenhower years. Armaments control as an element of foreign and security policy is considered only for the Kennedy administration.

842
Shaffer, Helen B. NUCLEAR BALANCE OF TERROR: 25 YEARS AFTER ALAMOGORDO. Editorial research reports, v. 2, July 1970: 485-506.
H35.E35, v. 2

Contents.--Nuclear arms race and strategic policy: Dual policy of nuclear escalation and limitation. Deterrence as rationale of nuclear arms race. Defense planning for 'worst possible' condition. Nixon's call for build-up to meet Russian gains.--Quarter-century of atomic development: Idea for A-bomb: Einstein's letter to Roosevelt. Birth of the bomb in wartime Manhattan Project. Atomic bombs at Alamogordo, Hiroshima, Nagasaki. Creation of hydrogen bombs in America, Russia. Diversification of sources of nuclear attacks.--Efforts to restrain nuclear arms race: Aim of scientists' lobby in 1946 to ban bomb. Treaties on nuclear testing and arms control. Nuclear issues in American-Soviet arms talks.

Traces the development of atomic weapons from the Manhattan Project to the multiple independently targetable warhead; comments on the arms race, focusing on the rationale of deterrence; and examines past and present arms control efforts, especially the strategic arms limitations talks. Shaffer contends that although the balance of terror has played a major part in curbing the use of nuclear weapons, it has had little influence in preventing limited conventional wars. She concludes that despite their mutual distrust the superpowers appear to be heading toward some sort of understanding on arms control.

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843
United Nations. Office of Public Information. DISARMAMENT: IMPERATIVE OF PEACE; ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS. New York, 1970. 42 p.
DLC

Outlines the role of the United Nations in arms control and disarmament since 1959. Among the achievements reviewed are the nuclear test ban treaty, the nonproliferation treaty, the treaty banning nuclear weapons in Latin America, and the treaty governing the use of outer space. Current efforts to prohibit nuclear weapons on the seabed and to outlaw chemical and biological weapons are discussed, as are the prospects for future disarmament agreements.

GENERAL ANALYSES

844
DECLARATION ON PEACE AND DISARMAMENT. Presented to the President of the 25th session of the General Assembly and to the Secretary-General of the United Nations on 21 September 1970. [New York, Trust for Education on the United Nations, 1970] 3 p.
DLC

Text of a declaration endorsed by all living Nobel Peace Prize Laureates: Lord Boyd Orr, René Cassin, Philip Noel-Baker, Lester B. Pearson, Linus Pauling, and Ralph J. Bunche.

Although 1970 marks the beginning of the Disarmament Decade proclaimed by the United Nations, distrust, tension, and violence appear to be the order of the day. Tremendous increases in military expenditures during the past decade have failed to bring security or peace; these can only be achieved by a reduction in armaments. Steps in the right direction have been taken through several important treaties restricting nuclear weapons, but much more needs to be done if man is to avoid a nuclear holocaust from which he might never recover. The present strategic arms limitation talks must succeed in halting and reversing the nuclear arms race. War can no longer bring either victory or peace. "Whatever its costs, whatever presumed advantages have to be ceded, the political settlement of international differences will in the end always prove less costly and less dangerous than any attempted settlement brought about by the force of arms."

845
Ignatieff, George. THE OUTLOOK FOR DISARMAMENT IN THE COMING DECADE. In Canada. Dept. of External Affairs. External affairs, v. 22, Dec. 1970: 425-433. JX351.A3, v. 22

Statement made to the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly on November 2, 1970. The Canadian representative on the committee surveys past accomplishments in arms control and disarmament and looks ahead to future possibilities in these fields. Although disarmament negotiations were comparatively sterile during the past quarter century, the 1960's saw the achievement of encouraging arms control agreements, including the partial nuclear test ban treaty, the outer space treaty, and the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. Ignatieff believes that while none of these agreements has stopped the spiraling arms race, "each has contributed, at least, to an expanding system of international agreement to control the proliferation of new weapons, or of old weapons into new environments." He concludes by declaring that the Canadian delegation to the U.N. Committee on Disarmament will contribute its best efforts to consolidate the progress already made.

846
Institute for Defense Analyses, Washington, D.C. International and Social Studies Division. FUTURE SOVIET INTERESTS IN ARMS CONTROL. Prepared for U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. [Arlington, Va.] 1970. 2 v.
DLC

"ACDA/IR-151."

Contents.--v. 1. Summary.--v. 2. Basic report.

Analyzes the objectives, motivations, and determinants of Soviet arms control policies. It is argued that the Soviet Union is genuinely interested in stabilizing the present military balance through some form of arms control agreement and that the prospects for such an agreement are favorable. The authors examine the Soviet Union's strategic relationships to the United States, Western Europe, and China, as well as domestic factors that may influence Soviet arms control policies.

847
Howard, Michael E. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT. NATO's fifteen nations, v. 15, Dec. 1970/Jan. 1971: 40-44. UA646.F5, v. 15

Arms control is a dialectical synthesis of armaments competition and disarmament, two earlier prescriptions for military stability, neither of which ever prevented the outbreak of war. Disarmament is plagued by problems of balance, verification, and security. Today, on all three issues, disagreement between the Soviet Union and the West is total. The resulting impasse on disarmament has not prevented the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament from negotiating some significant arms control agreements, however, or laying a good deal of the groundwork for some others. Moreover, as a consequence of certain of these agreements, enough dissatisfaction was generated among smaller states to induce them to pressure the superpowers into bilateral strategic arms limitation talks. In these talks, the superpowers hope to gain control over recent potentially destabilizing innovations in military technology, namely multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles, improvements in missile accuracy, and ABM's. Once these weapons were deployed it might be possible to reestablish strategic stability on a higher level, but the uncertainty and the costs would be enormous. Although there is no way of knowing whether the talks will be successful, the mere fact that the two sides are talking is significant.

848
Keys, Donald F. MEANWHILE, BACK IN THE DISARMAMENT COMMITTEE. . . War/peace report, v. 10, Aug./Sept. 1970: 8-9, 16. JX1901.W38, v. 10

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Although the superpowers have taken the nuclear arms question out of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD), having decided instead to negotiate within the framework of the U.S.-Soviet strategic arms limitation talks, the CCD has continued to play a leading role in arms control and disarmament negotiations with its draft treaties on the seabed and chemical and biological weapons (CBW). Yet, like the nuclear test ban treaty, these measures have thus far been limited in scope. For instance, due to the demands of American military planners, the proposed seabed agreement will denuclearize rather than demilitarize the ocean floor despite a unanimous appeal by the other members of the CCD for a treaty covering all weapons. While other suggestions have been incorporated in the revised U.S.-Soviet draft treaty on the seabed, the superpowers rejected a Canadian proposal that would have sanctioned the use of "international procedures including the good offices of the secretary general of the United Nations" in the inspection of alleged violations, a provision that many countries thought might establish an important precedent for future arms inspection agreements. This fall the U.N. General Assembly is expected to urge all nonsigners to ratify the 1925 Geneva Protocol. Japan has just done so, and the United States and Brazil have announced that they would soon ratify. However, in light of U.S. use of tear gas and herbicides in Vietnam and a recent U.N. resolution stating that the protocol prohibits the use of these agents in war (which the United States promptly claimed was unenforceable), U.S. ratification now appears uncertain. Great Britain apparently agrees with the U.S. definition. Inspection and verification procedures for chemical weapons are an emerging stumbling block in the negotiation of a draft treaty on CBW. The Soviet Union favors a comprehensive ban, and while the United States and Great Britain contend that chemical weapons and biological weapons should be treated under separate agreements, all other nations would rather have both types eliminated by a single treaty. The Conference has also increased its attention to various general questions of disarmament.

849
Kinsella, Kevin J. DISARMAMENT: THE CURRENT STATE OF THE FRAUD. Science journal, v. 6, Nov. 1970: 40-44. illus. Q1.S57, v. 6

Such so-called "disarmament" agreements as the nonproliferation treaty, the partial test ban treaty, and the impending draft seabed treaty are in fact nonmilitarization agreements, "designed either to sanctify the status quo or to legislate against actions which no country has contemplated anyway." These treaties, which carry no provisions for security guarantees from the superpowers nor disarmament measures applicable to them, are indicative of the lip service the Soviet Union and the United States have been paying to disarmament. The United States continues to base its objections to a comprehensive test ban treaty on the possibility of secret violations, even though more sensitive and effective detection devices are constantly being developed. It has become increasingly clear that the major obstacles to disarmament agreements are not specific problems, such as verification, but the momentum of the arms race and the political problems attending it. If the strategic arms limitation talks fail to curb the arms race and if the development of multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles and ABM's continues to threaten the balance of power between the superpowers, a Pandora's box of new weapons of annihilation will be opened. Unfortunately, arms limitation agreements will be a function of political and social forces within the superpowers rather than a genuine desire on the part of their governments to relinquish weapons.

850
Korhonen, Keijo. DISARMAMENT TALKS AS AN INSTRUMENT OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS. Cooperation and conflict, no. 3, 1970: 152-167.
DL55.C66, 1970

Arms control talks have come to play a significant role in international politics whether or not they produce arms control agreements. The superpowers find them useful for confining conflict within manageable limits and for preserving the nuclear status quo vis-a-vis third powers. Potential nuclear-weapon states--a significant new group in international politics--exploit them as a means of squeezing economic and security concessions out of the superpowers. Not all states benefit, however. To the allies of the superpowers, and to the rank and file of the international community generally, arms talks may be, or appear to be, seriously dysfunctional, and it is not surprising that recent negotiations have accentuated difficulties within alliance systems, and, in relation to the nonproliferation treaty, precipitated a "revolt of the masses" among smaller states. Clearly arms talks can have unexpected and unwanted consequences, and lengthy proceedings and a lack of concrete results only exacerbate matters. Nevertheless, when all is said and done, arms control negotiations do contribute significantly to the integration of the international community. Indeed, this, and not the making of specific agreements, may be their raison d'être.

851
Leitenberg, Milton. THE PRESENT STATE OF THE WORLD'S ARMS RACE. Cooperation and conflict, no. 3, 1970: 185-197. illus.
DL55.C66, 1970

Examines trends in weapons technology, both nuclear and conventional, and speculates on the prospects for success in current efforts to limit armaments. Leitenberg argues that the arms competition between the Great Powers, which rests heavily on vast investments in research and development, is "a selfpropagating process" that "needs no increase in tension to keep it going and hardly needs a real enemy." For this and other reasons, he concludes that the strategic arms race is bound to continue. The world can look forward to ever-growing stockpiles of fissile materials and to ever-new refinements in warhead and delivery-system design. The only bright spot in this otherwise dismal picture is the growing concern over chemical and biological weapons, which may culminate in their ban.

419-653 O - 71 - 6

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852
Scoville, Herbert, and Robert C. Osborn. MISSILE MADNESS. Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1970. [93] p. illus.
UF767.S35

Describes the evolution and present status of strategic nuclear forces and discusses the emerging technological innovations in nuclear weaponry that are adversely affecting nuclear stability because of the threat they pose to assured-destruction forces. Scoville emphasizes that the arms race has led the superpowers to acquire a stockpile with a staggering overkill potential. He concludes that the only solution to curbing the arms race and reducing the risk of nuclear war is arms control.

853
Stanford University. Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace. ARMS CONTROL IMPLICATIONS OF COMMUNIST CHINA'S DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICIES. Prepared for the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Stanford, Calif., 1967. 3 v. (Its Arms control arrangements for the Far East, v. 4-6)
JX1974.S658, v. 4-6

"ACDA/IR-53."
The first 3 volumes of this study were published under the title Arms Control Arrangements for the Far East and cited as item 780 in v. 4, no. 2, of this bibliography.

Contents.--v. 4. Summary.--v. 5. Basic report. --v. 6. Annex.

Analyzes the "professed and implied policies and attitudes of Communist China toward general and specific arms control and disarmament (ACD) measures in order to determine (1) what particular measures might be acceptable to Communist China on a voluntary basis and (2) what measures are enforceable in the sense that observance by Communist China can be obtained, whether voluntary or not." The authors find that China is not likely to show serious interest in the control of nuclear weapons and delivery systems or in the regulation of support for "wars of national liberation." China's position on chemical and biological weapons, the limitation of conventional weapons and armed forces, the use of outer space, and the establishment of denuclearized zones is less certain. Probable Chinese opposition to on-site inspection arrangements would create problems of enforcing any arms control agreement, and China might insist on preconditions unacceptable to its adversaries, which would make agreements difficult.

854
Tomilin, IU. URGENT NECESSITY. Current digest of the Soviet press, v. 22, Jan. 5, 1971: 24.
D839.C87, v. 22
Translated from Izvestiia, Dec. 8, 1970.
Slav Rm

Reviews the discussion of disarmament at the 25th session of the U.N. General Assembly, pointing to continued U.S. refusal to ratify the Geneva Protocol. The failure of any NATO countries except Canada, Norway, and Denmark to approve the resolution calling for immediate cessation of the nuclear arms race and the testing of weapons is described as "highly indicative."

855
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT AMENDMENTS, 1970. Hearing, Ninety-first Congress, second session, on H.R. 16200. February 26, 1970. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1970. 28 p.
KF27.F6 1970a

Statement by Gerard C. Smith, together with memoranda submitted by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in support of the proposed budgetary amendments to the Arms Control and Disarmament Act.

856
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT AMENDMENT, 1970. Hearing, Ninety-first Congress, second session, on S. 3544 [and] nomination of Vice Adm. John M. Lee to be assistant director, A.C.D.A. March 23, 1970. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1970. 41 p.
KF26.F6 1970b

Statement by Gerard C. Smith, Director, together with a discussion of the activities of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, focusing on its role in the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) and military sales programs, the status of SALT and of the seabed treaty, and the effect that Soviet and American attitudes toward one another and their mutual suspicions can have on reaching an arms limitation agreement. In response to questions, Smith notes that he is hopeful that an agreement will soon be reached at SALT and contends that Secretary of the Air Force Robert Seamans' announcement of U.S. multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle deployment will have no effect on the Soviet attitude toward the talks. A table representing the world's military expenditures for 1969 is included.

857
Yost, Charles W. UNITED STATES REVIEWS MAJOR DISARMAMENT ISSUES FACING THE U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY. In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 63, Dec. 28, 1970: 803-807.
JX232.A33, v. 63

"Statement made in Committee I (Political and Security) of the U.N. General Assembly on November 2 by U.S. Representative Yost, together with the text of a resolution commending the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Ocean Floor, which was adopted by the committee on November 17 and by the Assembly on December 7," 1970.

Voices U.S. approval of the proposed resolution and outlines U.S. views on other issues pending before the First Committee, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD), and the negotiators at the strategic arms limitation talks. The text of the resolution is appended. The seabed treaty should be opened for signature and ratification as soon as possible. It is regarded by the United States as "an outstanding example of how an important multilateral instrument can be developed with the participation and the significant help of many countries," and as "another building block in

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the arms control structure which the world community has been seeking to erect during the past decade." On the other hand, much work remains to be done on proposals to control chemical and biological weapons. The United States supports the British approach to this problem, which envisages a separate convention for the control of biological weapons. On the matter of a comprehensive test ban treaty, the United States favors "a ban with adequate verification, which in [its] judgement must include onsite inspection." However, it will continue to cooperate "in international efforts to improve seismic detection and identification capabilities, whose role in verifying an underground test ban will certainly be a vital one." The increasing attention being given in the CCD to the question of conventional armaments is another important development. Though it "touches on the most delicate and sensitive security interests of states," the United States would like to see an exchange of views continue.

COMPREHENSIVE APPROACHES

858
JOINT STATEMENT BY THE DELEGATION OF THE CHINA-JAPAN FRIENDSHIP ASSOCIATION AND THE FIFTH DELEGATION OF THE JAPANESE SOCIALIST PARTY TO CHINA. Peking review, v. 13, Nov. 6, 1970: 14-16.
DS701.P42, v. 13

In a joint communique issued on November 1, 1970, following talks in Peking between delegations of the China-Japan Friendship Association and the Japanese Socialist Party regarding the international situation, the two parties called for nuclear disarmament and an end to the threat of war. The Japanese delegation voiced support for China's pledge not to use nuclear weapons first and for China's proposal to convene a worldwide summit conference to negotiate agreements outlawing the use of nuclear weapons and ultimately providing for their "complete prohibition and thorough destruction."

859
Senghaas, Dieter. [DETERRENCE AND PEACE. STUDIES ON THE CRITIQUE OF ORGANIZED PEACELESSNESS] Abschreckung und Frieden. Studien zur Kritik organisierter Friedlosigkeit. [Frankfurt a.M.] Europäische Verlagsanst. [1969] 317 p. (Kritische Studien zur Politikwissenschaft)
JX1395.S4
Bibliography: p. 295-316.

Contents.--Introduction.--On the relationship of politics and violence.--On the critique of deterrence.--Deterrence and peace research.--Beyond deterrence.--Postscript.

Questions the prevailing analyses of war and peace and offers the concept of "organized peacelessness" to describe the total complex of interstate structures, relations, social strategies, and motivations into which the political concept of deterrence fits. This policy must be criticized because, although its goal is to eliminate or contain war, it perpetuates violence and makes preparation for war a permanent condition. Senghaas describes the historical relationship between politics and violence and illustrates the sufferings brought about by any policy of violence. He then gives a critical evaluation of deterrence, discusses the philosophy of arms control, and presents the analytical and practical problems of peace research. Arms control stabilizes the system, but since it does not entail disarmament it does not contribute to lasting peace. He concludes that deterrence is irrelevant and a "misinvestment," bringing suffering and forcing the members of the politically young generation into a lifestyle of terror they never chose. History and the dangers of modern technology show that true peace can be achieved only by going beyond deterrence and the threat of retaliation, by giving priority to such problems as the elimination of social injustices and health hazards.

860
Shestov, V. THE MAIN DISARMAMENT PROBLEM. International affairs (Moscow) no. 10, Oct. 1970: 35-38.
D839.I465, 1970

The United States hoped to intimidate all the world by the militarily unnecessary atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The universal tide of moral indignation that resulted explains why the only agreements concluded so far on the limitation of the arms race are concerned with nuclear armament. After having produced its own nuclear arms the Soviet Union took the lead in attempting to secure agreements on their prohibition and destruction. The charge made by bourgeois historians that the Soviet Union proposes complete disarmament only to please world public opinion is absurd. The nuclear potentials of the Soviet Union and the United States are now approximately equal, and even the diehard militarists must recognize that any attack will be followed by retaliation. Nuclear disarmament, rather than the present nuclear balance, is what the world wants, but nuclear disarmament can be attained only by prefatory steps like the nonproliferation treaty, the seabed treaty, and the strengthening of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Many rightly think that the cessation of underground testing is a concession the nuclear powers should make to the nonnuclear nations that signed the nonproliferation treaty. The difficulties Americans allege in verifying a ban on underground testing do not really exist. The Soviet Union is prepared to accept control by scientific instruments, but not on-site inspection, which constitutes espionage. In addition, the Soviet Union attaches much more importance to the strategic arms limitation talks than does the United States.

861
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. ARMS CONTROL AND NATIONAL SECURITY. 2d ed. Washington [For sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1970] 33 p. illus. (Its Publication 49)
DLC

Contents.--"Arms control" in brief.--Arms control and disarmament negotiations since World War II.--Organization of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

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Surveys the field of arms control and the activities of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA). The booklet stresses the role of technology in creating both the necessity for, and the possibility of, arms control. The U.S. position on recent and current arms control and disarmament negotiations is presented, with special attention given to the strategic arms limitation talks. The final chapter describes the functions of each of ACDA's bureaus and offices.

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V. SPECIFIC PROBLEMS AND LIMITED MEASURES

REDUCTION OF THE RISK OF WAR (COMMAND AND CONTROL OF WEAPONS, ESCALATION, ACCIDENTAL WAR, NEGOTIATION, DISENGAGEMENT, NEUTRALIZATION)

862
Afheldt, Horst H., and others. [DEFENSE AND DETERRENCE IN EUROPE] Verteidigung und Abschreckung in Europa. Merkur; deutsche Zeitschrift für europäisches Denken, v. 24, Aug. 1970: 708-721.
AP30.M43, v. 24

From a chapter in Kriegsfolgen und Kriegsverhütung [The Effects of War and War Prevention] edited by Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker and to be published autumn 1970.

Reflects on the results of this rigorously scientific research by a group from the Research Institute of the Society of German Scientists speculating on the shape of a war fought in Europe, specifically on West German soil. The authors conclude that none of the existing nuclear strategies offer sufficient guarantees against an escalation of military conflicts leading to major nuclear war. (Translation of supplied abstract, modified)

863
Beattie, Robert R., and Lincoln P. Bloomfield. CASCON: COMPUTER-AIDED SYSTEM FOR HANDLING INFORMATION ON LOCAL CONFLICTS; SUMMARY REPORT. Prepared for U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. [Cambridge, Arms Control Project, Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology] 1969. 2 v.
UA11.B35

"ACDA/WEC-141."

Describes a computerized system designed to assist in the understanding and control of local conflicts. The authors outline the theoretical foundations of this system, explain how it works, and relate a practical exercise in which it was tested. They conclude that the system demonstrates the feasibility of utilizing computers in the control of local conflict and recommend that this system be expanded and made more flexible to increase its effectiveness.

864
Bolt, Beranek, and Newman, inc. Browne and Shaw International Studies Division. THE CONTROL OF LOCAL CONFLICT: CASE STUDIES. Prepared for the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Waltham, Mass., 1969. 4 v. illus.
DLC

"ACDA/IR-154."

Contents.--v. 1. Summary report.--v. 2. Latin American case studies.--v. 3. Middle East and North African case studies.--v. 4. Far Eastern case studies.

Analyzes local conflicts through 13 case studies intended to promote understanding and control of local conflicts in the developing countries. Each case study consists of a brief historical narrative, a structural analysis within the framework of previous Massachusetts Institute of Technology studies of conflict control, a summary of the implications for conflict control, and an appendix describing the weaponry available for use. The general findings for the 13 studies considered as a whole are presented in the summary report.

865
Duchêne, François. [SALT, OSTPOLITIK, AND THE LIQUIDATION OF THE COLD WAR] SALT, die Ostpolitik und die Liquidierung des Kalten Krieges. Europa-Archiv, v. 25, Sept. 10, 1970; 639-653.
D839.E86, v. 25

The strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) and the Ostpolitik negotiations fall within the same political category in that the former aims to legitimize the status quo between the world powers, and the latter, the status quo between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Soviet Union. The world's new awareness of the rules of the deterrence game, the interest of both parties in a security based on "stable" nuclear balance, and the tremendous costs of the arms race have led to SALT. The talks have made it clear that a permanent dialogue between the world powers is essential and could even offer the possibility of a modus vivendi with China. Some Europeans fear SALT will estrange Europe and the United States and that the Soviet Union will become a participant in the Western nuclear policy through SALT at the same time that its influence on Europe is being strengthened by Germany's Ostpolitik. However, the European majority welcomes both rounds of negotiations as means to end the cold war, acquire stability, and end the nuclear arms race. It is Europe's task to profit from the possibilities of détente without losing the security balance.

866
Falk, Richard A. RENUNCIATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS USE. In Nuclear proliferation: prospects for control. Edited by Bennett Boskey [and] Mason Willrich. New York, Published for the American Society of International Law [by] Dunellen Co., 1970. p. 133-145. JX1974.7.N83

Renunciation of the first use of nuclear weapons by the United States would further both U.S. and

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world interests. Although the Soviet Union and Communist China have already taken this step and a majority of U.N. members have expressed their support, the United States has thus far refused to renounce the option to initiate nuclear warfare. The Government contends that to do so would work to the relative disadvantage of the United States vis-a-vis Russia and China by rendering Western Europe vulnerable to a conventional Soviet attack and by undermining the U.S. commitment to non-European nations. Moreover, the Government is reluctant to cast a shadow over its previous use of atomic weapons against Hiroshima and Nagasaki and unwilling to limit its options in a future crisis. All of these arguments are questionable, however, and there is good reason to believe that U.S. commitments to Western Europe and the rest of the world could be maintained just as effectively without the nuclear option. Renunciation would reduce the likelihood of nuclear war, slow down the arms race, and encourage the reduction of nuclear stockpiles.

867
Herbert, Hugo. [THE CONFERENCES] Die Konferenzen. Revue militaire générale; general military review, no. 9, Nov. 1970: 546-561.
U2.R48, 1970
Includes summaries in English and French.

Despite the United Nations failure to prevent conflicts, the widening of the economic gap between East and West, and the mistrust prevailing between the Soviet Union and the United States, some countries, working through conferences, continue trying to curb the arms race. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) has already worked out the nonproliferation treaty and is now considering the question of nuclear emplacement on the seabed and ocean floor. At the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) the United States is discussing ways to reduce the risk of war with the Soviet Union and to maintain the balance of power. Even if the talks result in an arms limitation agreement, many problems will remain. Indeed, Communist China's absence from SALT could further aggravate these problems and adversely affect an agreement. CCD and SALT have created a propitious atmosphere for a pan-European conference, which would discuss, among other issues, the renunciation of force, the German question, and general technological and scientific cooperation. Reaching agreement on any of these issues will be difficult, with the possible exception of scientific and technological cooperation. If CCD and SALT fail, and if the proposed pan-European conference does not materialize, the world's population will continue to live under the threat and fear of nuclear holocaust.

868
Honan, William H. RUSSIAN AND AMERICAN PILOTS PLAY 'CHICKEN.' New York times magazine, Nov. 22, 1970: 25-27, 103, 105-106, 108, 110, 112-116.
AP2.N6575, 1970

Describes the "hair-raising game of confrontation, surveillance and occasional brinkmanship" that is being played between Soviet pilots, dispatched from the U.S.S.R. or Egypt to keep an eye on the U.S. 7th Fleet, and the U.S. Navy airmen who must intercept and shadow them. In the event of war, the Soviet Union would have to know the whereabouts of the U.S. fleet in order to bring its cruise missiles to bear. The fleet, on the other hand, must be able to intercept incoming potentially hostile aircraft before they can locate U.S. surface forces or attack them. According to a Navy spokesman, despite appearances these measures of surveillance, interception, and escort are not provocative. On the contrary, they help to minimize the chances of surprise and hasty action on either side.

869
Lang, Daniel. THE SUPREME OPTION. New Yorker, v. 46, Jan. 9, 1971: 52-61.
AP2.N6763, v. 46

Reports the results of an investigation to find out why the United States has refrained from using nuclear weapons in the Vietnam War so far and whether this policy is ever likely to be reversed. Lang describes the views of Government officials, military men, legislators, and academics on the political consequences, military practicality, and morality of the use of these weapons and on the role of the President in making decisions of this nature, with special attention to the influence of his personal attitudes on the outcome. Lang found no one willing to advocate the use of nuclear weapons, and "practically everybody" doubted that they would be used. On the other hand, many of those interviewed stress the point that the Vietnam War is an unusual one, with many unexpected twists and turns in the past. "To sum up, there is no certainty that [the United States] won't drop an atomic bomb on Indo-China."

870
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Center for International Studies. Arms Control Project. ARMS CONTROL AND LOCAL CONFLICT. Cambridge, Mass., 1970. 3 v. illus. DLC

Contents.--v. 1. Summary, by Lincoln P. Bloomfield and Amelia C. Leiss.--v. 2. Anticipating conflict-control policies: the "CONEX" games as a planning tool, by Lincoln P. Bloomfield with Cornelius J. Gearin and James L. Foster.--v. 3. Arms transfers to less developed countries, by Amelia C. Leiss with Geoffrey Kemp and John H. Hoagland, Jacob S. Refson, and Harold E. Fischer.

Two studies on the problem of preventing or controlling local conflict, with recommendations for U.S. policy in the early 1970's. Volume 2 reports on four professional-level political-military exercises conducted at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology between September 1968 and September 1969. The authors find that these exercises demonstrated the existence of a post-Vietnam syndrome, a reluctance to intervene in future local conflicts for fear that this might lead to another Vietnam War. They warn against overreacting against the failure of the Vietnam intervention. Alternative forms of unilateral and multilateral intervention that might avoid past mistakes are examined. Volume 3 analyzes the transfer of conventional arms to some 52 less developed countries since 1945. The authors discern a quantitative plateau in arms transfers but a steady trend toward modernization. They examine various patterns

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among both donors and recipients and conclude that no simple relationship exists between arms transfers and local conflicts; consequently U.S. arms transfers and military training and assistance need not be incompatible with a policy of controlling local conflict.

871
Mikhailov, V. THE SECURITY OF NATIONS AND ITS FOES. Reprints from the Soviet press, v. 11, Oct. 16, 1970: 8-15. DK266.A2R37, v. 11
Translated from Pravda, Sept. 20, 1970.
Slav Rm

The reception of the Soviet-West German renunciation-of-force treaty shows that the world public considers it the logical sequel to the main trends in postwar developments and the product of the collective peaceloving efforts of the Socialist countries. Of course the treaty evoked hostile reactions as well. There are two main groups of ill wishers: in West Germany, the forces, personified by Strauss and von Thadden, that flourished during the cold war, and, across the Atlantic, those circles that profit from the existence of tensions in Europe. Peking's propagandists use the same arguments as the West German revanchists. While the imperialist yellow press tries to whip up anticommunism, the Peking propaganda machine raises the bogey of German imperialism. The men in Peking fail to see the broad popular movement in all European countries, West Germany included, that has made it impossible to continue the old order. Peking's nervousness is obviously caused by brightening prospects for the normalization of relations among nations. Now Chinese leaders have adopted from imperialist propaganda the absurd theme that the Soviet Union is untying its hands in the West so as to confront China.

872
Rubinstein, Amnon. A PLAN FOR THE SINAI--'SOMETHING LESS THAN PEACE IN RETURN FOR SOMETHING LESS THAN TOTAL WITHDRAWAL.' New York times magazine, Jan. 17, 1971: 12-13, 32, 34, 36-37, 39.
AP2.N6575, 1971

Proposes that the Sinai Peninsula be demilitarized as a first step toward permanent peace between Egypt and Israel. Amnon bases his reasoning on the belief that there are no inherent conflicts of interest between the two countries. Egypt's original attitude toward the dispute over Palestine was one of strict neutrality, and it became involved in the conflict on the side of the Palestinians only as a result of a miscalculation on the part of the Farouk government. Demilitarization would give both sides the security they need to work out a normalization of relations.

873
Schwarz, Urs. CONFRONTATION AND INTERVENTION IN THE MODERN WORLD. Dobbs Ferry, N.Y., Oceana Publications, 1970. 218 p.
UA11.S34
Includes bibliographical references.

Examines confrontation and intervention as doctrine and as practice. Schwarz identifies 23 confrontations that have taken place since World War II, beginning with the Berlin blockade and extending to the Sino-Soviet dispute, and he notes that as a strategy to limit the use of force it leaves much to be desired. He traces the pattern of U.S. intervention along the lines of the Truman doctrine, the Eisenhower doctrine, and the Nixon doctrine. In his foreword Milton Katz states, "Schwarz stresses the potential implications of the Nixon doctrine as a new departure in U.S. policy, but he reminds us that more is required than statements in Washington to realize the potentialities."

874
Watt, D. C. BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS AND THE AMERICAN MILITARY WITHDRAWAL FROM GERMANY. In Royal United Service Institution, London. Journal, v. 115, June 1970: 42-44. illus.
U1.R8, v. 115

Outlines options open to the European members of NATO in the face of imminent U.S. military withdrawals. Watt concludes that since all NATO members are faced with similar economic and political problems, and all are attempting to reduce or peg military expenditures and commitments, the whole European defense structure will have changed by the late 1970's. Not only will there be fewer American troops in Europe, but there will also be fewer European troops committed to NATO. Identical problems are confronting the Warsaw Pact powers, however, necessitating reductions in their military efforts in Eastern Europe. Can these pressures be harnessed to achieve a balance of forces at a lower level through negotiated balanced force reductions (BFR)? Given the Soviet Union's budgetary and strategic problems, it should be interested in BFR proposals, with the condition that Moscow's suspicions regarding West Germany's aims in Eastern Europe be alleviated through the success of West Germany's Ostpolitik.

875
Wieck, Hans-Georg. [POLITICAL AND MILITARY PROBLEMS OF MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS] Politische und militärische Probleme ausgewogener Truppenreduzierungen in Europa. Europa-Archiv, v. 25, Nov. 25, 1970: 807-814.
D839.E86, v. 25

It is essential to deal with the political and military questions regarding mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR) while ensuring that the solution of one problem does not further complicate the other. Along with the strategic arms limitation talks, the Bonn-Moscow treaty, and the four-power talks on Berlin, the MBFR approach strives to find peace in a modus vivendi between East and West. Although détente is imminent, the maintenance of NATO and of efforts to unite Europe remain important. Politically an agreement on MBFR envisions achieving political and military balance in Europe, while at the same time maintaining security and reducing defense costs. The East stresses a European security conference and wishes to reduce only the armed forces stationed abroad, whereas the West wants overall troop reductions. NATO has undertaken preliminary studies and set up models to solve the military-political problems. An optimum MBFR agreement would remove

the aggressive potential of the Warsaw Pact countries. A less ideal but positive agreement would at least reduce offensive components to permit reduction of defense expenditures and improve the general atmosphere; and a limited approach would curtail the freedom of action of the Warsaw Pact countries and move toward a reduction of the present level of armed forces.

CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS

876
Alia, Josette. [THE MERCHANTS OF DEATH] Les marchands de mort. Nouvel observateur, no. 313, Nov. 19, 1970: 24-25.
AP20.02, 1970

In less than 5 years France has become a major arms exporter. The turning point in French arms production and trade came in 1956, when Dassault began production of the Mirage aircraft and France quickly found a market for its new jet in the Near East and Greece, Portugal, and Spain. If French arms shipments to European, African, and Latin American countries continue at their present rate, France will deliver $3.6 billion worth of aeronautical material in the next 5 years. Indeed, French helicopters have been sold to the United States for the first time, and an arms contract with West Germany has already opened to French arms merchants a large European market traditionally reserved for the Americans.

877
Blumenfeld, Yorick. INTERNATIONAL ARMS SALES. Editorial research reports, v. 2, Sept. 2, 1970: 649-666. H35.E35, v. 2

A history and analysis of the world arms trade, focusing on the period since World War II. Blumenfeld notes that although the United States and the Soviet Union continue to dominate arms sales, the smaller industrialized nations have significantly increased their proportion of this profitable business in recent years. He reviews the failures of various attempts to regulate arms sales and foresees bleak prospects for effective controls in the near future.

878
Gibert, Stephen P., and Wynfred Joshua. GUNS AND RUBLES; SOVIET AID DIPLOMACY IN NEUTRAL ASIA. [New York, American-Asian Educational Exchange, c1970] 60 p. (American-Asian educational exchange. Monograph series, 6)
HC412.G55
Bibliography: p. 57-58.

Contents.--Neutral Asia in Soviet aid policy.--The wedge in the Northern Tier: Afghanistan.--Great Power rivalry in the South Asian subcontinent.--Balance sheet of frustration: Indonesia.--The minor recipients.--Guns and rubles: patterns and prospects.--Appendices.

Examines Soviet aid to the neutral countries of Asia. The authors stress that the Soviet Union itself has furnished almost all the military assistence these countries have received. They contend that the replacement of Khrushchev by Brezhnev and Kosygin did not change Soviet aid policy in the Third World.

879
Guha, S. B. PAKISTAN'S AIR POWER. In Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. Journal, v. 2, Oct. 1969: 124-149.
UA840.I55, v. 2

Assesses the strength of the Pakistani Air Force and speculates on future sources of foreign military assistance for Pakistan. Its limited industrial and technological base will prevent Pakistan from developing and producing sophisticated military aircraft for 10 to 20 years. Pakistan has received substantial military aid from the United States and China in the past, and is currently receiving military aircraft from the Soviet Union. In the future, however, it will be much more difficult for Pakistan to purchase costly combat aircraft abroad, due to a serious balance-of-payments deficit, the needs of donor countries, and mounting Great Power rivalries, although future deliveries by these powers should not be ruled out altogether. Great Britain, France, West Germany, Italy, Sweden, or Iran could become alternate suppliers of military aircraft for Pakistan. The author asserts that Pakistan's Air Force will maintain its current strength of 16 combat squadrons for the next 10 years.

880
Lipton, Merle. BRITISH ARMS FOR SOUTH AFRICA. World today, v. 26, Oct. 1970: 427-434.
D410.W63, v. 26

A storm of protest has forced the British Government to backtrack on its announced intention to resume the sale of arms to the Union of South Africa. The retreat and delay are good indications of Tory sensitivity to Commonwealth and U.S. criticism, but a South African request for clarification of the Simonstown Agreement, which lays down the terms of British-South African military cooperation, was an additional reason for postponing a decision. The South Africans want the arms embargo lifted and the agreement amended to insure that a supply of British arms will be forthcoming even after a change of British governments. They would also like to see the agreement broadened into something like a defense alliance. British economic interests on both sides of the Zambesi are certain to affect the final outcome. The usefulness of the Simonstown base for the protection of tanker routes around the Cape is another important factor, though the British certainly put less value on the base than the South Africans put on having them there. To both South Africa and the Black African states, the issue, which may not amount to much in real military terms, has assumed a symbolic significance. Much depends on the course of British relations with Black Africa. Many Torys would not mind seeing a breakup of the Commonwealth; others would hate to see it destroyed, particularly by the ugly race issue. Besides, the Commonwealth still might serve as a backup if Britain should fail to get into the European Economic Community. It remains to be seen what the British will do. Though it would be embarrassing for the Conservatives to back down, they might yet do so.

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881
Martin, Laurence W. THE ARMS TRADE. Listener, v. 84, Aug. 27, 1970: 274-275.
AP4.L4165, v. 84

Summarizes and analyzes recent trends in the direction and composition of the international arms trade; examines economic, political, military, and strategic factors governing the supply of, and demand for, arms; and concludes that arms sales are the result rather than the cause of international conflict. The arms trade "has good or bad, stabilising or destabilising, dangerous or reassuring effects, according to the circumstances."

882
Thorne, Christopher. THE QUEST FOR ARMS EMBARGOES: FAILURE IN 1933. Journal of contemporary history, v. 5, no. 4, 1970: 129-149.
D410.J66, v. 5

Examines the 1933 British embargo on the sale of arms to Japan and China with the intention of revealing some of the current difficulties facing those responsible for halting or permitting the flow of arms shipments.

883
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs. AIRCRAFT SALES IN LATIN AMERICA. Hearings, Ninety-first Congress, second session. April 29 and 30, 1970. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1970. 27 p.
DLC

Testimony of John H. Crimmins, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, and Eugene A. Massey, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State, on the possible sale of A-4 and F-5 aircraft to Argentina, Colombia, Chile, and Brazil. Crimmins contends that the sale of these subsonic and transsonic aircraft would not cotribute to an arms race in Latin America, since the states involved would probably purchase supersonic French and British aircraft if they were unable to obtain the desired U.S. aircraft. He presents figures on the cost and performance of various aircraft being considered for purchase by Latin American governments and compares the credit terms of U.S., French, and British companies and governments. He and Massey argue that the sale of A-4 and F-5 aircraft accords with congressional restrictions on military sales and assistance to Latin America since it would be in the interest of national security to maintain good relations with those states requesting U.S. aircraft.

884
U.S. Dept. of Defense. MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND FOREIGN MILITARY SALES FACTS. [Washington] 1970. 26 p. illus. DLC
Issued by the Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs.

A statistical and narrative summary of U.S. military assistance and sales programs from 1950 to 1970 that includes numerous tables and graphs showing the distribution of funds by geographical area, function, and type. In the past, the Military Assistance Program has served U.S. national interests well, enhancing its security and promoting its foreign policy. Its importance is increasing, because the Nixon Doctrine places greater emphasis on the contributions of allied and friendly countries to their own and common defense. However, unless the United States can provide many of these countries with additional training and equipment, its policy of decreasing its direct involvement will fail. In short, the Nixon Doctrine will require more, not less, military assistance, and current trends toward less aid are inconsistent with U.S. foreign policy objectives. "Both the impact of past cuts in annual budget requests and limited present fund availability are inhibiting factors in efforts to put the Military Assistance Program, in conjunction with U.S. credit financed military sales, to optimum use in facilitating the assumption of greater self-defense responsibilities by allied and friendly forces." Military sales will be substituted for grant aid whenever possible, and a growing number of countries, including Japan, Germany, France, Norway, Belgium, Denmark, Italy, Netherlands, and Great Britain, have already made the change-over. However, this advantageous shift from assistance to sales has not been accompanied by an increase in total U.S. military exports. It is also important to note that sales to the more industrialized nations have dropped off, while sales to the underdeveloped countries have increased.

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

885
Brooks, David B., and Henry R. Myers. PLOWSHARE EVALUATION. In Nuclear proliferation: prospects for control. Edited by Bennett Boskey [and] Mason Willrich. New York, Published for the American Society of International Law [by] Dunellen Co., 1970. p. 87-101. JX1974.7.N83

Discusses the economic utility of specific Project Plowshare applications. The authors are skeptical of using nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, noting that it will not be "sufficient to justify an explosives development program other than one whose principal objective is to achieve a nuclear weapons capability." They conclude that the economic utility of nuclear explosives has not been established for any proposed Plowshare applications. The Soviet Union generally supports a program with goals similar to those of the Plowshare program.

886
Bunn, George. HORIZONTAL PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. In Nuclear proliferation: prospects for control. Edited by Bennett Boskey [and] Mason Willrich. New York, Published for the American Society of International Law [by] Dunellen Co., 1970. p. 29-37. JX1974.7.N83

Articles 1 and 2 of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty (NPT), which prohibit nuclear powers from transfering nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices "to any recipient whatsoever" and from assisting nonnuclear states in the manufacture of nuclear weapons, and which oblige nonnuclear states not to receive nuclear weapons, would not interfere with NATO's present arrangements for

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the defense of the United States and its allies against enemy nuclear attack. The superpowers have agreed that these provisions do not apply to the deployment of, or control over, nuclear weapons in allied territories. The NPT would, however, prohibit transfer of nuclear weapons to a multilateral force of surface vessels controlled by the alliance. The treaty prohibits the transfer of nuclear-tipped ABM's to NATO control but would permit a U.S. ABM system designed to protect alliance members to be deployed on their territory provided it remained under U.S. control, and it would allow the transfer of nuclear delivery vehicles to NATO if no delivery of actual nuclear weapons took place. Finally, articles 1 and 2 would not prohibit an ally from vetoing the use of U.S. nuclear weapons deployed on its territory. The NPT could break down if India or Israel acquires nuclear weapons or if the superpowers do not demonstrate restraint through strategic arms limitation. Indeed, failure of the strategic arms limitation talks could offer the nonnuclear nations an excuse to withdraw from the treaty. In addition, the treaty structure would collapse if NATO dissolves or if no effective response is made by a nuclear power to an act of aggression against a nonnuclear signatory power. The NPT will be successful if and only if the United States and the Soviet Union cooperate in maintaining peace, exercising control over their nuclear ambitions, and keeping the lid on other states' nuclear aspirations.

887
Cassuto, Aldo. CAN URANIUM ENRICHMENT ENRICH SOUTH AFRICA? World today, v. 26, Oct. 1970: 419-427.
D410.W63, v. 26

Several factors would seem to militate against South Africa's reaping large rewards from its announced breakthrough in uranium-enrichment technology. South African uranium ores are of low grade, and the capacity of its one ore extraction plant is limited. Present rates of production scarcely justify construction of a large-scale enrichment facility, and there are few signs that steps have been taken to increase output. There is also the problem of financing. Foreign capital would be needed to exploit the breakthrough on any scale at all, but each of the major potential sources--the United States, France, West Germany, and Great Britain--has some reason or another for avoiding further commitments in South Africa. Of course, the military dimension must also be considered. The South African Government has stated publicly that the new technology will be used "uniquely for pacific purposes." If that is its true aim, then recent discoveries of high-grade ore deposits in Australia offer a more favorable opportunity than could be found at home for applying its newly acquired scientific expertise. However, considerations of strategy and prestige may prevail. Should that happen, South Africa's isolation in world affairs would only grow deeper.

888
Coffey, Joseph I. THREAT, REASSURANCE, AND NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION. In Nuclear proliferation: prospects for control. Edited by Bennett Boskey [and] Mason Willrich. New York, Published for the American Society of International Law [by] Dunellen Co., 1970. p. 119-132.
JX1974.7.N83

Nonnuclear states may be able to justify procuring nuclear weapons, depending upon the type of threat they are faced with and the capabilities of their nuclear adversaries. In light of this, the United States could play an important role in reducing the incentive to go nuclear by issuing unilateral security guarantees, establishing alliance relationships, deploying troops in threatened nonnuclear countries, or providing nuclear weapons for the armed forces of another country. Whether these "offset measures" would be adequate depends not only upon the nature of the threat but also upon the willingness of the United States to carry out these options. It may also depend upon the willingness of a nonnuclear state to accept an American military presence on its territory. Offset measures may be rejected by a potential nuclear power if it desires to unilaterally develop a nuclear force or if it wishes merely to preserve its freedom of action. The examination of specific cases will help to judge the possibility of success in applying meaningful offset measures. Sweden, which is safeguarded by its geographical isolation and traditional neutrality, does not feel threatened by the Soviet Union and therefore has no purpose in acquiring nuclear weapons. India, on the other hand, feels threatened by Communist China and would almost certainly acquire a nuclear capability unless the nuclear powers could offer to it a firm joint security guarantee. Reassurances to India may "require not only an extension of U.S. commitments, but also the formulation of complex politico-military arrangements for making good on these commitments." A U.S. policy designed to dissuade nonnuclear states from acquiring nuclear weapons would require the United States to settle disputes immediately to prevent proliferation, curb conflicts in a more or less impartial manner, and cooperate closely with the Soviet Union. Whether the United States will be able to induce others to renounce nuclear weapons development or acquisition will depend on its readiness to ensure its security by means other than arms buildups.

889
Fisher, Adrian S. GLOBAL DIMENSIONS. In Nuclear proliferation: prospects for control. Edited by Bennett Boskey [and] Mason Willrich. New York, Published for the American Society of International Law [by] Dunellen Co., 1970. p. 3-8.
JX1974.7.N83

The nuclear nonproliferation treaty (NPT), objected to by some potential nuclear-weapon states because it fails to enforce a balance of obligations between the nonnuclear powers and the superpowers and because it requires the smaller nations to forgo a weapons system that they consider essential to their national security, nevertheless offers security to potential nuclear powers in regional tension areas by providing them with an opportunity to renounce nuclear weapons and thus prevent the possibility of their threatening each other. The NPT would obviate the hopeless task of potential nuclear-weapon states' attempting to acquire a nuclear capability in an effort to deter the Soviet Union or the United States. Guarantees

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of security to these states would depend upon whether they belong to an alliance or are nonalined. Alliance members can rely on the deterrence of their superpower partners for protection against enemy attack, while nonalined states can now look to the U.N. Security Council resolution of June 19, 1970, which contains statements of intent by the superpowers to oppose aggression against signatory states. The treaty, through its provisions for the establishment of international safeguards, could also create a worldwide system of controls over the material used to make nuclear weapons. The NPT's success will not be limited to obtaining the signatures of all potential nuclear weapon states. In special cases, such as those of India and Israel, the decision not to acquire nuclear weapons would be made without the country becoming a party to the treaty. It is realistic to hope that the NPT will obtain global, if not universal, dimensions. With widespread acceptance of the treaty, it will enhance a nation's security interests to sign.

890
Gilinsky, Victor. MILITARY POTENTIAL OF CIVILIAN NUCLEAR POWER. In Nuclear proliferation: prospects for control. Edited by Bennett Boskey [and] Mason Willrich. New York, Published for the American Society of International Law [by] Dunellen Co., 1970. p. 41-52. illus.
JX1974.7.N83

Discusses the capacity of civilian nuclear power plants to supply fissile materials useful for nuclear weapons. Gilinsky describes the potential increase of plutonium production in civilian power reactors, emphasizing that the chief danger of these reactors is the possible diversion of the plutonium produced by them. He explains the limitations of plutonium and its production by light-water reactors and concludes with a survey of diversion options.

891
Lambeth, Benjamin S. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND SOVIET ARMS CONTROL POLICY. Orbis, v. 14, summer 1970: 298-325. D839.068, v. 14
Based on a chapter in The Soviet Union and Arms Control: A Superpower Dilemma, by Roman Kolkowicz and others. DLC

Unless the nonnuclear nations can be dissuaded, the chances are good that they will eventually acquire nuclear weapons. Soviet leaders, who attach a great deal of importance to nonproliferation in their hierarchy of disarmament interests, will come to find nuclear proliferation tolerable--and even manageable. Aside from West German nuclear acquisition, which they would resist, the Soviets might be concerned about proliferation, but they will not be alarmed. After all, Moscow has reconciled itself to the idea of Chinese nuclear weapons even though it considers Peking "the number-one 'adventurist.'" The problem for the Soviet Union is not whether it prefers other such forces but whether it can contain them. "On this latter point, Moscow has appeared reasonably self-assured." Despite the possibility of nuclear dispersion, the interactions in the superpower strategic relationship will dominate Soviet arms control policy. In the short run, nonproliferation will continue to be used in conjunction with such Soviet proposals as a comprehensive test ban treaty and regional nuclear-free zones. In the long run, however, the proliferation issue will become a tangible politicomilitary problem. Moscow will resist proliferation in some cases and tolerate it in others, depending upon how it affects Soviet national interests. In either case, Soviet attitudes toward strategic arms control will be guided less by nuclear proliferation than by such traditional factors as internal pressures and conflicts, economic incentives and disincentives, and Moscow's sense of "strategic logic."

892
NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: PROSPECTS FOR CONTROL. Edited by Bennett Boskey [and] Mason Willrich. New York, Published for the American Society of International Law [by] Dunellen Co., 1970. xvi, 191 p. JX1974.7.N83
"Notes": p. 173-185.

Discusses the political, military, technical, and administrative problems raised by the nuclear nonproliferation treaty and examines some of the treaty's possibilities as interpreted "by a diverse group of highly qualified experts." The purpose of the collection of papers is to foster public understanding of the problems of proliferation, describe the possible solutions of the issues involved, and outline the long-term prospects for the treaty's success or failure.

893
NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND INDIA'S SECURITY. Editor: K. Subrahmanyam. In Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. Journal, v. 3, July 1970: i-vi, 1-125. UA840.I55, v. 3

Contents.--Introduction.--The role of nuclear weapons in international relations, by K. Subrahmanyam.--China's advanced weapons development programme, by S. K. Ghosh.--Outlook for the seventies: strategic and technological, by K. Subrahmanyam.--Nuclear costs.--Costing of nuclear weapons programme, by K. Subrahmanyam.--Proposals of Dr. Sarabhai.--The path to nuclear capability, by K. Subrahmanyam.--Options for India, by K. Subrahmanyam.--Pakistan's atomic energy programme, by S. B. Guha.

Papers presented at a seminar on "Nuclear Weapons and India's Security," held May 10, 1970, and sponsored jointly by the Indian Council of World Affairs and the Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses for the benefit of Members of Parliament, members of the academic and scientific communities, Government officials, and retired civil servants and military officers. Additional articles highlight the international, strategic, technological, and economic issues in the current Indian nuclear weapons debate. While an overwhelming majority of the seminar's participants called for the development of nuclear weapons by India, a small minority pleaded against Indian acquisition.

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894
Patil, Raghavendra L. M. INDIA--NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS. Delhi, National [Publishing House, 1969] 338 p.
UA840.P2914
Bibliography: p. 127-338.

Includes a brief survey of India's policy on nuclear weapons and disarmament; statistical data on the cost of nuclear weapons and the status of nuclear-power industries; and domestic, foreign, and international documents on major international nuclear issues. Almost half the book consists of 3,000 unannotated bibliographic entries selected from domestic and foreign books, periodicals, and newspapers published between 1955 and 1968. The topics covered in the bibliography are as follows: nuclear strategy; politics among nuclear-weapon states; nuclear weapons and arms control and disarmament, international law, outer space, and ethics; nuclear problems of select countries; and nuclear weapons and political and technological challenges.

895
Rao, R. Rama. THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY. In Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. Journal, v. 1, July 1968: 12-29.
UA840.I55, v. 1
"A paper issued by the Institute in April 1968."

Summarizes U.N. disarmament efforts, briefly outlines U.S. and Soviet disarmament proposals and the provisions of the proposed nonproliferation treaty, examines the treaty's limitations, presents India's objections and reservations in light of its security problem, and considers India's policy on the treaty. If the superpowers refuse to accept India's reservations, then India, as well as the other nonnuclear powers, may well reject the treaty. In order to allay the fears of those who might interpret such a move as an indication that India had plans to "go nuclear," the Indian Government would have to reiterate that it had no intention of developing nuclear weapons. But at the same time, the Indian Government should state that it did not want to foreclose that option. If no genuine progress has been made toward world disarmament, particularly an enforceable international agreement outlawing the use of nuclear weapons, and if the country is confronted by a mounting threat to its security, India will be "obliged to reserve to herself the right of determining how best to meet such aggression, not excluding the nature of weapons in her armoury."

896
Seaborg, Glenn T. GENERAL CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY HOLDS 14TH SESSION AT VIENNA. In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 63, Oct. 26, 1970: 485-491.
JX232.A33, v. 63
Statement made before the conference on Sept. 22, 1970.

Outlines U.S. views on international nuclear science and technology, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system, peaceful applications of nuclear explosives, and the use of nuclear techniques to increase world food productivity. In regard to the IAEA safeguards system, Seaborg stresses the great importance that the United States attaches to the two "key principles" of "independent verification by the Agency" and "the principle that the Agency shall make full use of national systems of control in carrying out safeguards." He also gives a U.S. endorsement to "the present system of financing Agency safeguards costs under the Agency's regular budget." On the question of peaceful applications of nuclear explosives, he expresses U.S. approval of Agency efforts to promote the exchange and dissemination of information and to define the scope of its responsibilities under Article V of the nonproliferation treaty.

897
A STRATEGY FOR INDIA FOR A CREDIBLE POSTURE AGAINST A NUCLEAR ADVERSARY. New Delhi, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses [c1968] 13 p.
UA840.S7
"A contributed paper."

While India's first objective should be to effect an international agreement outlawing the use of nuclear weapons, it must keep its nuclear option open by investing in research and development on delivery and warhead systems and by stockpiling fissile material. A credible strategy might also include a limited civil defense program, a capability to communicate directly with the superpowers, and constitutional amendments to ensure continuity in government. India should avoid guarantees and alliances, but at the same time it "has to highlight the stake [it] constitutes to the two superpowers." If the prospects for a no-first-use agreement appear dim and if the Chinese Communist nuclear threat becomes a reality, then India should be prepared to deploy operational nuclear weapons.

898
United Nations. Secretary General, 1961- (Thant) EFFECTS OF THE POSSIBLE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE SECURITY AND ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS FOR STATES OF THE ACQUISITION AND FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF THESE WEAPONS. Report of the Secretary-General transmitting the study of his consultative group. New York, 1968. 76 p. illus. (United Nations. [Document] A/6858) JX1977.A2 A/6858
"United Nations publication. Sales no.: E68.IX.1."
At head of title: Department of Political and Security Council Affairs.
Includes bibliographical references.

A technical report prepared by a group of consultant experts, focusing on the destructive power, costs, and economic and security implications of nuclear weapons. The report includes a brief assessment of damage inflicted on Hiroshima and Nagasaki; estimates of the physical effects of nuclear detonations on specific population centers, economies, and major military targets and of the destructive power of tactical nuclear weapons in battle zones; and a brief survey of the history of nuclear weapons. The annexes contain descriptions of the technical characteristics of nuclear explosions and of the genetic effects of nuclear radiation and calculations of the cost of developing nuclear warhead and delivery systems. The report

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"unhesitatingly concludes from the considerations that have been set out that whatever the path to national and international security in the future, it is certainly not to be found in the further spread and elaboration of nuclear weapons." Agreements halting the spread of nuclear weapons and reducing existing nuclear arsenals would be powerful steps in the right direction. However, genuine security can be achieved only through eliminating all such weapons and banning their use. Additional nuclear-free zones, a comprehensive test ban treaty, and measures safeguarding the security of the nonnuclear states would contribute significantly to the objectives of the nonproliferation treaty and to the dampening of the arms race.

899
Wasan, R. P. NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEBATE IN INDIA: A SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY. In Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. Journal, v. 1, Jan. 1969: 142-161.
UA840.I55, v. 1

An unannotated bibliography containing approximately 400 entries selected from domestic and foreign periodicals, newspapers, studies, and documents published between 1960 and 1969. The materials explore a wide range of topics related to India's nuclear dilemma, including Communist Chinese nuclear capabilities, Indian nuclear policies and programs, the question of nuclear guarantees, and the nonproliferation treaty as it affects India's security.

CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

900
Abonyi, George. CREDIBILITY GAP ON CBW. Canadian forum, v. 50, Nov./Dec. 1970: 268-269.
AP5.C125, v. 50

A summary and critique of Mr. George Ignatieff's March 24, 1970, statement before the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, regarding Canadian policy on chemical and biological warfare (CBW). This statement was published in the Canadian Department of External Affairs journal, May 1970, and was cited as item 1690, v. 6, no. 4 of this bibliography. Contrary to the views expressed by the Canadian press, Ignatieff's statement reflected "no substantial change in the historical Canadian position, but is instead a summation of past attitudes." In addition, it dodges the issue of nonlethal chemicals and completely disregards the question of defoliants, the existence of which has tended to hinder efforts to strengthen present controls. Their use in Vietnam and the approval of their use weaken existing prohibitions. The author contends that while the Canadian Government is committed to performing only defensive CBW research, the line between defensive and offensive research on these weapons is perilously thin.

901
Baroyan, O. V. BACTERIOLOGICAL WEAPONS: A THREAT TO MANKIND. Peace and the sciences, no. 1, July 1970: 31-41. JX1901.P25, 1970

The use of biological weapons in war has become a real possibility. The United States has an active program in this field, and some Western military authorities are trumpeting the advantages of these weapons over conventional and nuclear ones. If biologicals have not been used to date, it is only because of fear that the other side may also possess them. Science opens up boundless prospects to man, but it also threatens his destruction. Thanks to the efforts of the Soviet Union, the Socialist community, and other peace-loving peoples, the threat of nuclear war has been countered with notable achievements in arms control--the test ban treaty, the outer space treaty, and some other agreements. It is true that aggressors all too often ignore the law. Though international agreements do impose some restraints, they cannot guarantee that militarists will not resort to force. The Socialist countries are a bulwark against war, and some international organizations also play an important role in the struggle for peace. But a greater contribution from scientists is needed. Only through the united efforts of all who cherish peace can the faulty logic of the barbarians and militarists be exposed.

902
Baxter, R. R., and Thomas Buergenthal. LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE GENEVA PROTOCOL OF 1925. American journal of international law, v. 64, Oct. 1970: 853-879. JX1.A6, v. 64

Contends that the conduct and statements of parties to the Geneva Protocol support the conclusion that the prohibition on chemical warfare extends to "all chemical agents having a direct toxic effect on man that might be used as antipersonnel weapons, including tear gas and other forms of irritant chemicals." The prohibition appears to extend to herbicides as well, although the evidence for this interpretation is less conclusive. The authors explore various legal positions the United States might take if it chooses to ratify the protocol, ranging from outright acceptance of the view that the protocol prohibits all irritant gases and antiplant chemicals to qualified acceptance or explicit rejection of this interpretation.

903
Bull, Hedley. CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS: THE PROSPECTS FOR ARMS CONTROL. Australian outlook, v. 24, Aug. 1970: 152-163.
DU80.A947, v. 24

Paper presented at the Symposium on Chemical and Biological Warfare held March 3-5, 1970, under the auspices of the Australian and New Zealand Association for the Advancement of Science.

The effectiveness and strategic utility of chemical and biological weapons (CBW) as agents of mass destruction have been exaggerated. They are unpredictable, slow to take effect, and affected by weather conditions. As a counterforce measure, CBW cannot destroy Minuteman missile sites or Polaris submarines. However, CBW can ensure the survivability of assured destruction forces by providing additional means of creating destruction, and it can deter initiation of chemical or biological warfare by the threat of retaliation in kind. The inferiority of CBW to nuclear weapons

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in the assured-destruction and damage-limitation roles underlies President Nixon's biological weapons (BW) ban and his no-first-use chemical-weapons policy. Because a CBW program is cheaper than a nuclear one, chemical and biological weapons have been termed a "poor man's atom bomb." In fact, a universal CBW ban "might represent a very drastic restraint on the potential military capability of poor and small nations." Although public discussion of chemical and biological agents publicizes their potential and spreads knowledge of how to use them, "it would be wrong to place hopes for [their] control on the restriction of information." The major powers contemplate prohibiting the possession of BW despite the lack of adequate inspection and verification controls. The United States has given its support to the British draft convention prohibiting the production and possession of BW. The Soviet draft, on the other hand, refers to chemical warfare as well as biological, and for this reason it is unlikely to gain acceptance without effective verification and inspection measures. Prohibition of the use of CBW was established in the 1925 Geneva Protocol, but this instrument is a no-first-use statement that only prohibits use of CBW "in war" and, through its use of the term "bacteriological," is open to the interpretation that it excludes biologicals of a nonbacteriological nature. Australia has no offensive CBW capability, stockpile, or production facilities, but its CBW policy has been open to criticism on the question of nonlethal agents. Although these agents could temper military conflict with some element of humanity, the risk of escalation remains. Thus a firebreak might be created against the deadly types of CBW if these relatively innocuous types, which governments find so convenient to use against their own people, are proscribed.

904
GAS AND GERM WARFARE RENOUNCED BUT LINGERS ON, by our Washington correspondent. Nature (London) v. 228, Nov. 21, 1970: 707-708.
Q1.N2, v. 228

President Nixon appears to be experiencing some difficulty implementing his pledge to have the Geneva Protocol ratified, limit biological research to defensive measures, and destroy existing stockpiles of biological weapons. Obstructionism in the Pentagon may be partly to blame, but there are other reasons as well. The inevitable difficulties with interagency coordination have caused some holdups, and there may be a financial explanation for the delay in turning over the research facilities at Fort Detrick to the National Institutes of Health. One is entitled to ask, however, whether the administration's tolerance of these delays is not indicative of a change of policy on biological warfare. The factors that motivated the renunciation in the first place appear not to have changed. Unfortunately, the more general question has been complicated by the matter of tear gas and herbicides. Debate on the protocol is almost certain to raise the divisive issue of the Vietnam War. The Secretary of State has informed the Senate that it is his "understanding" that tear gas and herbicides are not covered by the protocol. This position is less entrenched than a declaration or formal reservation might be, but the latter "could force other signatories of the treaty to agree with or dissent from the US position, whereas an 'understanding' presents a sufficiently low profile to be overlooked."

905
Gellner, Charles R., and Leneice N. Wu. THE USE OF TEAR GAS IN WAR: A SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS AND OF U.S. POLICY AND PRACTICE. In U.S. Congress. House. Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Development. Chemical-biological warfare: U.S. policies and international effects; report. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1970. p. 11-41.
KF32.F663 1970

"Explores the history of the Geneva Protocol and its interpretation regarding its application to nonlethal agents, the evolution of U.S. policy in regard to these agents, and the use by the United States of such agents in warfare." The authors note that the Geneva Protocol and subsequent pre-World War II disarmament talks were ambiguous concerning the use of tear gas in war, although recent U.N. votes indicate that an impressive majority of member states consider both tear gas and herbicides to be prohibited by the Geneva Protocol. In contrast, the United States has increasingly accepted the use of tear gas, herbicides, and other nonlethal agents. In World War II and the Korean War, all requests by the military for permission to use tear gas and other nonlethal agents were denied, but in the Vietnam War the United States has employed such agents extensively. When this practice was first made public, the Government justified it in terms of saving not only American and allied lives but also the lives of civilians and the enemy; more recent statements, however, justify the use of nonlethal agents in terms of military effectiveness.

906
Kanegis, Art. U.S. CBW POLICY. Liberation, v. 15, Nov. 1970: 11-19. BF1995.L47, v. 15

Condemns the American failure to implement President Nixon's November 25, 1969, renunciation of the first use of lethal chemical weapons. Kanegis sees deliberate and important ambiguities in this statement of renunciation. He concludes that the intent of American policy on chemical and biological weapons may be to disarm the President's critics more than to disarm the Nation's CBW capability.

907
McCarthy, Richard D. THE ULTIMATE FOLLY; WAR BY PESTILENCE, ASPHYXIATION, AND DEFOLIATION. New York, A. A. Knopf, 1969. 176 p.
UG447.M233 1969

Contents.--Introduction.--Humanity by agreement: arms limitations that work.--The hidden arsenal: growth by neglect.--Chemical weapons and the breakdown of policy.--Pestilence as policy.--War against food and foliage.--Mistakes that mattered.--Policy by default.--Prospects for a return to reason.

A critique of U.S. chemical and biological warfare (CBW) policies. McCarthy protests against

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what he regards as the excessive secrecy in which CBW programs have been conducted and the shift in U.S. policy since the late 1950's toward acceptance of CBW agents for use in war. He condemns the U.S. policy of maintaining an offensive biological warfare capability and urges that those facilities engaged in the research, development, and production of biological agents be converted into centers for the study and prevention of disease. He finds that changes in U.S. policy have come about through the failure of leading military and civilian policymakers to maintain an open and rigorous review of CBW programs.

908
Miles, Wyndham D. THE IDEA OF CHEMICAL WARFARE IN MODERN TIMES. Journal of the history of ideas, v. 31, Apr./June 1970: 297-304.
B1.J75, v. 31

The history of proposals for the use of chemical agents in warfare prior to World War I. Miles recounts the proposals of Thomas Cochrane, a British naval officer who recommended the use of sulfur dioxide gas on several occasions between 1812 and 1854; Lyon Playfair, a British chemist who urged the use of cacodyl cyanide against Russian naval vessels in the Crimean War; John Doughty, who in 1862 informed the U.S. War Department of the potential military value of chlorine gas; and Forrest Shepherd, who urged President Lincoln to use hydrogen chloride in the battle of Petersburg.

909
NERVE GAS. Japan quarterly, v. 17, Oct./Dec. 1970: 365-369. DS801.J274, v. 17

Contends that there is no practicable safe way of storing nerve-gas weapons on Okinawa. Several accidents involving nerve gas have already occurred, and inadequate storage facilities and handling procedures and the proximity of the main U.S. base to population centers make the risk of more serious accidents very real. Neither the American Government nor its people appear to appreciate this threat to Okinawans.

910
Polanyi, John C. CBW--WHAT HOPE FOR RESTRAINT? International Journal, v. 25, autumn 1970: 766-778. D839.I5, v. 25

Comments on the conclusions of the U.N. report Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of Their Possible Use and discusses several alternatives to chemical and biological weapons (CBW) control. The report suggests that the risks involved in CBW probably exceed the military advantages and that the danger of CBW proliferation is great but that there is hope for controlling CBW. Polanyi maintains that the recent U.S. National Security Council review of CBW owed less to the political force of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency than to the mood arising from the Vietnam War. To achieve an unpoliced total ban on the production and possession of chemical weapons the superpowers could go through two stages, first ceasing all production and then eliminating all stockpiles of these weapons. Failing this, "a way to show the world that these weapons are being retained only in order to deter an opponent from using them" must be sought. The author concludes that the United States and the Soviet Union could agree to publish all CBW findings in open literature to assure that their research establishments are engaged in purely defensive research.

911
U.S. Congress. House. Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Development. CHEMICAL-BIOLOGICAL WARFARE: U.S. POLICIES AND INTERNATIONAL EFFECTS; REPORT. WITH AN APPENDED STUDY ON THE USE OF TEAR GAS IN WAR: A SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS AND U.S. POLICY AND PRACTICE, PURSUANT TO H. RES. 143. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1970. 41 p.
KF32.F663 1970

At head of title: Committee print.
Includes bibliographical references.

Summarizes the findings and recommendations of the subcommittee, based on hearings held in November 1969. The report examines the use of tear gas and herbicides in Vietnam, the submission of the 1925 Geneva Protocol to the Senate for ratification, and the possibilities for new international agreements banning chemical and biological weapons. It concludes that a universal ban on the development, production, and stockpiling of chemical and biological weapons would be in the Nation's security interest since the proliferation of these relatively inexpensive weapons threatens to undermine the U.S. strategic position; that President Nixon should be commended for his unilateral renunciation of the use of biological weapons; that "the continued, large-scale use of chemical agents in Vietnam by the United States creates troublesome political problems"; that the United States should encourage other nations to renounce biological weapons; and that facilities at Pine Bluff, Ark., and Ft. Detrick, Md., should be converted to centers for research on environmental and ecological problems. It recommends that the President should submit and the Senate ratify the 1925 Geneva Protocol, leaving the question of the use in war of tear gas and herbicides open pending a uniform international agreement on these weapons.

912
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Commerce. Subcommittee on Oceanography. DUMPING OF NERVE GAS ROCKETS IN THE OCEAN. Hearing, Ninety-first Congress, second session. August 5, 1970. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1970. 141 p. illus.
KF26.C663 1970a

"Serial 91-76."

Testimony by military and Government representatives and civilian scientists on the feasibility and desirability of disposing of 418 steel-encased concrete vaults containing nerve gas by dumping them in the Atlantic Ocean. Most of those testifying agreed that this method of disposal entails minimal risks to human and marine life, although several witnesses voiced their concern about possible damage to deep sea marine life in particular and the practice of using the ocean as a dumping ground for weapons of this type in general.

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913
Wasan, R. P. CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE: A SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY. In Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. Journal, v. 2, Jan. 1970: 365-378.
UA840.I55, v. 2

An unannotated bibliography of 175 entries selected from domestic, foreign, and international periodicals, newspapers, books, studies, unpublished papers, and documents printed between 1926 and 1970. The materials cited cover a wide range of subjects related to chemical and biological weapons, including arms control and disarmament efforts, legal issues, countermeasures, national policies and the arms race, and role of these weapons in modern warfare.

914
World Health Organization. HEALTH ASPECTS OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS. Report of a WHO group of consultants. Geneva, 1970. 132 p.
UG447.W66
Includes bibliographies.

Assesses "the health effects of the possible use of chemical and biological weapons on civilian population groups at different levels of social and economic development." The report describes the toxicology, therapy, and use in chemical warfare of the principal lethal, incapacitating, and harassing chemical agents, as well as the epidemiology of viral, rickettsial, bacterial, and fungal biological agents. The authors discuss the probable effects of various hypothetical attacks on cities of different size and socioeconomic status, together with preventive and treatment measures for both physical and psychosocial consequences.

STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION

915
ANOTHER ROUND OF SALT [editorial] Nature (London) v. 228, Nov. 7, 1970: 489-490.
Q1.N2, v. 228

The future of the strategic arms limitation talks turns on the tenor of the Soviet reply to proposals, chiefly American, now pending before the negotiators. A negative response could bring the talks to a quick halt, and some have argued that this would be preferable to lengthy, but ultimately nonproductive, discussions. The Americans, in particular, are concerned that the Soviet Union is using the talks to gain time for its bid to achieve strategic superiority. Given the inaccuracy of Soviet independently targetable reentry vehicles and the invulnerability of the U.S. submarine deterrent force, and considering that the United States will deploy more advanced offensive warheads of its own, as well as an ABM, anxiety on this score is premature. The danger that protracted discussions will lead to a worthless or even dangerous agreement may be more real, however. For many reasons, including technical ones, a workable agreement to limit strategic missile forces may be beyond reach. That is why it would be advisable to consider other measures, for instance, an extension of the nuclear test ban treaty, an agreement to limit weapons systems in Europe, or "even outrageously unorthodox schemes such as the requirement that both sides should publish fuller information about the weapons systems which exist."

916
Barnaby, Frank. FALSE PROMISES OF DISARMAMENT. New scientist, v. 47, Aug. 6, 1970: 278-279.
Q1.N52, v. 47

The nuclear catastrophes of Hiroshima and Nagasaki demonstrate that the survival of civilization and, perhaps, human life hinges on the eventual elimination of war. A vital first step toward ending war is nuclear disarmament. However, despite 25 years of nuclear terror and numerous disarmament proposals, not one nuclear disarmament agreement has been signed. Instead of moving in this direction, nuclear militarism reigns in the world today. "The whole history of disarmament reads like a gigantic confidence trick." In recent years, three new nuclear-weapon states have emerged and are now competing with the superpowers in an insane arms race. The prospects for nuclear disarmament are completely dependent on the outcome of the strategic arms limitation talks. If these talks fail to produce a meaningful agreement, and if the quest for nuclear superiority goes on unrestrained, nuclear disarmament will be unattainable, "and the world will move rapidly to the Armageddon."

917
Finch, Edward R. ARMS CONTROL IS NOT DISARMAMENT. International lawyer, v. 4, July 1970: 765-771.
JX1.I63, v. 4

While the U.S.-Soviet balance of nuclear power has kept the world free from nuclear war for over 25 years, deep-seated fear and distrust between the United States, the Soviet Union, and now China have hindered progress toward arms control and disarmament and made continuous on-site inspection a prerequisite to any agreement. Although the two superpowers might now find strategic arms limitations mutually advantageous from a domestic economic point of view, technological breakthroughs in strategic weaponry could reduce these internal pressures. And can the two superpowers afford to implement effective strategic arms limitations now, when there may be 10 nuclear powers by 1980? Apparently this would, indeed, be the best time for Russia and America to find a safe and workable basis for executing arms limitations that other nations can adopt later. Strategic arms limitations would be advantageous for both sides, provided that the strategic nuclear power balance is maintained and that such an agreement did not adversely affect existing international security arrangements. Even if the strategic arms limitation talks fail, domestic economic demands may force both the Soviet Union and the United States to reduce spending on strategic weapons. This, in turn, will increase expenditures in research and technology, leading eventually to the development of more efficient strategic arms. "It is hoped that the strategic arms balance scale will always remain nearly equal, and hopefully lighter, in the 1970's and forever, for all mankind."

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918
Freistetter, Franz. [STRATEGY AND SALT] Strategie und SALT. Österreichische militärische Zeitschrift, v. 8, Sept./Oct. 1970: 363-369.
U3.034, v. 8

Reviews the present level of nuclear armaments, their historical development, and their potential impact within the context of the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT). Strategy has always been essential; now it is no longer limited to the military, but reaches into politics, psychology, economics, science, and technology. Therefore conflicts cannot be solved on the military level alone. The Soviet Union sees in the present problems of war and strategy an era of contest between two opposed social systems, Socialist and national-liberation revolution, and the final victory of socialism and communism in the world. War is not excluded. Peaceful coexistence represents the continuation of the class struggle on the international level. The United States foresees an end of the era of superpowers. The postwar task of the United States, to bear the lion's share of defense, is evolving into a "partnership doctrine." Both SALT participants want to avoid nuclear war, clarify each other's military position, and reduce the cost of armaments. SALT is important not only because it is a quest for security, but also because it will largely determine the overall new strategic (i.e. political and social) development of our planet. Since partial solutions are dangerous, extensive research to obtain a coherent picture of the world is essential.

919
Kahan, Jerome H. STRATEGIES FOR SALT. World politics, v. 23, Jan. 1971: 171-188.
D839.W57, v. 23

Analyzes both discussions and limitations as the two components of strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) strategy capable of accomplishing the goal of the talks. The balance or mix of the components is established by determining the purposes of a strategic debate, its optimum organization, and probable results on one hand, and the importance, possible approaches, and alternate forms of bilateral limitation agreements on the other. The value of the strategic dialog is brought out in discussion of its purposes, organization, and limitations. In considering the framework to be given the explicit bilateral limitation agreements essential to SALT's success, Kahan rejects treaties and executive agreements as not immediately feasible. Although the formal treaty remains the long-range goal, the initial approach might well be informal but explicit agreements, in which each group would issue statements of its intent to take stipulated unilateral action on condition that the other side took a certain specified and related action. The possible content of these reciprocal-action arrangements is illustrated to suggest two criteria for choosing tradeoffs.

920
Karber, Phillip A. MIRV: ANATOMY OF AN ENIGMA. Air Force and space digest, v. 54, Feb. 1971: 83-84, 87.
UG633.A65, v. 54

In contrast with Soviet strategic missile systems, the American ABM and multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV) have a stabilizing effect, since they offset the first-strike potential of the SS-9 without posing a threat to the Soviet Union's second-strike capability. In the event of a Soviet first strike, U.S. Minuteman missiles equipped with MIRV's could be used to destroy the Soviet missiles that are held in reserve as a coercive, counter-city force. Thus MIRV's will enhance the U.S. deterrent, not only through their assured-destruction capability but also through their damage-limiting potential. Although the administration has been criticized for not accepting a recent congressional resolution calling for a moratorium on MIRV testing, the moratorium method has proven to be an ineffective and destabilizing approach to arms control. However, the destabilizing effects of MIRV could be reduced at the strategic arms limitation talks if the Soviets agreed to limit the number of SS-9's in exchange for U.S. limitations on Safeguard, and if agreement could be reached on a mutual gross ceiling on all ICBM's.

921
Kolkowicz, Roman. SALT AND THE KREMLIN: THE POLICY OF HOLD-AND-EXPLORE. Interplay, v. 3, Nov. 1970: 33-36.
N&CPR

Russia's willingness to engage in the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) stems from its achievement of strategic parity and its hold-and-explore policy. To a growing number of Soviet leaders, this policy, in which Moscow holds onto and stabilizes the Western flank while exploring some of the soft areas of the world, such as the Middle Eastern and Mediterranean regions, contains low risks and has been the basis for the Soviet overtures toward a European security conference, treaties with West Germany, and arms limitation talks. The Russians are reluctant to adhere to such high-risk and high-cost policies as a strategic arms race with the United States; they prefer to negotiate. Their posture on SALT stresses the uncoupling of strategic arms control problems from political issues, the exclusion of issues dealing with conventional forces, exclusive bilateral talks, and the rejection of supranational on-site inspection arrangements. Such "critical" developments as multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) deployment or the development of a credible Chinese nuclear capability could adversely affect the outcome of the talks. Although "tolerable" developments, such as the deployment of a "thin" ABM system or certain types of nuclear proliferation, would not materially affect Soviet or American assured-destruction capabilities, they could lead to rash actions, depending upon the superpowers' perceptions of the intensity and direction of such developments. Realistic analysis suggests that a SALT agreement would not profoundly alter the superpowers' adversary relationship. However, negotiations would "stabilize and formalize U.S.-Soviet relations and help establish some new rules of the game for the superpowers in the 1970s." Among the potential outcomes of SALT would be a freeze on land-based missile launchers, a moratorium on MIRV deployment, and a limitation on the future expansion of ABM systems. Fruitless talks, paralleled by increasing military technologies, would reduce the margin of negotiating op-

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tions and create a hardening of respective negotiating positions. A breakdown of negotiations might be followed by a heightened sense of insecurity and mistrust on both sides, but it "would not necessarily imply a return to a war-like international climate." The Russians do not want a breakdown since this would jeopardize their hold-and-explore policy and force them to spread their resources and capabilities too thin.

922
Nielsen, Walter. [SALT--REVERSAL OR CROSSROADS?] SALT--Umkehr oder Kreuzweg? Aussenpolitik, v. 21, Oct. 1970: 603-615; Nov.: 668-683.
D839.A885, v. 21

Discusses the background of the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) and assesses the outcome of the talks. Part I deals with the motives, goals, and strategic aspects of the superpowers. Part II considers the technical possibilities and conditions for continuing the talks, focusing on the verification problem, the technical elements of deterrence, and the weapons systems of the Soviet Union and the United States, as well as on their respective strategic, political, and ideological motivations. Nielsen believes that the time is not yet ripe for a reversal of policies entailing complete arms control and true détente, but he sees SALT as an effective political step allowing for a constructive dialog, yet only indirectly protecting the Third World. SALT symbolizes a focal point for many different developments and interests, a crossroads at which essential decisions regarding the future must be taken.

923
NO SALT ON THE TAIL. Nature (London) v. 227, Sept. 26, 1970: 1282-1283.
Q1.N2, v. 227

So far, the most encouraging sign to come out of the strategic arms limitation talks has been the evident willingness of the two sides to listen to one another. Attempts to limit strategic weapons face inherent difficulties: it will not be easy to decide which weapons to restrict, and even should the matter be resolved in favor of strategic missiles, no merely numerical limitation could protect the future against advances in weapons technology. In this latter regard, it is becoming evident that the problem of controlling military research and development will have to be dealt with directly--for example, by means of an extension of the nuclear test ban treaty to prohibit underground testing, the logical next step. Even so, no amount of discussion in the present can predict what strategic weaponry will be like 20 years from now. It might be desirable, therefore, to institutionalize the current discussions along the lines of a permanent forum for the exchange of information on military technology. This kind of arrangement could be very reassuring to all concerned. "In this sense, what matters most about the resumption of the SALT negotiations is that the two parties should agree to keep on talking. If there is no tangible agreement about which to boast, nobody needs to be downcast."

924
Perle, Richard. CRITERIA FOR THE EVALUATION OF ARMS CONTROL OPTIONS. Waltham, Mass., Westinghouse Electric Corporation, Advanced Studies Group, 1970. 19 l. (Westinghouse Electric Corporation. Advanced Studies Group. ASG monograph no. 3)
DLC

Proposes three criteria for the assessment of possible strategic arms limitation agreements: "(1) the effect on the stability of the strategic balance; (2) negotiability; and (3) visibility." Perle discusses the basic assumptions of strategic stability and the differences between static and dynamic stability. He argues that too much visibility (i.e. inspection) may be as destabilizing as too little.

925
Raven, Wolfram von. [DIALOGUE BETWEEN GIANTS: REFLECTIONS ON THE SALT CONVERSATIONS AT VIENNA] Das Gespräch der Giganten: Betrachtungen zu den SALT in Wien. Revue militaire générale; general military review, no. 8, Oct. 1970: 395-414.
U2.R48, 1970
Includes summaries in English and French.

Discusses the strategic nuclear balance in the context of increased Soviet deployment of offensive and defensive missiles and their threat to America's assured-destruction capability. Raven notes that although the United States wants to maintain the balance of terror, the Russians are building an enormous arsenal that threatens it. He concludes that an agreement to limit nuclear weapons will be difficult because technical progress cannot be halted and no superpower agreement will bind Communist China, and he holds out the small hope that the talks will lessen the danger of war.

926
SALT MAKES IMPORTANT PROGRESS--NATO CONSULTATION CONTINUES. NATO letter, v. 18, Oct./Nov. 1970: 19-20. illus. D845.2.A44, v. 18

Reports on the progress of the strategic arms limitation talks, focusing on statements by Gerard C. Smith that describe the talks as fruitful and meaningful. Of importance to NATO has been the continuous consultation between the United States and its allies throughout the talks.

927
Smart, Ian. [WHAT IS SALT DEALING WITH?] Worum geht es bei SALT? Merkur; deutsche Zeitschrift für europäisches Denken, v. 24, Aug. 1970: 701-708. AP30.M43, v. 24

The strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) deal not with any one nuclear system but with deterrence--the attempt to convince any potential aggressor that his risk is higher than his possible gain--and the strategic relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. The superpowers are well informed about each other's armament, and SALT can help clarify their knowledge of each other's intentions. In the deterrence relation the opponents' subjective evaluation of each other

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is more important than the realities of weapon numbers and kinds. Every measure that can be interpreted as protecting the civilians who are the hostages of deterrence weakens the balance of terror just as much as measures that bring into question the efficacy of weapons. Defensive and offensive missiles are ambiguous; they can be interpreted as either maintaining or upsetting the balance of terror. The negotiators at SALT must expend much effort to decrease this ambiguity, devise methods for verification, and come to a better understanding of each other's goals and intentions. The success of SALT depends not on the conclusion of formal treaties, but on the decisions both sides take to modify their own strategic arms programs.

928
Smith, Gerard C. [interview] CAN THE ARMS TALKS SUCCEED? U.S. news & world report, v. 69, Dec. 14, 1970: 62-63.
JK1.U65, v. 69

Discusses the strategic arms limitation talks--prospects for a meaningful agreement, difficulties of inspection and verification, the attitudes of Defense Department officials, and the problem of Communist China. The United States has made a thorough study of the verification and enforcement problem, and it bases its negotiating position on the results. It will not conclude an agreement that rests on mere "good faith and trust." Limitations on land- and sea-based missiles, ABM's, and heavy bombers are being discussed. Failure to reach an agreement would not be surprising or discouraging. U.S. negotiators do expect continued progress and a clearer indication of whether agreement is possible to come out of the Helsinki sessions.

929
Torsvik, Tomas. YOUTH, WAR AND PEACE. NATO letter, v. 18, Oct./Nov. 1970: 15-18.
D845.2.A44, v. 18

Discusses the effects of atomic weapons on international relations and national strategies. Torsvik contends that a genuine East-West détente is not possible until a political solution to the problem of European security is found. He concludes that the strategic arms limitation talks are less the result of the superpowers' wish for détente than of economic burdens and the uncertainty of China's intentions and that the object of the talks is to maintain the balance of power, "or at least to permit it to develop along paths that can be controlled."

930
UNITED STATES AND SOVIET UNION BEGIN THIRD PHASE OF STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS. In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 63, Nov. 23, 1970: 651-652.
JX232.A33, v. 63

Statements made on November 2, 1970, at Helsinki, Finland.

Remarks by U.S. Ambassador Gerard C. Smith and Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister V. S. Semenov on the occasion of the opening of the third phase of the strategic arms limitation talks. Smith recalls the work of previous phases in exploring "a wide range of questions relating to limiting both strategic offensive and defensive armaments and to increasing mutual understanding of some of the issues involved." The challenge of this third phase is "to translate objectives which all rational men must surely hold in common into agreed verifiable arrangements to limit strategic arms." Semenov reminds his listeners that "the Soviet Union has consistently come out in favor of the relaxation of tension in the world, the stopping of the arms race fanned up by certain imperialist circles, and the strengthening of international security," and he calls for "a constructive and businesslike approach" to the talks "from both sides."

REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

931
Abendroth, Wolfgang. [WHY A EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE?] Warum Europäische Sicherheitskonferenz? WH; Werkhefte, v. 24, Oct. 1970: 262-266.
BX803.W2, v. 24

The conclusion of the Second World War saw no peace treaty to stabilize European borders. Construction of a peace treaty 25 years later would be not only artificial but of doubtful value, since the issue now is no longer that on which the war was fought, but the East-West rivalry. Purification and definition of the European situation, however, are now politically possible. Military and nuclear dangers make it advisable to change the legally insecure cease-fire into peaceful coexistence, in which the borders are fixed by international law and backed by a real security guarantee. West Germany should participate in the proposed European security conference.

932
[THE BALANCED REDUCTION OF FORCES AND THE ARRANGEMENT OF EUROPEAN SECURITY IN THE PRESENT POLITICAL CONTEXT] La réduction équilibrée des forces et l'aménagement de la sécurité en Europe dans le contexte politique actuel. Politique étrangère, no. 5, 1970: 499-516.
JX3.P6, 1970

A group study on European security and the evolution of the German problem, presented in February 1970.

In June 1970, the Warsaw Pact countries agreed to address the question of regional disarmament during the course of a conference on European cooperation and security. Does this decision constitute an important stage in the process of adjusting East-West relations? In order to evaluate the chances of the conference, it is important to extract the real meaning of this concession made by the Soviet Union to NATO and to examine the methods of a reduction of armed forces in Europe. The way in which the negotiation will be conducted and the results it will produce will determine the future arrangement of European security. (Translation of supplied abstract, modified)

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933
Ball, Robert. "OSTPOLITIK": THE ERA OF NEGOTIATION IN EUROPE. Fortune, v. 82, Dec. 1970: 68-71, 109-110, 112-113. illus.
HF5001.F7, v. 82

In signing the Treaty of Moscow last August, nine years after the building of the Berlin Wall, West German Chancellor Willy Brandt took a bold step out of the trenches of the cold war. The heart of the document is West Germany's acceptance of the boundaries established by Red Army conquest in 1945, coupled with a renunciation of force by both parties. The treaty must still be ratified by the Bundestag, which will not act until new guarantees for Berlin are reached. By accepting the status quo in Europe, the Brandt government has changed it. Bonn has gained a freedom of maneuver that it will use to establish normal relations with the Communist bloc countries. Diplomatic ties will in turn lead to greatly expanded trade and cultural exahanges. As the most powerful state in a Western Europe moving rapidly toward economic unity, West Germany will be dealing from a position of considerable strength. But Brandt's "Ostpolitik" can succeed only in conjunction with his counterpart strategy, "Westpolitik." Without the presence of U.S. troops with U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe, as one Western diplomat remarks, "Ostpolitik would become a rout." (Abstract supplied)

934
Bundy, William P. NEW TIDES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. Foreign affairs, v. 49, Jan. 1971: 187-200.
D410.F6, v. 49

What are the conditions for lasting peace in Southeast Asia? During the past 5 or 10 years, the nations of Southeast Asia have shown that they can stand on their own politically and economically. More importantly, it has become evident that no Great Power has a vital military or economic interest in the region. These developments suggest that lasting peace requires preservation of national independence, continued or improved economic progress, regional cooperation, a "common law of change" (i.e., self-determination by the nations of Southeast Asia of the justifiability of violence), and restraint on the part of the Great Powers. The Soviet Union appears to have every reason to abide by these conditions, but the behavior of Japan, China, and the United States is less certain. Although a precipitate U.S. withdrawal from Indochina must be ruled out, it is clearly in the long-term interests of the United States to encourage the new tides in Southeast Asia.

935
Caradon, Hugh M. F., baron. A PLAN FOR MIDDLE EAST PEACE. War/peace report, v. 10, Dec. 1970: 7-11. illus.
JX1901.W38, v. 10

Proposes a plan for settling the Arab-Israeli conflict. Caradon believes that the initiative for a peace settlement should come not from the Arabs, Israelis, or superpowers but from an impartial intermediary, such as Britain or France. A peace conference would be convened to deal with three basic questions: the establishment of secure and recognized boundaries between Israel and the Arab States, resettlement of the Palestinian refugees, and resolution of the status of Jerusalem. He recommends that Jerusalem be made an undivided, entirely demilitarized city with freedom of movement for all. Areas under Arab and Israeli sovereignty and administration would be separate, with a U.N. authority to ensure freedom of movement and cooperation between the two.

936
Dohnanyi, Klaus von. [EUROPE: NOW. CONSIDERATIONS ON A EUROPEAN TECHNOLOGY POLICY] Europa: Jetzt. Überlegungen zu einer europäischen Technologiepolitik. Europa-Archiv, v. 25, July 25, 1970: 487-496.
D839.E86, v. 25

The eventual success or failure of the integration of European technological research may be a portent of the fate of European integration in general. In the research area, the national governments can formulate truly European goals, which they then need to defend only before legislative assemblies without submission to the general electorate. The history of the European Atomic Energy Commission shows how the claims of national economic interests inevitably distort the concept of all-European coordinated research. In reactors, computers, and aircraft, state-subsidized Western European firms weaken each other in pointless competition to the advantage of American business. While the multinational project that subordinates vested national economic interests is most difficult to bring to fruition, success in this form of cooperation is most important. The national governments must establish goals for a European community in science and technology and establish these goals by bilateral discussion with their partners. The long-range purpose should be equality in partnership with the United States in research areas complementing the American effort. For example, Europe should concentrate on research for civilian purposes, leaving military research to the United States. American interests will be best served when Western Europe becomes a strong factor in world science and technology.

937
Domdey, Karl H., and Johann L. Schmidt, eds. [EUROPEAN SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS] Europäische Sicherheit und internationale Wirtschaftsbeziehungen. Frankfurt/M., Verlag Marxistische Blätter, 1970. 134 p.
D1058.D635
Includes bibliographical references.

Contents.--Foreword.--For collective security in Europe, by A. Martin.--On the relations between the states of both systems in Europe, by J. Orlik and W. Rasmerow.--International class struggle, Socialist internationalism, and intersystem relations, by K. H. Domdey.--The scientific-technical revolution and the necessity for establishing a general community of Socialist countries, by W. Friedrich.--Economic relations of the Soviet Union and the other Socialist countries with the capitalist states of Europe, by J. Faminskij.--Nature and goals of the expansionist policy of West German imperialism in Europe, by S. Schwarz.

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Discusses the main problems of a European collective security system and satisfactory economic relations between the Socialist and capitalist systems. Martin argues that West German imperialism poses the greatest threat to peace in Europe. East and West Germany must live together in peaceful coexistence as sovereign states having equal rights, cooperating in the fields of trade, economy, science, technology, and culture. Friedrich argues for strengthening the Socialist economy and technology so that it will compare favorably to the capitalist system as a means of safeguarding European collective security. Schwarz also sees the Federal Republic of Germany as a major impediment to peace in Europe and alleges that its new Ostpolitik merely feigns to normalize the present situation, while actually being aggressive. The December 1969 proposal of the German Democratic Republic to conclude a treaty guaranteeing equal rights to East and West Germany is a practical and constructive step toward peaceful coexistence and cooperation between the Socialist and capitalist states in Europe.

938
Esser, Klaus. [NEW ELEMENTS IN THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF LATIN AMERICAN STATES] Neue Elemente in den Aussenbeziehungen der Staaten Lateinamerikas. Europa-Archiv, v. 25, Sept. 25, 1970: 691-702. D839.E86, v. 25

Tendencies toward the formation of a bloc of Latin American countries in the sixties stemmed from a new sense of nationalism, regional and subregional integration attempts, and an increased developmental problem in the small- and medium-sized countries. Bloc-formation and diversification of foreign relations and trade partners could in the future prevent manipulation of politically insignificant countries by powerful industrialized nations. It has become clear that traditional aid programs alone do not suffice to maintain Latin America's relationship to the United States. New investment prerequisites will have to be honored, and cooperation agreements are being considered. Diversification of foreign relations entails taking up and intensifying economic and cultural relations with industrialized East European and Pacific nations and cooperating with developing countries sharing the same economic or political interests; "deverticalization" will require replacing the vertical (north-south) relations with horizontal ties. The Latin American countries are no longer content to provide and export only raw materials and food; they have proclaimed industrialization and improving their total economies as their main goals. They would favor opportunities to increase and stabilize their incomes from exports, over and above development aid. Latin America will most likely continue to play an independent role in world politics. Cuba triggered the Latin American revolution and evoked a sense of nationalism, but it has also contributed to the avoidance of a Soviet-Chinese conflict in Latin America.

939
Gordon, Bernard K. UNITED STATES POLICIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. Current history, v. 59, Dec. 1970: 321-325, 369. D410.C82, v. 59

Reviews changes in the politics, economy, and security of Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand since World War II in the context of U.S. policy in the region. Gordon finds that the United States has contributed substantially to the stability of these states, although he cautions that they are not yet ready to assume the full burden of their own defense. He concludes that the non-Communist states of Southeast Asia increasingly recognize that cooperation rather than flamboyant nationalism offers the best guarantee of independence and prosperity.

940
Hallstein, Walter. [EUROPE 1980] Europa 1980. Einleitung und biographische Skizze von Theo M. Loch. [2., überarb. und erw. Aufl.] Bonn, Eichholz-Verlag [1968] 215 p. (Neue Wege nach Europa, Bd. 1a) D1060.H29 1968

Contents.--Walter Hallstein: A biographic sketch by Theo M. Loch.--Walter Hallstein.--Europe 1980.--Europe unites--the best traditions show the way.--The creative impulses of integration.--The commission--a new element in international life.--From the European-American dialog to the Atlantic partnership.--The political union has already begun.--In the crisis: stop the clocks and continue negotiating.--The formula for solving the future is the community.--Jawaharlal Nehru--idealism is tomorrow's realism.--John F. Kennedy--the rare gift of creative political imagination.--Konrad Adenauer--the realist at the weaver's loom of European history.

Collection of the author's addresses, lectures, and speeches, in which he energetically urges European integration. Internal dangers threatening the European community are nationalism, so-called realism, and the incompleteness of the European union; external dangers are loss of American interest in Europe and Soviet activities against European integration. Hallstein's program for the next decade calls for building a political and defense community for Europe based on the experiences gained in the European Economic Community. Such a community will not only improve social, economic, political, scientific, technical, and cultural conditions in Europe, but it will also safeguard peace.

941
Hartley, Anthony. EUROPE BETWEEN THE SUPERPOWERS. Foreign affairs, v. 49, Jan. 1971: 271-282. D410.F6, v. 49

The European integration movement is faced with a race against time as a consequence of changes in the policies of the superpowers. The improvement in Soviet-U.S. relations and the diminution of the Soviet military threat to Western Europe have weakened the primary incentive to integration. U.S. support for integration is declining as the United States contemplates withdrawing its forces from Europe, and the Soviet Union has launched a diplomatic offensive intended to make integration as difficult as possible. The strategic arms limitation talks and the proposed European security conference may very well lead to agreements that will place still more obstacles in the way of in-

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tegration. The need for an American policy of actively encouraging integration is greater than ever.

942
Joyce, James Avery. PLANNING PEACE IN THE 1970'S. Contemporary review, v. 217, Sept. 1970: 131-134.
AP4.C7, 1970

Welcomes trends toward the establishment of regional peace and security arrangements in Southeast Asia, Africa, Latin America, and Europe. These trends represent a shift away from dependence on the elusive military-sanctions provisions of Chapter 7 of the United Nations Charter toward greater reliance on the pacific-settlement procedures of Chapter 6 and the provisions for regional arrangements in Chapter 8. No change may be more significant for the United Nations and world peace in the 1970's.

943
Joyce, James Avery. TOWARD ENDING THE COLD WAR IN EUROPE. War/peace report, v. 10, May 1970: 8-11.
JK1901.W38, v. 10

Proposes that an all-European nonaggression treaty be negotiated to replace NATO and the Warsaw Pact. NATO was created to meet a Soviet invasion plan that never existed, is committed to "a continuation of the Cold War and the suicidal nuclear arms race," and "by its very nature and purpose . . . must oppose nuclear-free zones, disengagement and genuine European 'unity.'" The Warsaw Pact is its complement, and neither of these military blocs could long survive the other's demise. Both are incompatible with the obligations set forth in the U.N. Charter, but a nonaggression treaty would not be. Indeed, the latter would be the very fulfillment of Charter purposes and principles in Europe. Under such a treaty, the arms race could be ended in Europe, foreign troops withdrawn, nuclear-free zones created, Germany reunified, and cultural freedom restored.

944
Kegel, Gerhard. [A QUARTER OF A CENTURY LATER; THE POTSDAM AGREEMENT AND WHAT HAPPENED TO IT] Ein Vierteljahrhundert danach; das Potsdamer Abkommen und was aus ihm geworden ist. Berlin, Staatsverlag der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 1970.
223 p. illus. D734.B4 1945snr
Bibliography: p. 221-223.

Contents.--Introduction.--The end of a difficult road.--A new map of Europe for a quarter of a century.--At the prosecutor's bench of history.--Interim balance of justice.--The overcome past and the past that still bothers.--On the great wandering of the peoples and the feigned miracle of the refugees.--Potsdam and the misery of West Berlin.--Considering division and reunification.--From Potsdam to European security--final remarks of the author, but no concluding chapter.

Contends that the West German Government and its allies used the Potsdam agreement to further their own imperialistic and aggressive purposes. The author believes that the time is propitious for stabilization and regularization of the European status quo and urges that a European security conference be convened in the absence of a formal peace treaty. The democratic principles expressed in the Potsdam agreement will remain vitally important until they are realized in West Germany as well as in the German Democratic Republic. This can be achieved by the West German working class, farmers, and all others who are interested in democratic, progressive, anti-Nazi, and peaceloving government.

945
Kray, Bruno. [EUROPE: AGAINST, WITHOUT, WITH, ENGLAND?] Europa: gegen, ohne, mit England? Kreuzweingarten/Rhld., Zeitbiographischer Verlag [1969]
219 p. D1058.K67

Contents.--Foreword.--The historic world alliance missed.--An unpolitical people.--The battle of the Marne.--Gustav Stresemann.--Paneuropa.--The superiority of seapower.--Manifest Destiny.--Scientific world politics.--The "American challenge."--What is Europe?--Europe--continent of wars.--The defeated continent.--France's European problem.--The country of the "Great Revolution."--The "Connétable."--The country of the Magna Carta.--England and the EEC.--"The new rise of the Occident."--Politics as the German fate.--Appendix.

Discusses the pros and cons of England's joining the European Economic Community and concludes that Europe can meet the American challenge only with British membership. Kray views Europe's future optimistically, since détente seems to be the general trend. However he believes that socialism will expand westward as a consequence of present developments in Western industrial society. The author warns against the diminution of individual creative initiative and overreliance on government, which necessarily becomes inefficient, consuming too much of the national product. Europe's crisis can be solved by dealing with facts rather than illusions, by making correct judgments rather than approaching problems with empty formulas and vague concepts, and by demonstrating maturity, decisiveness, and experience rather than artificial "youthfulness." Enlightened conservatism is the recommended attitude for Europe, persistent in maintaining proven truths, intelligent in testing new ideas, and versatile in adapting to modern change. Europe's first task is to enlarge the European Economic Community, and Germany must play a leading role in promoting a united Europe. Then Germany will be at peace with its neighbors and with its past.

946
Matthiessen, Gunnar. [BEFORE THE EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE] Vor der europäischen Sicherheitskonferenz. Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik, v. 15, Aug. 1970: 778-781.
D839.B57, v. 15

Bilateral agreements alone cannot exclude the dangers of war or guarantee peaceful coexistence on the basis of international law. A peace system in Europe can be achieved only by a collective renunciation of force by all European countries; this would impose the duty of common defense against any aggressor. The solution of the German question need not precede the proposed European

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security conference, since it cannot be isolated as a national problem. The relationship between the two Germanys can only be viewed in the framework of peaceful coexistence of the two social systems to which each belongs. A collective renunciation of force, based on existing political and territorial relations, can take the place of a treaty terminating World War II, and it can guarantee the sovereignty and self-determination of all European states.

947
Mehnert, Klaus. [SECURITY CONFERENCE FOR EUROPE] Sicherheitskonferenz für Europa. Osteuropa, v. 20, Oct. 1970: 657-678.
DR1.08, v. 20

Describes Soviet policy toward the proposed European security conference from 1954 to 1970 and discusses the problems of participants, place, time, duration, and agenda. Mehnert thinks it important that the keywords of an eventual Western counterproposal be defined. He offers definitions for "status quo," "territorial intangibility," "expansion of relations," and "normalization" and points to the inconsistencies regarding all these concepts in Soviet policies. The Eastern proposals contain no concrete suggestions for Europe's future and security, and it is deplorable that neither NATO nor the European Economic Community have produced a "great draft" for Europe's future. From the conference, the Soviets expect to secure their imperium and expand their hegemony in Europe at the expense of America. The goals of the non-Communist countries are security against Soviet pressure and a federal Europe without superpower hegemony. The author believes that a European security conference is in the European interest provided it does not create tensions within NATO and has no anti-American features, and if the West comes to it with good trump cards in its hand. The concessions made in the Moscow Treaty must be considered in the larger European balance of accounts, so that Germany's sacrifices for European peace will not be in vain.

948
Oppermann, Thomas. [THE RENUNCIATION-OF-FORCE POSITION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY] Die Gewaltverzichtsposition der BRD. Aussenpolitik, v. 21, Aug. 1970: 453-469.
D839.A885, v. 21

Analyzes the renunciation-of-force concept through the experience of West Germany. All countries should of course renounce the use of force toward all, but as long as the United Nations fails to secure peace, solve conflicts, or build a workable "legal machinery for peaceful change," bilateral or regional agreements offer a viable and legal alternative for improving international relations. The renunciation-of-force negotiations of the Federal Republic of Germany with East European countries are a constructive step in this direction, although there are many problems involved in solving concrete political questions, such as the recognition of East Germany or the fixing of borders with Poland.

949
Radovanović, Ljubomir. THE CONCEPTION OF EUROPEAN INSECURITY. Review of international affairs, v. 21, Aug. 5/Aug. 20, 1970: 10-12.
D839.R4, v. 21

While the convocation of a general European conference would certainly contribute to European security, there are other factors in the overall situation to which attention should be called. Will the European security conference decree the disappearance of the rival blocs, answer the German question, dismantle foreign bases and garrisons, or remove regional economic barriers? All of these measures are desirable but realistically must be considered improbable. European history is replete with demonstrations that an effective security system requires equally the removal of the causes of insecurity and the kind of international environment that ensures respect for international law and treaty obligations. Even if it were possible to secure agreements for removing the sources of present tensions, it would be necessary to ensure the permanency of the agreements.

950
Rasch, Harold. [ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GERMANS AND RUSSIANS: HISTORICAL AND CURRENT] Zum Verhältnis zwischen Deutschen und Russen: Geschichtliches und Aktuelles. Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik, v. 15, Nov. 1970: 1129-1137.
D839.B57, v. 15

The historical and cultural contacts maintained between Germany and Russia over the past 250 years will continue to be of importance. The renunciation-of-force treaty between the two countries demonstrates West Germany's genuine interest in peace and provides the chance for a good relationship while it offers economic and political advantages to the Soviet Union. Although German technical and industrial cooperation, which is based on long-term credit, runs the danger of indirectly giving military aid to the Eastern bloc at the expense of the German taxpayer, this should be regarded as an acceptable risk on the path to a peaceful relationship. Ratifying and putting in force the Moscow agreement must not depend on a desirable Berlin settlement. The Soviet Union has no interest in threatening Berlin, and Berlin's security can only benefit from the renunciation-of-force agreement. Also decisive for good rapport with the Soviet Union would be West German acceptance of the juridical consequences of political realities through its recognition of East Germany. Coming to terms with communism must not involve a Western attempt to interfere with the social order of the German Democratic Republic in any way, particularly since there are substantial social injustices in the Western world itself that need setting straight. The future of West Germany at least must be that of a third force, taking a middle course between capitalism and socialism. In this respect it is also desirable that the Federal Republic of Germany participate in the proposed European security conference.

951
Thompson, W. F. K. NATO IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN EAST

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AND WEST. NATO's fifteen nations, v. 15, Dec. 1970/Jan. 1971: 87-90, 92.
UA646.F5, v. 15

Is some new approach to European security possible? In answering this question, one must consider that the Western powers are "open societies," and that such societies traditionally are loath to assume defense burdens. One must also consider Russia's aims in Europe, which are to secure its imperial frontiers on the continent so as to have a free hand elsewhere, to drive a wedge between West Germany and the United States and force the latter out of Europe, and to attract Western investment in the Soviet Union. In this context, proposals have been advanced for an all-European security conference. The West would like to see the idea of mutual and balanced force reductions discussed; the East would prefer consideration of proposals to cut back foreign troops on European soil. Neither suggestion is realistic, however, given the asymmetries that exist between the two military blocs, and it would be far better to begin discussions by considering the establishment of an inspection and verification organization. A joint Anglo-American test of this concept 3 months ago has already shown that the monitoring of arms control agreements in Europe would be much less difficult than anticipated and could be performed by many fewer personnel. Reconciliation between the two halves of Europe is bound to be a slow process, however, and meanwhile the security of the West must continue to rest on the old foundations--nuclear deterrence and a strong Atlantic Alliance.

952
Uschakow, Alexander. [THE NEW SOVIET TREATIES OF ALLIANCE WITH CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND RUMANIA] Die neuen Bündnisverträge der Sowjetunion mit der Tschechoslowakei und Rumänien. Europa-Archiv, v. 25, Nov. 10, 1970: 791-800.
D839.E86, v. 25

The importance of Soviet renewal of the 1943 treaty with Czechoslovakia and the 1948 treaty with Rumania is political rather than military. The principle of Socialist internationalism (the Brezhnev doctrine) underlies both treaties, which consolidate the unity of the Eastern bloc economically and politically. Since 1966 Rumania had been arguing to loosen the alliance; it had refused to renew its treaty with the Soviet Union, but it was pressured into it by the 1968 events in Czechoslovakia and the latter's renewal of its treaty after hard negotiations. Both treaties encourage Socialist economic integration, stating that Socialist international law should be based on fraternal help, which, according to the Soviets, means "the right and the duty of every Socialist state to cooperate with other Socialist states in the struggle against imperialism and establish socialism and communism." The essential achievements of socialism must under all circumstances be retained. East Europe's relations with non-Warsaw Pact members are ruled by peaceful coexistence, regarded as an armistice between two systems. While internationalism has become a major social power in the West as well, there it manifests itself in efforts to raise the standard of living, overcome national frontiers, and establish peaceful relations between the people, goals not yet accomplished by Eastern Europe's revolutionary internationalism. The major military change in the new treaties is the implication that the Balkans must help the Soviet Union in case of an armed conflict with China. Both treaties also favor the proposed European security conference. Although Bucharest made it clear that it opposes perpetuating the Warsaw Pact, the treaties confirm that alliances are at present the decisive political vehicles in both East and West.

953
Vernant, Jacques. [EUROPE IN A DECADE] L'Europe dans dix ans. Revue de défense nationale, v. 26, Dec. 1970: 1858-1862.
D410.R45, v. 26

Forecasts the European political situation 10 years from now. Vernant asserts that the plan for a one-state Europe is impossible and unrealistic. The plan was bolstered by the threat of Soviet aggression and the promise of the development of a European commercial market to challenge the United States. The former is no longer relevant, the latter, dubious of achievement. He concludes that such problems as regional underdevelopment, agricultural adaptation, regional administration, and "participation" are made more difficult under a supranational authority. Supranationality would mean not a stable Europe but a chaotic one.

954
Wettig, Gerhard. [SECURITY FOR EUROPE IN THE CHANGING ATTITUDE OF THE KREMLIN] Sicherheit für Europa im Wandel des Kremls. Aussenpolitik, v. 21, Aug. 1970: 482-491.
D839.A885, v. 21

The Soviet conception of a European security conference has been changing in light of the developments in Eastern Europe since France left NATO in 1966. Because NATO was weakened by France's withdrawal, the Soviets saw the time ripe to strive for a secure Europe under their influence without the need to make concessions regarding the Warsaw Pact. The turning point came with Czechoslovakia in 1968, when the Soviets proclaimed the Brezhnev Doctrine, and the West realized the importance of NATO and strengthened it. In the spring of 1969 the Soviet Union started working for peace and security in Europe, first on the economic and technical level, perhaps to be followed by political cooperation. In domestic propaganda, however, the latter was denied, and the international class struggle and the duty of Communists to avoid "softening" the Socialist society were stressed. Such problems as Berlin or mutual force reductions will not appear on the agenda of a security conference. Moscow is trying to encourage the West to disarm, without being willing to do the same, in order to obtain economic and technical cooperation from the West. Although the proposed renunciation of force is of political and psychological importance, it does not reduce the possibility of a confrontation. The Soviet Union fears an East-West détente because the East might be too receptive to Western policies. It remains to be seen whether the Warsaw Pact memorandum of June 22, 1970, in which the Soviet Union favors the "reduction of foreign troops on territories of European states," con-

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forms to NATO's idea of mutual balanced force reductions or if the Soviet Union intends to use it polemically against the American presence in Europe. Since the Soviets want these problems dealt with by an organization that would be established at the security conference, and that would not, therefore, begin work until after the conference, the Soviet Union probably intends to dispense with one of NATO's stated prerequisites for the conference.

955
Zeller, Willy. THE NEUTRALS AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION. Swiss review of world affairs, v. 20, Dec. 1970: 7. D839.S9, v. 20

Exploratory talks aimed at determining the future relations of Switzerland, Austria, and Sweden with the European Economic Community (EEC) have begun, and they "are to be followed by subsequent treaty negotiations aimed at implementing an agreement roughly simultaneously with the actual acceptance of new members in the European Economic Community." Despite the present favorable climate for negotiations, the important and complex issue of the neutrals' sovereignty versus the EEC's goal to maintain its autonomous decisionmaking authority remains. The most difficult problem at the talks will center around whether the tensions arising from these countries' need to retain sufficient sovereignty in their economic policies to support the credibility of their neutralism can be overcome. In this context, an agreement that can be progressively expanded to permit a dynamic development toward European integration has recently gained support.

SPECIAL ENVIRONMENTS (OCEAN, SEABED, SPACE, ETC.)

956
Andrassy, Juraj. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE RESOURCES OF THE SEA. New York, Columbia University Press, 1970. 191 p. maps. JX4143.A52

Partial contents.--pt. 1. Physical and technological aspects of the ocean floor.--pt. 2. The expanding concept of the continental shelf: Extension of claims to national control over portions of the sea. The development of the legal concept of the continental shelf. A critical examination of the concept and the criteria of the continental shelf. The delimitation of the continental shelf in special circumstances.--pt. 3. Proposals for revision of the present law: Proposals for a redefinition of the continental shelf. Proposals for the control of the deep ocean space: the case for international control. --Selected bibliography.

Surveys the legal problems concerning the seabed and outlines alternatives to the present race for the nationalization of the oceans. Andrassy discusses the natural and technological factors that have caused the problems and traces the evolution of the continental shelf as a legal concept. He concludes that since no specific rules control the consequences of technological advances, the lack of an adequate legal system governing the jurisdiction of individual coastal states could engender serious problems.

957
Borgese, Elisabeth M. THE OCEAN REGIME; A SUGGESTED STATUTE FOR THE PEACEFUL USES OF THE HIGH SEAS AND THE SEA-BED BEYOND THE LIMITS OF NATIONAL JURISDICTION. [Santa Barbara, Calif.] Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions [1968] 39 p. (A Center occasional paper, v. 1, no. 5) JX4419.B58

Contents.--Introduction.--The draft statute.--Comment.--Some references.

A proposed statute to govern peaceful uses of the high seas and seabed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, together with introductory remarks, in which alternative proposals and a method of adoption are considered, and an article-by-article commentary on the proposal. The provision for the establishment of a "regime" to administer the law as adopted distinguishes this statute from other proposals. Among other things, the statute would reserve use of the seabed for peaceful purposes only, prohibit the emplacement on or below the seabed of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction, and authorize "the complete demilitarization of ocean space . . . in consultation between the Disarmament Committee, the Regime, and the Member States."

958
Daniels, Paul C. THE ANTARCTIC TREATY. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 26, Dec. 1970: 11-15. illus. TK9145.A84, v. 26

Traces the events leading to the conclusion of the Antarctic Treaty (1959) and discusses its major provisions. Daniels asserts that although a number of problems have been dealt with in the treaty, there remain others that may require international agreements or joint decisions; for example, the lack of an agreement on the exercise of civil and criminal jurisdiction in Antarctica. He advocates informal consultations among various governments as a means of reaching agreement on such problems before they reach the point of controversy.

959
Dȍll, Bernhard. [ELEMENTS OF A SEABED LEGAL REGIME] Elemente einer Ordnung des Meeresgrundes. Aussenpolitik, v. 21, Oct. 1970: 616-629. D839.A885, v. 21

Analyzes the basic political and legal elements of existing incomplete international principles that can be utilized in formulating a complete seabed regime. Although freedom of the seas is the governing principle for the high seas, it does not suffice in determining the status of the underwater regions or establishing the border between the seabed and sovereign territories of states. Models must be built to deal with the various aspects of the problem, including the economy, scientific research, transport and traffic, storage of waste materials, and demilitarization. Dȍll examines the basic principles of a seabed legal regime, their political-territorial

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manifestation, the limits of sovereign power, and the problem of responsibility and adaptability in light of the necessary changes. He concludes that an internationalization (like that accepted for the high seas and outer space) and socialization of the seabed to the optimum advantage of all countries must be the goal of the new seabed legal regime. The United States has not yet determined its position; the Soviet Union seems to be more interested in demilitarization than in establishing an international regime. Since not all problems concerning the peaceful use of the seabed can be solved immediately, Döll suggests "freezing" territorial claims in order to obviate expansionist tendencies. This interim solution will not prejudice the final agreement; rather, it will help by permitting consideration of previous international experiences in law and their applicability to a seabed regime in the interest of all states.

960
Friedheim, R. L., J. B. Kadane, and J. K. Gamble. QUANTITATIVE CONTENT ANALYSIS OF THE UNITED NATIONS SEABED DEBATE: METHODOLOGY AND A CONTINENTAL SHELF CASE STUDY. International organization, v. 24, summer 1970: 479-502.
JX1901.I55, v. 24

Analyzes U.N. debates on the seabed to determine the positions of member states on the continental shelf and the general adequacy of the present legal framework relating to the seabed. The authors contend that U.N. debate records are the best single source for a quantitative analysis of views on the seabed. They compare states on a scale of nationalism-internationalism, focusing on the emphasis of each state rather than the frequency with which it refers to an issue.

961
Glenn, William. SCRAMBLE FOR FLYSPECKS. Far Eastern economic review, v. 69, Sept. 12, 1970: 42. map.
HC411.F18, v. 69

A few months ago the Nationalist Chinese announced plans to begin prospecting for oil in international waters around the little-known, uninhabited Senkaku Islands. Although neither the Japanese nor the Nationalists have claimed sovereignty over the Senkakus, the Okinawan government maintains that they are part of the Ryukyu chain, which will be returned to Japan in 1972. Taipei contends that, as a member of the Continental Shelf Convention, and as the only legitimate government of the Chinese mainland, it has an exclusive right to prospect for and exploit oil in the Senkaku Islands area. However, there is not much enthusiasm over submitting the case to the International Court of Justice, because the determination of "whose continent is entitled to exercise control over what continental shelf" is touchy. The Control Yuan of Taiwan's National Assembly has denounced Japan's position in the dispute, asserting that the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the Potsdam Declaration forbid Japanese territorial claims. If prospects for oil look good and exploitation begins, the United States and Communist China will probably be drawn into the quarrel, but the U.S. 7th fleet is still strong enough to prevent any shooting.

962
Mushkat, M. NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN OUTER SPACE LAW AND THEIR ROLE IN INCREASING INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, v. 30, Apr. 1970: 113-124.
Kl.U753, v. 30

Both the United Nations and the relevant treaties have left the concept of outer space undefined so that no firm border can be fixed to the application of state sovereignty. The outer space treaty leaves open the possibility of justifying the passage of ballistic missiles through space, as well as the exploitation of space for such purposes as spying, which do not require the emplacing of nuclear weapons. The treaty can be interpreted as accepting the establishment of military forces on the moon and permitting nuclear experimentation there. In addition, it lacks a definition of the weapons of mass destruction and thus invites conflicting interpretations. The treaty is equivocal concerning inspection, and it leaves undefined the purport of activities "exclusively for peaceful purposes." The obligation imposed to act in accordance with international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, may actually complicate the situation. "Thus the Treaty embodies pseudoarrangements, lack of clarity, and in some cases contradictions." The fundamental question is whether the development of outer space can be properly furthered without the concept of sovereignty and the privileges it implies concerning outer space, and without defining outer space in particular.

963
Pardo, Arvid. DEVELOPMENT OF OCEAN SPACE--AN INTERNATIONAL DILEMMA. Louisiana law review, v. 31, Dec. 1970: 45-72. LL
Adapted from a two-part speech delivered at the annual Bailey Lectures in April 1970 at the Louisiana State University School of Law.

Man's rapidly expanding technological ability to exploit the ocean's resources offers immense opportunities, but it also poses a serious threat to the marine environment and to man himself, unless it is brought under the control of international law. Present international law is too fragmented; it lacks the authority to insure the maximum beneficial use of, and minimal damage to, the seas. A review of postwar international legal developments on the use of the ocean reveals three basic areas of disagreement: the basic concept that is to govern the exploration and exploitation of the seabed beyond national jurisdictions, the nature of the legal regime to be established over the use of the ocean, and the limits of national jurisdiction.

964
Pavicevic, Vladimir. THE OCEAN FLOOR--THE COMMON HERITAGE OF MANKIND. Indian and foreign review, v. 7, May 1, 1970: 13-20.
D839.I453, v. 7

A new international law must be formulated to resolve the question of the legal status of the ocean floor and its resources. The enormous potential of the ocean floor has attracted the military-industrial complexes of the major powers, and

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the nonexistence of law will permit these countries to appropriate resources far from their own shores. The ocean floor must be reserved for peaceful uses. It cannot be an object of national sovereignty, and all nations should have the right to participate equally in the benefits of exploitation and to take part in administration and research. The conception that the ocean floor and its resources belongs to everyone "opens up one more battlefield for the real democratization of international relations and the progressive development of international law." Failure to realize this goal will only lead to "new complications and negative consequences."

965
U.S. AND JAPANESE REACTIONARIES OUT TO PLUNDER CHINESE AND KOREAN SEA-BED RESOURCES. Peking review, v. 13, Dec. 11, 1970: 15-16.
DS701.P42, v. 13

In July, following the automatic extension of the U.S.-Japan mutual security pact, South Korea, Nationalist China, and Japan agreed to set up a liaison committee to facilitate the exchange of information on China, to conduct joint studies, and to increase communications on matters related to joint defense. Due largely to the influence of the Japanese militarist forces, the committee's first undertaking will entail the establishment of a joint-stock company to begin developing the "undersea oil in the water areas around China's Taiwan Province and its appendant islands and in the shallow water areas close to China and Korea." The Japanese militarists "want the people of China and Korea to surrender their sovereignty and let Japanese militarism ravage and occupy the islands and resources at will." Given Japan's rapid military buildup and its ongoing need for strategic materials, particularly petroleum, the Japanese reactionaries are eager to exploit China's rich undersea resources. They also want to annex Tiaoyu and several other Chinese islands and water areas. However, "the U.S. and Japanese reactionaries will reap their own bitter fruits if they do not pull in their claws of aggression."

966
Young, Elizabeth. OCEAN POLICY AND ARMS CONTROL. World today, v. 26, Sept. 1970: 401-407.
D410.W63, v. 26

Recent international discussions concerning international ocean policy have broader implications for arms control in general. The superpowers continue to balk at the need to demonstrate to the rest of the world their compliance with such hard-to-verify agreements as the draft seabed treaty, but the requirement for verification is likely to emerge if any agreement is reached in the strategic arms limitation talks. Nations that have not ratified the nuclear nonproliferation treaty will expect more than reassurances from the superpowers that an agreement is being observed. The newly developed orbiting satellites have turned away Washington's attention from international verification, but the advent of multiple reentry vehicles, which cannot be counted without close inspection, "may revive American interest in a problem that other governments have had in mind all along." The Canadian Arctic Water Pollution Prevention Act and President Nixon's statements on U.S. ocean policy might contribute to solving the verification problem indirectly. The extension of Canadian territorial waters and fishing zones to 12 miles and the pollution act have not only made Canada a leader in environmental control of the high seas and the foremost challenger to the tradition-laden assumption that the ethos of international law is still shipping-oriented rather than environment-oriented, but, de facto, these doctrines have also placed "something of a limitation on other States' freedom to deploy military gear." In reaction to the Canadian legislation and Brazil's extension of its territorial waters (200 nautical miles) the Nixon administration has issued several statements advocating the establishment of a system of coastal-state trusteeship and the use of the resources beyond the 200-meter isobar by all mankind. The Russians are cool to the Nixon ocean philosophy because it encompasses too much. But if pollution is to be prevented and governments are to be certain that their security is not threatened by foreign military activity on the shelf beyond their territorial waters, something like President Nixon's proposals will be required.

VIOLATION, INSPECTION, VERIFICATION, AND ENFORCEMENT OF AGREEMENTS

967
Bechhoefer, Bernhard G. PLOWSHARE CONTROL. In Nuclear proliferation: prospects for control. Edited by Bennett Boskey [and] Mason Willrich New York, Published for the American Society of International Law [by] Dunellen Co., 1970. p. 103-115. JX1947.7.N83

Describes the resources available for international control of the peaceful uses of nuclear explosives, "including the probable characteristics of such an international body and the functions it is practically certain to perform." Bechhoefer offers three hypotheses to determine the requirements for safeguards against the use of peaceful nuclear explosives for weapons development. He concludes that available controls seem adequate to prevent nonnuclear nations from acquiring nuclear weapons technology and to assure that nuclear states will not benefit militarily from such explosions. He warns that if there is no progress in controlling peaceful nuclear explosions, neither the nuclear nonproliferation treaty nor the partial nuclear test ban treaty will survive as long as 15 years.

968
Joenniemi, Pertti. ASPECTS ON THE MEASUREMENT OF ARMAMENTS LEVELS. Cooperation and conflict, no. 3, 1970: 141-151.
DL55.C66, 1970

Current techniques for the measurement of armaments levels suffer from serious shortcomings. For lack of a better standard, it is common practice to take defense spending as the best reflection of armaments levels. Difficulties arise from neglect of the multidimensional character of the

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armaments process or as a result of the general inadequacy of defense budgeting procedures. Typically, indirect costs to the community, such as those imposed by the artificial maintenance of self-sufficiency or the withdrawal of draftees from the civil sector, are not accounted for. In addition, many states intentionally conceal some part of the cost of defense. As a result, defense outlays are almost always greater than the figure reported officially. These observations are of considerable significance to defense decisionmaking, as well as to current arms control and disarmament efforts. In regard to the latter, some knowledge of existing armaments levels and the consequences of any given adjustment to those levels is prerequisite to meaningful agreement. An international organization ought to be charged with the responsibility for collecting and systematizing information on national armaments and defense budgets. In the preparation of estimates, more attention must be given to the sources of error cited above. In particular, a greater effort ought to be made to relate defense costs to the total national economy. The possibility of using measurement techniques developed in long-range defense planning ought also to be considered.

969
Palfrey, John G. ASSURANCE OF INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS. In Nuclear proliferation: prospects for control. Edited by Bennett Boskey [and] Mason Willrich. New York, Published for the American Society of International Law [by] Dunellen Co., 1970. p. 81-86. JX1974.7.N83

Rep. Craig Hosmer, a critic of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), contends that safeguards could not prevent any country from "beating the system" without much risk of exposure, but he is missing the point of the safeguards system established by article 3 of the nonproliferation treaty (NPT). The chief objective of the safeguards system is to make the likelihood of detecting violators strong enough so that any nation will think twice before it attempts to beat the system. In fact the safeguards system will put teeth in the NPT by providing for a uniform international system of controls under which signatory states would be unable to go it alone by using their own uranium and producing their own plutonium. However, ratification of the NPT by key nonnuclear nations will depend upon the outcome of the negotiations between the European Atomic Energy Community and the IAEA and the ability of the latter to solve such problems as the demand by some countries that it be impartial in its treatment of regional and national safeguards systems. Even if these obstacles are overcome, uncertainties will remain regarding safeguards, namely, the failure of article 3 to ensure against a nonnuclear-weapon state establishing a secret weapons program outside its civilian nuclear industry, and the absence of sanctions for NPT violators. Despite such weaknesses "safeguards under the treaty will be effective primarily because nations do not like to run the risk of being caught cheating."

970
Scheinman, Lawrence. EURATOM AND THE IAEA. In Nuclear proliferation: prospects for control. Edited by Bennett Boskey [and] Mason Willrich. New York, Published for the American Society of International Law [by] Dunellen Co., 1970. p. 63-79. JX1974.7.N83

Discusses the problems of negotiating safeguards agreements between the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) as required by Article 3 of the nonproliferation treaty (NPT). Scheinman reviews the discussions that led to the inclusion of Article 3 in the NPT and examines the positions of the three major groupings within EURATOM: France, West Germany, and the Benelux countries. He concludes that "the EURATOM states appear agreed not to accept direct controls by the IAEA and not to ratify the Non-Proliferation Treaty until such time as a satisfactory agreement has been reached on safeguards between the two organizations."

971
Scoville, Herbert. TECHNICAL CAPABILITIES OF SAFEGUARDS. In Nuclear proliferation: prospects for control. Edited by Bennett Boskey [and] Mason Willrich. New York, Published for the American Society of International Law [by] Dunellen Co., 1970. p. 53-61. JX1974.7.N83

Examines and evaluates the safeguarding techniques that would be applied under the terms of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty during various stages of the fuel cycle, emphasizing the auditing of accounting procedures and the maintenance of a material balance by measurements as the most desirable approaches. Several highly technical procedures to assist in accounting and in maintaining a material balance, including nondestructive assay methods, fuel numbering and identification, and tamper-resistant or tamper-indicating seals, are described. Scoville contends that only in the fuel fabrication and reprocessing stages are there serious questions about the technical capabilities for safeguards. He concludes that effective safeguards will depend upon the range of the development of new safeguarding techniques and practices, the degree of efficiency in large nuclear plants, and the amount of support given individual inspectors by the International Atomic Energy Agency when they obtain evidence of excessive losses of material.

972
STUDIES OF THE SOCIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF VERIFICATION, INSPECTION, AND INTERNATIONAL ASSURANCE. [Lafayette, Ind.] Herman C. Krannert Graduate School of Industrial Administration, Purdue University, 1968-69. 5 v. in 7. illus. JX1974.S87

"Prepared for the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency."
Vols. 2 and 5 published by Purdue Research Foundation, Purdue University.
"ACDA/E-104."
Includes bibliographical references.

Contents.--#1. A system of attitudes related to international assurance: theoretical framework and review, by R. E. Walton and others.--#2. The New York Times and the development of assurance between adversary nations; six case studies, 1961-1963, by W. L. Gould, W. Klecka, and C. Weyant.--

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#3. Content analysis, by D. A. Strickland and others.--#4.1. American college elite opinion and international assurance, by M. J. Driver and others.--#4.2. American mass opinion and international assurance, by M. J. Driver and others.--#4.3. Effects of education on American public opinion; effects of college education on the complexity and content of opinions concerning international assurance, by M. J. Driver and others.--[#5] Final report, by R. E. Walton and others.

Reviews behavioral-science findings pertinent to the organization and change of attitudes that impinge upon international assurance and determine public support for arms control measures; presents studies of attitude change, communication and persuasion, cognitive functioning under stress, laboratory experiments of social processes, and opinion surveys; and offers predictions about U.S. public-assurance attitudes toward the Soviet Union.

973
Sullivan, Michael J. INDIAN ATTITUDES ON INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY CONTROLS. Pacific affairs, v. 43, fall 1970: 353-369.
DU1.P13, v. 43

Examines India's long-standing technical and political objections to international nuclear safeguards systems, especially those of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in light of the evolving Chinese Communist nuclear threat, India's fruitless search for a nuclear guarantee, and its opposition to the verification provisions of Article 3 of the nonproliferation treaty. India has, in practice, accepted some limited external verification of its nuclear projects, but, on a policy level, it has rejected international controls over atomic energy as dangerous and discriminatory. For example, though India has accepted controls over imported fuels, it has never consented to controls over imported equipment, and even though it has implicitly agreed to the principle of international control over major power-reactor projects and has actually accepted IAEA safeguards under certain conditions, it has asserted that it will never submit to such restrictions under an international treaty. "There exists in India a significant opposition to the very concept of outside inspections by an international authority which neither security guarantees nor concessions regarding the benefits of peaceful explosions will overcome."

974
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Weapons Evaluation and Control Bureau. Field Operations. TECHNICAL PLAN PHASE II: FIELD TEST FT-45; TAMPER RESISTANT DATA LINK. [Washington] 1968. 31 p. illus. DLC

Describes the equipment and procedures for testing a tamper-resistant data link as part of a program whose purpose is the development of a practicable, unclassified, unattended sensor system. The field experiment involves tests to determine whether the sensor system would be subject to surreptitious cable penetrations, probing, or data alteration.

CONSEQUENCES OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT MEASURES

975
Adams, Earl W., and Michael H. Spiro. THE TIMING OF THE IMPACT OF GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES. Prepared for the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Washington, For sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1970. 155 p. illus. (U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Publication 56) DLC
"ACDA/E-157."

Studies "the mix of fiscal programs on the expenditure side of the budget which might be used to compensate for the reduction in aggregate demand accompanying a reduction in defense spending." Adams and Spiro assess the "lag-structures" of highway construction, oceanography, space, urban mass transit, and urban construction programs to determine whether these would be useful for short-term economic reconversion. The authors find that long delays in the effects of Government spending programs are primarily caused by the time required for legislative and administrative action. The lag between obligation of funds and economic impact is relatively insignificant and depends mainly on the availability of excess capacity in a given industry. They therefore recommend that only those programs approved and ready for funding be considered for short-term economic impact.

976
Christodoulou, Aris P. CONVERSION OF NUCLEAR FACILITIES FROM MILITARY TO CIVILIAN USES; A CASE STUDY IN HANFORD, WASHINGTON. New York, Praeger [1970] xiv, 101 p. (Conversion of industry from a military to civilian economy)
HC108.H29C47
Praeger special studies in U.S. economic and social development.
Includes bibliographical references.

Contents.--Introduction.--Historical background and organization of the plant.--Functions and capabilities of the present organization.--Anticipated future needs.--Plan for full employment of the Hanford area--short term.--Plan for partial industrial conversion of the Hanford area--intermediate and long term.--Plan for total industrial conversion of the Hanford area in case of general disarmament, without conversion plans.--Current status of Hanford segmentation and diversification program.--Conclusions and recommendations.

Examines the problem of converting the Hanford facility for the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons to civilian uses or finding alternative employment for its more than 9,000 employees. With sound planning, partial conversion could make an important contribution to the local civilian economy; without it, serious economic dislocations would result. The effects of total conversion as a result of general disarmament could be offset only by the influx of new industry or by the use of Government relief funds. These conclusions may be generalized to apply to other large defense facilities.

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977
ECONOMIC IMPACT OF MILITARY BASE CLOSINGS, by Darwin W. Daicoff [and others] Prepared for the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Lawrence, University of Kansas, 1970. 2 v.
DLC

"ACDA/E-90."

Contents.--v. 1. Adjustments by communities and workers: Introduction. Community impact and adjustment. Community adjustment--Salina, Kansas. DoD manpower impact and adjustment.--v. 2. Specific community impact studies of the discontinuance, reduction, or consolidation of defense activities: Impact of the Brookley Air Force Base closing on the economy of Mobile, Alabama. A case study of the phase-out of Schilling Air Force Base, Salina, Kansas. The local impact of reduction of base activity, Dow Air Force Base, Bangor, Maine. The closure pattern and its local impact: a case study of the New York Naval Shipyard, Brooklyn, New York. A case study of the phase-out of Olmsted Air Force Base, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. Economic effects of the announced closure of Amarillo Air Force Base, Amarillo, Texas. A case study of the phase-out of Larson Air Force Base, Moses Lake, Washington. Discontinued studies.

Assesses the economic and social effects of the November 18, 1964, Pentagon order terminating or reducing the activities of 80 military installations. The study undertakes both an overall assessment and a detailed analysis of the effects on nine communities where the impact apeared to be especially significant. The efforts of one of these nine communities, Salina, Kansas, to cope with the problems of readjustment through community action are subjected to still further investigation. The impact of these closings and reductions on Department of Defense personnel is analyzed separately. The study concludes that "the individuals and communities affected by the Announcement adjusted without calamitous economic or social consequences," although it is emphasized that readjustment occurred during a period of rapid economic expansion.

978
Kalkstein, Marvin. INTERNATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AND CONTROL FOR THE PEACEFUL APPLICATIONS OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES. Stockholm, Almqvist & Wiksell; New York, Humanities Press [1970] 39 p. (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Stockholm papers no. 4) JX1974.7.K16

Contents.--Introduction.--pt. 1. Prospects for applications of nuclear explosives: The appeal: possible peaceful uses. The pros and cons: economic and social considerations for the user. Remaining technical problems and the timetable for their solution.--pt. 2. Implications for arms control: The non-proliferation treaty. The partial test ban. A comprehensive test ban. Inhibitions on the use of nuclear weapons.--pt. 3. An international approach to policy questions.--pt. 4. International arrangements for conducting peaceful applications: Control measures. Financial alternatives. Organizational arrangements.--Conclusions.

Over the last few years, the question of peaceful applications of nuclear explosives has emerged as one of the major issues in arms control and disarmament negotiations. Although the civilian potential of nuclear explosives has not yet been demonstrated and, in many cases, their value may remain marginal, any benefits realized in the future that are not prejudicial to arms control measures should accrue to the whole international community and not just to the nuclear powers. Since the nonproliferation treaty bans the development of nuclear explosives and related technology by the non-nuclear-weapon states, several of them have expressed reservations about the treaty. In the interest of achieving meaningful arms control and disarmament agreements and in order to make the treatment of the nuclear and nonnuclear powers more equitable under the nonproliferation treaty, the major nuclear powers should relinquish their right to proceed unilaterally with programs to develop civilian uses for nuclear explosions until these programs are sanctioned by international agreement.

979
Lynch, John E. LOCAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AFTER MILITARY BASE CLOSURES. New York, Praeger [1970] xxiv, 350 p. (Conversion of industry from a military to civilian economy)
HC110.D4L94

Praeger special studies in U.S. economic and social development.
Bibliography: p. 331-350.

Studies the economic recovery efforts of individual communities affected by the closing of major military bases and the role played by the Office of Economic Adjustment in the recovery of these communities. Lynch maintains that there are no comprehensive Federal, state, or regional plans for dealing with the problems engendered by base closings. A statistical appendix lists the major military installations in the United States.

980
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Government Operations. Subcommittee on Executive Reorganization and Government Research. NATIONAL ECONOMIC CONVERSION COMMISSION; RESPONSES TO SUBCOMMITTEE QUESTIONNAIRE. Submitted pursuant to S. Res. 320, 91st Congress, on S. 1285, a Bill to establish a National Economic Conversion Commission, and for other purposes. Washington, For sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1970. 174 p.
DLC

At head of title: 91st Congress, 2d session. Committee print.

Responses of the executives of 69 major industries, the mayors of 5 major cities, and the leaders of 2 labor unions to a questionnaire on the subject of conversion from defense to nondefense spending. Sen. Abraham Ribicoff, Chairman of the Subcommittee, finds the responses reveal "that private industry is not interested in initiating any major attempts at meeting critical public needs" and that few industries have any plans to convert to civilian projects unless they would bring quick financial rewards. He urges strong Federal action to overcome the inertia of private enterprise.

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OTHER PROBLEMS AND MEASURES

981
ON 'IMPOSING' PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA [editorial] War/peace report, v. 10, Oct. 1970: 12-13. JX1901.W38, v. 10

A Middle East peace settlement should be imposed by the Great Powers through political and economic pressures, not military force. They should not force the Arabs and the Israelis to accept a peace plan but rather see to it that the belligerents are represented in a settlement, and, if possible, find some way for the Palestinians to communicate directly with the major powers. Peace must be imposed not only on the Middle East but also on South Vietnam. The United States should pave the way for an interim government to oversee the elections that would create a permanent government in Vietnam, by allowing the South Vietnamese to impose a "departure from power" on the present Vietnamese Government. If political stability could come to the Middle East, Southern Africa, and Southeast Asia, the great problems of disarmament, world order, and human rights would be able to command more of the attention they must be given.

982
Scheinman, Lawrence. PANDORA'S NUCLEAR BOX. International journal, v. 25, autumn 1970: 779-785. D839.I5, v. 25

The promise of peaceful nuclear energy in terms of abundant and cheap electrical power has been accepted throughout the world, including the developing countries, which regard the peaceful atom as a decisive factor in helping eliminate poverty and underdevelopment. But the evidence that exposes the radiation hazards and environmental pollution associated with peaceful nuclear power is compelling. Such critics of the power-reactor program as Sheldon Novick, Richard Curtis, and Elizabeth Hogan emphasize that nuclear power development is exceeding America's command of the technology and that the long-term consequence of continued commercial exploitation under present conditions are, at best, risky and, at worst, potentially calamitous. Solutions to the problem will be difficult at either the domestic or international level. On the domestic level nuclear policymaking has "tended to fall on the margin of traditional political processes" and has not varied much from country to country, largely because of its military origins. The pattern of nuclear politics is shaped by the structure of the nuclear policymaking field, which, in the United States, consists of two almost indistinguishable bodies, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and the congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE). These organizations have resisted all efforts to separate promotional and regulatory responsibilities in the area of nuclear technology or transfer weapons responsibilities to the defense establishment. However, changes in the composition of the AEC and the JCAE and the increased public concern over ecology augur a loosening up of the existing nuclear policymaking structure. On the international level the United States has been guilty of oversalesmanship by creating illusions regarding the almost boundless promise of peaceful nuclear energy applications. Although the problems engendered by the widespread acceptability of the desirability of peaceful nuclear energy will be difficult to resolve, the fact that agreement on a nonproliferation treaty has been achieved "should encourage us in the belief that the insidious side of the peaceful atom also can be dealt with effectively at the national and international levels." To this end, methods of regulating technology and of exerting social controls over technological development should be pursued. Capitulating to panic and abandoning peaceful nuclear reactor programs is not the answer.

983
SCIENTISTS AND SENATORS AGAINST ARMS RACE, by our Washington correspondent. Nature (London) v. 228, Oct. 31, 1970: 406-407. Q1.N2, v. 228

Reports on recent activities of the Council for a Livable World and the Federation of American Scientists, two organizations governed and supported largely by scientists and concerned with the arms race and a limited number of other issues of particular interest to scientists. Both groups have been active in supporting congressional candidates opposed to ABM deployment. The Council now hopes to turn its attention to the strategic arms limitation talks and the Geneva discussions on chemical and biological weapons; the Federation plans to extend its activities to include matters of professional concern to scientists.

984
Seaborg, Glenn T. AN INTERNATIONAL CHALLENGE. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 26, Nov. 1970: 5-7. TK9145.A84, v. 26

"Adapted from an address . . . to the IAEA Symposium on Environmental Aspects of Nuclear Power Stations, meeting at the United Nations on August 10, 1970."

Argues that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) should become "a central repository of data on the amounts and concentrations of radioactivity released in connection with civilian uses." Seaborg proposes that this repository be extended to cover an international network, treating the environment as a global problem. He notes that the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission has played an important role in bringing to the public's attention the impact of nuclear power on the environment, and he discusses the legislative progress in pollution control during the past year.

985
Summy, Ralph V. MILITANCY AND THE AUSTRALIAN PEACE MOVEMENT, 1960-67. Politics, v. 5, Nov. 1970: 148-162. JQ3995.A1P64, v. 5

Reviews the major developments in the Australian peace movement from 1960 to 1967. Summy discerns three broad periods of change: the years immediately following the 1959 Melbourne Congress, which were distinguished by left-wing trade union support and moderate tactics; the period prior to the November 1966 elections, when an influx of middle class youth, students, and women coincided with increasingly militant tactics; and the denouement

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of the peace movement following the resounding defeat of peace candidates in the elections, with an older faction retreating into quiescence and a youthful group becoming even more militant.

986

Tigar, Michael E. JUDICIAL POWER, THE "POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE," AND FOREIGN RELATIONS. U.C.L.A. law review, v. 17, June 1970: 1135-1179.
LL

Examines the constitutional, statutory, and decisional limitations on the power and duty of Federal courts to hear and decide cases. Tigar reviews the historical development of the so-called political question doctrine, arguing that this doctrine is in fact no more than a cluster of disparate legal rules too vague to serve as a basis for not deciding a case. He finds that the courts have the power and in some cases--notably the war in Indochina--the duty to decide on the constitutionality of U.S. military involvements abroad. "The notion that the President and his advisors have a broad, sweeping and arbitrary power to enforce the laws, or conduct military affairs, in any way they see fit is gaining increasing currency," and this notion is reinforced by the too-great reluctance of the judiciary to challenge executive power.

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U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1971 O - 419-653

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